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Summary 
The objectives of this study are to compile the prevalent institutions in capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago, and to analyze how these institutions emerge, persist, and change 
from time to time. The study included a reconstruction and redefinition of components of 
institutions through a synthesis that incorporate contemporary theories of institutions and the 
prevalent social and cultural aspects within the community. According to the “rationales” 
behind particular prescriptions and the types of punishments applying to non-compliance 
conducts with such prescriptions, institutions managing capture fisheries in this region are, in 
general, classified into conventions, norms, and rules. Each component of institutions stem 
from a different strand of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures. Conventions, 
norms, and rules did not emerge within the same time. Each of these components, in fact, 
has emerged following the development of capture fisheries in this region. Conventions, 
norms, and rules function as institutions that manage interaction between fishermen and 
redistribute marine and coastal resources under the ever-changing circumstances. 
The development of capture fisheries in this region is the result of a sequence of social, 
economic, and political upheavals that took place at local, national, and international levels. 
Literature study suggests that capture fisheries in this region have been an integrated part of 
the global markets since the beginning of the 17th century; that was when Spermonde 
Archipelago became an important port that supported trading activities between the locals 
and merchants from Java, Sumatra, Malacca, India, the Arab world, and China. This was 
partly owed to its strategic geographical position and partly owed to the economic and 
political “contestation” between the Portuguese, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and 
then the Dutch and the British empire. A substantial migration throughout small islands in this 
region occurred within this period. 
The independence of Indonesia in the 20th century (i.e. in 1945) is a milestone in the 
development of capture fisheries in Indonesia. Government started to put more efforts to 
enhance the contribution of this sector for the economic development of the young republic. 
However, literatures do not suggest any significant change taking place in Spermonde 
Archipelago where six thousands artisanal fishermen were still fishing with hook and line, gill 
nets, traps, and bamboo-fences. A national policy that significantly impacted capture 
fisheries in this region was officially launched by Soeharto in 1969. Through Indonesia’s first 
“blue revolution”, government introduced and encouraged, among others, mechanization and 
adoption of large-scale fishing equipments. Foreign investment and exports were expected to 
fuel a more vibrant economic growth. The existence of boat engines has enabled fishermen 
to exploit fishing grounds in remote areas of the region. It also facilitated innovation in fishing 
methods. Before the 1960s, some innovations and adoption of fishing methods were initiated 
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by the locals. The blue revolution has significantly increased the contribution of marine 
capture fisheries to the whole national production within the period of 1967 to 1974. 
Integration of capture fisheries in this region into international markets is revitalized by the 
establishing of Makassar Industrial Park, in which dozens of companies deal with exporting 
various marine commodities. The beginning of live reef fish capture fisheries in 1990 has 
strengthened such relationship. The latter also introduced and promoted a wider adoption of 
new fishing method (i.e. cyanide fishing) throughout this region. The practice of what is now 
known as illegal fishing practices by fishermen in this region is not actually a new thing. 
Fishermen have adopted and practiced blast fishing since the end of World War II. Through 
out this development, some occurring events have been important milestones in institutional 
dynamics. 
Institutional dynamics in capture fisheries have occurred in terms of temporal, spatial, 
situational attributes, and with regard to functions and structures. New institutions have 
emerged while the previous existing institutions have changed following a sequence of 
events. Institutions have become spatially dynamic since fishing grounds in this region are 
managed under three different institutional arrangements (i.e. open access zones, island-
restricted zones, and private-restricted zones) within which different rules and norms are 
applied. At the same time, interactions between fishermen using different fishing methods 
are managed by a set of norms that inform fishermen what appropriate actions or decisions 
must be taken in particular situations. This indicates the situational aspect of institutional 
dynamics that subject particular situations to particular institutions. Functions and structures 
of institutions in capture fisheries have undergone alteration. The emergence of rules and 
norms for managing interactions between fishermen and distribution of marine and coastal 
resources implies that fishermen and islanders need institutions capable of protecting 
interests and private ownership and at the same time promoting values. The emergence of 
norms and rules represent the existence of normative and regulative structures that 
complement the cognitive structure as represented by conventions. 
Routines, culture, and social structures have been observed to be the carriers of institutions. 
The latter has been observed to be an important carrier of institutions at patron-client group 
level. To explain how institutions emerge, persist, and change, it matters to conceive 
institutions either as cognitive, normative, or regulative structures. Repetitive interaction 
between resources’ users is a medium from which new institutions emerge. As an illustration, 
in Spermonde Archipelago, norms have been observed to emerge from interaction framed by 
values provided by the existing normative structure. On the other hand, when resource users 
see regulative structure as crucial for protecting their interest, they craft rules by adding 
costly external sanctioning mechanisms to ensure compliance with institutions. 
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Fishermen and islanders’ shared-views on natural resources and life, spatial discontinuity of 
fishing grounds, interventions from institutional agents, diversity of fishing methods, and 
policy dynamics at regional and/or national levels are five drivers I identified to be 
responsible for the emergence, persistence, and change of institutions in capture fisheries. 
With regard to their roles in determining the trajectories of institutional dynamics, those five 
factors can be categorized into two forces; the conservative force that maintains institutional 
“status-quo” and the innovative force that facilitates institutional innovations. Institutional 
dynamics in this region occurred in environments shaped by the interaction between these 
two forces. Those five drivers stems from different social, cultural, ecological, and political 
aspects occurring at local, regional, and global scales. The significance of each of this aspect 
in influencing the trajectory of institutional dynamics may therefore change at any time. The 
change will revise the interaction between conservative and innovative forces and, hence, 
may facilitate the emergence, persistence, and change of institutions under the new 
circumstances. This, I would argue, is what makes capture fisheries in this region difficult to 
manage or regulate, as is indicated by the prevalent illegal fishing practices.  
It has appeared that capture fisheries in this region are not amenable to conventional 
management strategies. Capture fisheries in this region exhibit characteristics that only a 
complex adaptive system has. The existing of different types of agents (i.e. resources’ users) 
capable of learning and responding to feedbacks, the emergent phenomena, and gradual 
shifts between orders and disorders are characteristics that make conventional top-down 
management strategy ineffective. Conceiving capture fisheries as a complex adaptive 
system brings consequences for both future research and management policy. 
Understanding the “simple behavior” of each component (for example individuals or groups 
of fishermen) when responding to the particular (changing) situations and how particular 
phenomena emerge from interaction between them shall provide new perspectives for 
integrated coastal zone management with important methodological implications.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. The Day When They Returned Home…. 
Thursday, 20th of August 2009, 9 AM was for me one unusual morning on Bonetambung 
Island, an island in Spermonde Archipelago. Men, women and children, crowded the 
beach that day. Unlike men and children, all women were holding plastic-made baskets 
and some amount of money in their hands. Some men and women made smaller 
crowds. They sat on the sand or on piles of excavated reef. They talked and laughed to 
each other. Children were impatiently moving forward, walking through the dense sea 
grass bed without any fear of getting stung by the poisonous sea urchins that 
overpopulated the coast. They were racing with each other as dozens of boats were 
approaching the drop-off area. That was the time when many more people came out to 
the beach that morning. Some of them, somehow, were all looked nervous, but yet 
happy.  
“I hope they get a lot of fish this time […] but the most important thing for me is my 
husband has returned home safely,” said a woman. 
That part of beach was not as quite as it was yesterday or two days before. It was a 
special morning, a small “festival”, when husbands, brothers, and sons returned home 
after three or four days of fishing expedition. Those fishermen were expected to bring 
along with them live groupers for cash money and by-catch fish mainly for their 
subsistence.  
Of the approaching boats, one belonged to Us. His jolloro’, a kind of traditional boat (see 
Figure 1), was crewed by three other fishermen who Us called his children (anak-anak). 
There was a pile of quadrangular fish traps at the rear part of the boat. Those traps 
(were made woven bamboo reeds) are locally called bu or bubu. Us and his crews 
carried at least 10 traps. For a moment, I thought the expedition was their another 
unfortunate fishing expedition—a typical frustrating story often told by fishermen. But it 
was not what I supposed. On that morning, they brought home with them 11 live 
groupers, and dozens of groupers, snappers, and various kinds of reef fish that, 
according to Us, unfortunately did not survive decompression or died as they were 
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severely injured and/or exhausted when desperately trying to escape from the traps (IV1, 
Us, July 2009). 
After taking sometime to rest, Us asked two of his crew to deliver the fish to Makassar, 
to a man he called bos—a live grouper collector who happened to be his patron recently. 
He also reminded them to buy rice, sugar, coffee, cigarettes, and to refill two gallons with 
fresh water in the city. In the city of Makassar, those groupers were going to be sorted 
and priced accordingly. Us was aware that the price he would get for each of their catch 
was lower than the normal price he could possibly get from other collectors or exporters 
in Makassar. However, he would not sell their catch to those other collectors. Us had to 
send their catch to his current patron because he, at the time, was indebted to his patron 
by some amount of money he would not mention. However, the price was still better 
than the price local patrons (on Bonetambung Island) could offer. According to Us, those 
patrons took too much benefit, especially from fishermen who were indebted to them. Us 
could not see any future for his family from such business relationship with those local 
patrons. This was the reason why he finally decided to quit his previous patron-client 
group. He paid all his debt to his previous patron with the money he borrowed from his 
current bos. He believed that business relationship with his current bos in Makassar 
offered greater opportunities for him to be a successful fisherman. To be successful, 
according to him, was to have a lot of money by which he could build a nice house, buy 
motorcycles, nice couch, and the most important was to go to Mecca for pilgrim. At that 
moment, he still strived to be a successful fisherman, he said. However, he was aware 
of the direct benefit he gained from his decision. He mentioned that his social status was 
“upgraded” accordingly. Once, he was just an ordinary fisherman, but at that moment, he 
was a free fisherman inferior to nobody on the island, including to any patrons on 
Bonetambung Island. 
Us and his crew would earn not less than IDR 850,000 (US$ 80) only from all live 
groupers they caught. From that amount, Us would subtract IDR 450,000 as total fishing 
expenses for the three days fishing expedition. Of the remaining amount, Us actually 
deserved a two-third, and left the rest for the three of his crew. But he would not do that, 
and never did that. His fishing crews were also his relatives to whom he should show 
some mercy. Therefore, he would simply divide the rest of the money into five parts 
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 IV = in-depth interview. 
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through which each of them would earn IDR 90,000.  The “fifth person” was the boat and 
the engine. Because they belonged to Us, he actually received two parts (IDR 180,000). 
There was still another source of income; dozens of dead groupers, snappers, and 
various kinds of reef fish. Us’s wife managed this kind of catch. She sold the dead 
groupers and snappers to specific collectors who would process the fish into dried-salted 
fish. She sold some portion of the other dead reef fish, and gave some of them to their 
relatives, friends, and neighbors. She sold all of those fish except few less valuable fish 
for her own family.  
Figure 1. Groups of trap fishermen returned to Bonetambung Island after days of fishing 
migration (sawakung) 
 
Not all groups of trap fishermen returned home with enough catch to at least cover their 
fishing expenses. That morning, some of them had to accept the results of their 
unfortunate fishing expeditions. Although God’s given destiny often appears as 
justification for their unfortunate amount of catch, yet they also believe that the 
increasing number of fishermen and the diversity of fishing methods are responsible for 
their lack of catch. Ngs (70 years old), an elder of Bonetambung Island once said; 
“There was more fish in the past. [In the past,] we installed fish nets just for a while, 
but [we] could not finish [detaching the fish from the nets] […] until the night. [In 
contrast] at present, even [if we fish until] the sun is high (until the midday) we will 
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get at maximum three or four baskets [of fish]. [The reasons for this are] there are 
now many fishermen and various fishing methods […] There were no purse-seine 
nets, modern boat liftnets, and cyanide fishing in the past….” (IV, Ngs, August 2009). 
Ngs believed that the application of large-scale fishing methods reduces the chance of 
small-scale fishermen (i.e. handline and trap fishermen) for getting more fish. However, 
like all islanders, Ngs believed that fish can never be exhausted. They only decrease in 
abundance.  
“People have been exploiting this area (fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding 
of Bonetambung Islands) for [many] years and still there are fish here. The fish are 
still there, but [their abundance] has declined,” he further explained. 
To cope with decreasing abundance of fish, fishermen of Bonetambung Island need to 
find new potential fishing grounds. It means they have to fish at locations far from their 
own island. They often fish in the neighboring regency (i.e. Pangkajene Kepulauan 
Regency). It is not an easy task considering the amount of money required and the 
climatic constraints. A strategy taken to cope with an intensified fishing competition is by 
protecting fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding of their island by non-physical 
fences; institutions. On other occasion, Ngs said; 
“[The reason] why I forbid pa’bius (cyanide fishermen) and pa’baracung (blast 
fishermen) to enter [and harvest] my area is because this [area] is where we rely our 
life (livelihoods) on.” (IV, Ngs, November 2008). 
The last boat arrived at around 11.30 AM, and then everybody went home. At night, the 
small island seemed to have its party. There were more men around, and that night was 
louder than the other nights before. It appeared that, it did not really matter how much 
fish they could catch in the days before. The fishermen seemed to be grateful enough to 
be eventually at home again, safely, since anything could happen to them during the 
fishing expedition. They were all aware that relying their livelihoods on capture fisheries 
is not easy. However, it did not stop them from celebrating the day and from looking 
forward for a better tomorrow. They all believe that they will have their fortune as long as 
God still lets them breathe. 
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Trap fishermen on Bonetambung Island took two to three days off from their routine. 
During the break, they prepared the next fishing expeditions, which would require fuel 
and other supplies. Some of them would have to ask their patrons for more money since 
the previous fishing expeditions ended unsuccessfully. The money was not only for 
preparing the upcoming fishing expeditions, but also for providing food for their families. 
1.2. Ordinary Fishermen with “Ordinary Problems”: Apolitical Explanations for 
Overexploitation in Spermonde Archipelago 
Us and the other trap fishermen were just ordinary fishermen. The story of their life is 
similar to the story of other fishermen living on small islands in Spermonde Archipelago; 
among others, they have to continuously cope with climatic constraints, declining 
abundance of fish and potential fishing grounds, and increasing competition between 
different fishing methods. The soil on the island appears to lack of nutrition and fresh 
water especially during the dry southeast monsoon. Therefore, marine and coastal 
resources appear to be the only exploitable resources from which more than 12 
thousands islanders on the six researched islands (BPS, 2009a) make their livelihoods.  
Assuming an increasing number of fishermen, the distribution of resources in the 
continuously degrading marine and coastal water in Spermonde Archipelago (see 
Jompa, et al., 2006) is among the main issues fishermen have to cope with. “Race for 
fish” among fishermen is unavoidable. Lsr (39 years old), a cyanide fisherman of 
Barrang Caddi Island whose point of view represents the view of all fishermen I have 
managed to interview, said that; 
“I do not care whether the groupers I caught were small. I take them instead of letting 
those baby fish back to the sea and waiting for them to grow bigger. There is no 
guarantee that I will be able to catch them again. [If I did not catch them], other 
fishermen would.” (IV, Lsr, November 2008). 
“Race for fish” is among the factors that triggered a conflict in the early 2000s. Conflict 
surfaced as groups of fishermen of several islands felt that their livelihoods were 
threatened by other groups of fishermen from other islands who exploited fishing 
grounds surrounding their islands. After the conflict, fishermen and islanders in 
Spermonde Archipelago put more serious efforts to define the distribution of marine and 
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coastal resources, and to manage interactions between fishermen using different fishing 
methods. 
Fishermen’s exploitative behavior in the archipelago is argued to be caused by the lack 
of awareness and the prevailing poverty among fishermen in this region which eventually 
result in degradation of coral reef caused by illegal fishing practices (COREMAP, 2009; 
Destructive Fishing Watch Indonesia, 2003). Spermonde Archipelago is known as a “hot 
spot” of illegal fishing practices in the eastern part of Indonesia (Destructive Fishing 
Watch Indonesia, 2003).2 Although Destructive Fishing Watch Indonesia (2003) has 
implicitly indicated the role of cross-scale interaction as one of the drivers for illegal 
fishing practices and exploitative behavior in this region (i.e. high markets’ demands for 
fisheries commodities), management interventions for marine and costal resources 
management in this region have been implemented by assuming problems are local in 
origin. Problems and project’s objective, as Li (2007) suggested, were made doable by 
rendering them technical through set of objectives and indicators for success (see for 
example Pusat Penelitian Terumbu Karang Universitas Hasanuddin, 2006) that, I would 
argue, did not really touch the roots of the problems; a continuing marginalization of 
fishing community in this region and its cyclical relation between exarcebating poverty 
and vulnerabiltiy to food security and the prevailing exploitative fishing behavior (see 
Sub-chapter 3.3). 
In this apolitical view, poverty and lack of awareness appear to be problems stem from 
local biophysical, social, cultural, and economic aspects.3 Competing human greediness, 
which is a non-technological problem that drives exploitative behavior and eventually 
causes natural resources degradation, can only be managed through privatization (either 
by state or private firms) of natural resources (Hardin, 1968).4 Base on this apolitical 
view, strategies for marine and coastal resources management in the archipelago were 
focused on creating alternative income generation for fishing households, increasing 
community awareness, crafting the so-called village regulation, and establishing 
community-based no-take zones (see COREMAP, 2009; Pusat Penelitian Terumbu 
                                                 
2
 In 2003, Destructive Fishing Watch Indonesia (2003) reported that nearly 70 per cent fishermen in this region 
involved in destructive fishing practices. 
3
 The enduring poverty among fishing communities in Indonesia is accused to be caused by fishermen’s 
dependency on seasonal variability and their mental model. The latter is a stereotyping which is often accused to 
fishermen, that fishermen  the lazy who will do nothing during harsh weather conditions (see Dahuri, 2000). 
4
 However, attention must be paid to the fact that Hardin built his model on over-simplified assumptions for which 
his model is susceptible to criticisms (see Ostrom, 2005 and Robbins, 2006).  
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Karang Universitas Hasanuddin, 2006). Limitations (such as village-regulations and no-
take zones) are often made on behalf of the greater sake of the community itself 
(Peluso, 1993). Healthy coral reef is associated with increasing abundance of fish and, 
hence, increasing fishermen’s income (see COREMAP, 2009), eventhough there is 
neither scientific nor empirical fact about how MPAs will contribute to the fisheries 
outside the reserved areas (Bostford, et al., 2006). 
Marine protected areas are mainly conceptualized from ecological and biological 
perspectives, with little or no inquiry into their social dimensions (Christie, et al., 2003; 
Mascia, 2003; Richardson, et al., 2006). The same MPAs can mean different things to 
different people, where the stated goals are not always those that govern the actual 
operation of MPAs (Jentoft, et al., 2011). Conflicts often occur between de jure and de 
facto institutions, where the latter are often more legitimate when it comes to the actual 
operation (Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). Both types of institutions often struggle in the 
flux of long historical conflict (Peluso, 1993). 
Marine protected areas configure a standardized top-down environmental management 
policy (Abakerli, 2001). State’s centralized control over natural resources 
disenfranchises local people whose long history of resources utilization contributes in 
shaping what is perceived (by the state) as wild or pristine habitat (Peluso, 1993; 
Robbins, 2006). This, in return, has increased local resistance5 against state’s policies in 
managing natural resources (Peluso, 1992; 1993). Such resistance ranges from back 
talk, rebellion (Robbins, 2006), and ignorance to state’s law. In Java, state control in 
forestry management has led to a continuing “illegal logging” and conflicts between state 
and the locals who historically own and manage forest for generations (Peluso, 1992). In 
Mabini Philippine, the management of marine protected areas benefited only tourism 
sectors, while local fishermen were marginalized from access and control of MPAs 
(Oracion, et al., 2005). 
Not least than Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management Program (COREMAP)6 is 
implemented to establish and to institutionalize an appropriate coral reef management 
                                                 
5
 Local community in Lamalera, Lembata Island, East Nusa Tenggara Province rejects conservation project 
through the establishment of Marine National Park Laut Sawu, through which they are given special zone for whale 
hunting (Khayam, 2009) . Local community (who traditionally hunts whale for generations) worries that this scheme 
will limit the practice of traditional whale hunting and, hence, threat their livelihoods (Patnistik, 2009). 
6
 COREMAP is initiated by the government of Indonesia with supports from World Bank, Asia Development Bank, 
and Australia Agency for International Development. In Indonesia, this program has been started since September 
1998 (see COREMAP, 2009). 
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systems at the local level (COREMAP, 2009). Nevertheless, fishermen in the 
archipelago keep practicing illegal fishing practices despite their awareness of the 
illegality of their action according to state law (Chozin, 2008). This illegal fishing 
practices are suspected to be responsible for the decreasing diversity and coverage of 
coral reef in this region within the last decade (see Jompa, et al., 2006).  
Lack of community participation is argued to be among factors responsible for ineffective 
implementation of community-based no-take zones in Spermonde Archipelago (see 
Baitoningsih, 2009). Nevertheless, I argue that, such management strategy (i.e. 
community-based no-take zones) has never been intended to fit the scale of complexity 
they suppose to manage (see Folke, et al., 2007).  Current strategy for marine and 
coastal management in Spermonde Archipelago neglects the impacts of trading and 
state policy on capture fisheries as practiced by fishermen. Bentley (1999) explicitly 
exposes the correlation between overexploitation of live reef fish in this region and the 
emergence and growth of international markets of live reef food fish (LRFF) in Hong 
Kong. Halim (2002) finds the diffusion of cyanide fishing practice among fishermen in 
this region is channelled through the spreading of live reef fish business in this 
archipelago. Knittweis and Wolff (2010) critisize the high trade quotas set by the local 
authority of South Sulawesi for ornamental coral species in the absence of sufficient 
data on the impacts of current collection practices on the sustainability of the species. 
This policy might be among factors responsible for overexploitation of ornamental coral 
species in the archipelago. 
1.3. Institutions and Institutions in Fisheries 
Prasetiamartati (2006) concludes that the inability of fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago to overcome the collective choice dilemma has resulted in degradation and 
overexploitation of marine and coastal resources. Theoretically, collective action 
dilemma can be solved either through a top-down facilitation supported by government 
agencies or through a bottom-up process initiated by resource users (i.e. by crafting de 
facto rules) (Schlager and Ostrom, 1999).7 Schafer and Reis (2008) argue that top-down 
management is usually inoperative because fishermen are not involved in decision 
making process and, consequently, fishermen are reluctant to comply with whatever 
                                                 
7
 Temporary fishermen camp on Jambudwip Island in Bengal Bay and fishing community in Newfoundland are two 
successful cases, where collective choice dilemma is solved through de facto rules. The latter fishing community 
formed a committee for defining fishing zones and authorized-users (Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). 
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imposed institutions. However, bottom-up process requires conditions in which 
communication between resources users is feasible and not costly in terms of time and 
money. These are two requirements that is difficult (if not impossible) to be fulfilled in 
Spermonde Archipelago where geographical isolation between islands and climatic 
constraints appears to be factors that impede communication between resources users 
living on different islands.  
In her thesis, Prasetiamartati did not consider the fact that in Spermonde Archipelago, 
fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding of certain islands are exploited not only by 
fishermen who live on those islands, but also by fishermen from other islands in this 
region. Spatial discontinuity of the geographical distribution of fishing grounds between 
islands and temporal and spatial occurrences of lucrative target fish have motivated 
fishermen to move to fishing grounds situated in the surrounding of other islands. This 
has created dependency between islanders of different islands in the archipelago. 
Accordingly, collective choice dilemma can not be solved at island-level, but must be 
solved at a higher level; that is at Spermonde Archipelago level. Hence, village 
regulations which are crafted on particular islands for managing coral reef in the coastal 
waters of those particular islands (see Pusat Penelitian Terumbu Karang Universitas 
Hasanuddin, 2006) are not an appropriate measure for solving collective choice action 
with exists at a higher level. 
Capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago could not exist without institutions, since 
fishermen would simply not know how to behave (Jentoft, 2004); that is to respond to 
actions taken by other fishermen or to different institutional arrangements managing 
different coastal waters in this region. In this case, institutions help reducing the 
unpredictability of situations (Jost, 2005). Institutions, for example, determine who may 
or may not harvest marine and coastal resources (Jentoft, 2004), and/or who does or 
does not have the right to define present and future of institutional arrangements 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1999).8  
The way marine and coastal resources are distributed to different types of users (i.e. 
fishermen using different fishing methods) is among institutional issues in natural 
                                                 
8
 Schlager and Ostrom (1999) develop a scheme to define property right regimes according to the bundles of rights 
(i.e. operational level and collective choice rights) through which fishermen are categorized into authorized users, 
proprietors, claimants, and owners. Each type of property right regime determines whether a fisherman has only 
the right to access and harvest marine and coastal resources, or even to change the present and/or to define 
future operational-level rules, for example to define future authorized fishing methods and fishing locations. 
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resources management (Agrawal, 2001). Institutions determine which groups of users 
have the right to do what, when, under which conditions, and how each group gains 
whatever rights have (Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). Institutions also inform resource 
users about the appropriate actions or obligations they should or must take in particular 
situations (Ostrom, 2005; Vatn, 2005). 
Institution itself, however, is a broad concept. Scientists of different or the same 
academic disciplines define its meaning and concepts differently (Jentoft, 2004; Vatn, 
2005). Concepts and definitions of institution cover a diverse set of constructs (Vatn, 
2005). Some definitions of institutions made by several experts tend to be omnibus. 
Ostrom (2005), for example, generally defines institutions as prescriptions to organize all 
repetitive and structured interactions, while sociologists like Berger and Luckmann 
(1991) see institutions as patterned typifications of interaction in daily life situations. In 
his effort to compile all contemporary views about institutions, Scott (1995) suggests that 
institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structure and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior.9  
While there are several works focusing on the exploitative behavior performed by 
fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago and its impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems 
and future socio-economic of islanders (see Chozin, 2008; Pet-Soede, et al., 2000; 
Prasetiamartati, 2007), there is considerably less efforts being made so far to 
understand the prevailing capture fisheries and marine and costal resources 
management as the outcomes of the ongoing institutional dynamics at the community 
level. Glaser et al. (2010a) highligted some emergent rules which they argued to be an 
unused potential for formal MPAs development. 
Research on institutions and natural resources management tends to regard institutions 
as independent variables (precursor variables) which are a necessary condition for 
determining the outcome variables (dependent variables) (Scott, 1995), for example the 
communities and the sustainable practices of natural resources management at 
community level (see Quinn, et al., 2007). But, such an approach (i.e. variance theories) 
cannot tell us about the logic, motives, and preferences underlying the existence of 
                                                 
9
 Those different definitions are developed from different assumptions of which matters are basic to individuals and 
to social relationship (Jentoft, 2004). The discrepancy reflects experts theoretical positions regarding, for example, 
the logic of choosing, and characteristic of the motives behind choosing, and how those motives and preferences 
develop overtime (Vatn, 2005). 
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institutions and, especially, it cannot inform us how particular sets of institutions “come 
into play” to govern natural resources management.  
Process theories come as an alternative to the variance theories above. According to 
process theories, events in the past influence present decisions on natural resources 
management (Scott, 1995) and can create a path-dependence (David, 2005) through 
which particular outcomes experience lock-in10 (Cowan and Hultén, 1996; David, 1985). 
The prevailing illegal fishing practices in Spermonde Archipelago and resistance of 
capture fisheries to management interventions made by government and development 
agencies appear to experience such a process. Arthur (1996) and David (1985) suggest 
that lock-in potentially creates a single-standard and prevents the creation of better 
innovations and alternative options. 
Process theories potentially explain how logic, motives, and preferences of the fishing 
community in Spermonde Archipelago evolve over time under changing circumstances 
(i.e. changing institutional context), and how such changes influence their decisions on 
how to govern capture fisheries and the distribution of marine and coastal resources in 
this region (i.e. through institutions). Institutional context, within which institutions 
developed, changes over time. The changing context is significant for the process of 
institutional dynamics. Change in forest policy in Netherland, for example, lies in the 
process in which discources and actors shaping forestry sectors in the country have 
significantly changed (Veenman, et al., 2009). However, the process through which 
institutions emerge and, especially, persist remains an understudied phenomenon 
(Scott, 1995).  
In a different context, research on the emergence and persistence of institutios relies on 
computer modeling (see Bowles and Naidu, 2008; Jost, 2005) by creating simplified 
environments that rarely exist in reality. Process approach in game theory which relies 
on rational choice theory (as a formal framework used in computer modelling) in itself 
does not suffice to capture the whole institutional dynamics. Emplyoing such a model in 
a process approach could only capture the regulative structures of institutions (Scott, 
1995: 66). Neoclassical economists, who develop game theory, assume that actors try to 
optimize preferred outcomes in markets that offer them full and timely information about 
a complete range of behavioral options (Turner and Powers, 1998). Assuming an 
                                                 
10
 See Sub-chapter 5.2.2. 
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isolated, context-free, and strategic environment as well as  optimal behavior, 
conventional game theory is unable to explain the patterned, contextual, and sometimes 
suboptimal behavior (Bednar and Page, 2004), for example an institutionalized act of 
reciprocal generosity performed by many communities living in resources-scarce area 
(see Moran, 1982), including the fishing community in Spermonde Archipelago. Culture 
influences the performance of institutions and, hence, a theory of institutions must come 
to grip with culture (Bednar and Page, 2004), which is among carriers of institutions 
(Scott, 1995). 
1.4. Managing Capture Fisheries: Managing the Unmanageable? 
Marine and coastal ecosystems have common-pool resources characterized by two 
prominent characteristics. Firstly, it is costly to set up physical and institutional fences to 
exclude potential users, and secondly, individual benefits are accrued at a cost to all 
potential resource users (Robbins, 2006; Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). Common-pool 
resources are complex ecological systems with a certain degree of difficulty to divide 
them into individual units of ownership and, hence, are traditionally managed as 
common property (Robbins, 2006) by a set of locally-crafted institutions (Robbins, 2006; 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1999).  
Experiences from capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago (for example 
Baitoningsih, 2009; Bentley, 1999; Chozin, 2008; Prasetiamartati, 2007) have suggested 
that managing marine and coastal resources in this region, in which human is an 
integrated part, is not an easy task. Community-level marine and coastal resources 
management in this region, especially capture fisheries, have undergone development 
for centuries (see Poelinggoman, 2002). Historical evidences suggest that capture 
fisheries in this region have evolved, partly, from the ability of various interacting actors 
(i.e. foreign and local traders and fishermen) to actively respond to feedbacks provided 
by global, regional, and local socio-economic and political upheavals (see Amal, 2007; 
Knapp and Sutherland, 2004; Mattulada, 1994; Poelinggoman, 2002).11 This process of 
development, I would argue, nominates capture fisheries in this region as a complex 
adaptive system, which is characterized by the existence of collection of agents (actors 
or stakeholders) capable of learning and changing their strategies with respect to the 
changing circumstances (Folke, et al., 2007; Lansing, 2006; Waldrop, 1992), whose 
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 Discussed with details under Chapter 3. 
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interaction generates emergence phenomena (Johnson, 2009). Such a system is not 
amenable to conventional command-and-control resource management approach 
(Mahon, et al., 2008; Plummer and Armitage, 2007). A bottom-up organization raises 
more chances for flexibility and plenty of room for creativity to respond to the changing 
environments (Waldrop, 1992).  
“Since it's effectively impossible to cover every conceivable situation, top-down 
systems are forever running into combinations of events they don't know how to 
handle. They tend to be touchy and fragile, and they all too often grind to a halt in a 
dither of indecision (Waldrop, 1992: 279).”  
Marine and coastal water in Spermonde Archipelago, in which capture fisheries 
prevailed, has long been the object of development policy interventions through which, 
among others, fishing technologies, institutions, money, and knowledge and information 
were deployed. One of development policy interventions that contributed to such a 
transformation is the first Indonesia’s blue revolution policy launched in 1968. Among the 
observable impacts of such interventions, within the last decades capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago has been transformed from small-scale fisheries12 into more 
commercial large-scale fisheries “devoted” to regional and international markets.  
However, capture fisheries in this region appear to be unmanageable because particular 
issues are poorly handled through the prevailing management strategy and the scale of 
governance (Kooiman, 2008). The prevailing illegal fishing practice (as partly the results 
of continuous supports from “prosecution insurance networks”13 and integration into 
international markets) is so far among poorly handled issues. This issue, in general, is 
stemming from the ability of actors involving in capture fisheries to actively respond to 
challenges and opportunities provided by the ever-changing circumstances (for example 
the emerging market and the corrupt bureaucracy and law enforcement systems), to 
learn from experience (feedback) and alter their behavior or strategy accordingly. This, I 
would argue, makes capture fisheries in this region complex and unpredictable. Such 
conditions create interesting yet challenging environments for researching the 
emergence, persistence, and change of institutions in complex, dynamic, natural, and 
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 Pomeroy et al. (2009) define small scale fisheries as non-mechanized near shore fisheries. 
13
 Prosecution insurance networks consist of individuals working at governmental bodies (for example, the police), 
whose role is to protect fishermen conducting illegal fishing practices from legal prosecution  (see Radjawali, 
accepted). 
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realistic settings. An understanding to the process of these understudied phenomena is 
what this thesis is striving to contribute to. 
1.5. Research Questions and Objectives 
The analysis of thesis is guided by three research questions: What institutions exist in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries? How do they manage capture fisheries? 
How do institutions emerge, persist, and change over time? Because institution is a 
broad concept consisting of different cognitive, normative and regulative structures 
managing different aspects of everyday life, and often exist at various levels (Scott, 
1995), some limitations, therefore, are made. With regard to the first research question, 
this research documents and analyzes institutions managing capture fisheries that 
prevail at the community level. It focuses on institutions that manage interaction between 
resource users, especially between fishermen using different fishing methods. It also 
concerns with institutions that manage the distribution of marine and coastal resources 
to different resource users.  
At the group level, differentiation of roles, rights, and obligations among actors within 
patron-client groups are analyzed. Documentation and analysis of institutions at this 
level are carried out with respect to the fact that the changing social structures within 
patron-client relationships have served as carrier of institutions dynamics at this level. 
However, such dynamics are found to influence fishermen’s behavior and decisions on 
harvesting activities, which eventually influence institutional dynamics at the community 
level. Analysis at group level (i.e. patron-client groups) highlights only institutions that 
influence the prevalent capture fisheries at the community level. Hence, the objectives of 
this research are; 
1. To compile the prevalent institutions managing capture fisheries, and 
2. To analyze the process through which institutions emerge, persist, and change 
over time. 
The analysis of institutional dynamics provided by this thesis is contextual to capture 
fisheries prevailing in Spermonde Archipelago, within a particular range of time. The 
analysis seriously takes into account the prevalent social structure and culture within the 
community of South Sulawesi, and the influences of ecological, economic, and political 
dynamics occurring at local and regional scales. Therefore, the approach (i.e. process 
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theories) employed in the analysis and the perspective that guide such process (i.e. 
complex adaptive system) enables this thesis to move further from a context-limited 
case study to a synthesis of a middle-range theory that explain how institutions emerge, 
persist, and change from time to time as the outcomes of interactions of smart and 
independent actors under the changing circumstances. 
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
I divide this thesis into six chapters (including this chapter). Chapter two compiles 
research methodology. Chapter three explores and analyzes the conditions in which 
institutional dynamics in capture fisheries in this region occur. This chapter mainly 
departs from two assumptions. Firstly, the current state of capture fisheries at the local 
level is influenced by stored-feedbacks from the historical events (including past 
development programs). Secondly, they are also shaped by the prevalent challenges 
and opportunities that influence fishermen’s current social and economic expectations 
from capture fisheries. While the past events create initial conditions for the present 
situations, the current challenges, opportunities, and expectations actively steer capture 
fisheries into new directions. Among the new directions is, for example, fishermen’s 
decision on what kinds of resources to be exploited at which fishing grounds, by which 
fishing methods, and for what purposes (i.e. subsistence or cash). 
Chapter three reconstructs the development of capture fisheries with documentations of 
social and ecological changes as recorded in fishermen’s memory.  In general, it 
examines the transformation of capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago and how 
such a transformation supports commercial large-scale fisheries, reinvents “new modes” 
of fisheries production (i.e. new structure of patron-client relationships), influences 
institutional dynamics, marginalizes fishermen, exacerbates their vulnerability to food 
scarcity and, hence, motivates more exploitative fishing behavior. 
Chapter four begins with “coping” with the contesting definitions of institutions. Through 
a synthesis between theories of institutions and empirical findings, this section 
constructs the components of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. 
This chapter then proceeds with descriptions and explanations of how capture fisheries 
have transformed from a “simple domain” consisting of only general conventions and 
cognitive structures into a more “complex domain” consisting of different sets of norms 
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and rules that represent normative and regulative structures of institutions. Each set of 
institutions are discussed in a sequence that fits time dimension. This chapter also 
analyzes the institutional contexts in which institutional dynamics occur. 
Under chapter five, I discuss the driving factors for institutional dynamics, and examine 
the roles of each of these factors with regard to their contribution to institutional 
innovations or to the conservation of institutional status-quo, with highlights on some 
important carriers of institutions through which particular institutions emerged over time. 
Of the driving factors, I discuss one factor (i.e. the diversity of fishing methods) with 
some details. Therefore, I also discuss factors influencing individuals and collective 
preferences in particular fishing methods and factors sustaining such preferences. A 
sustained preference for particular fishing methods, through which lock-in phenomena of 
fishing methods occur, is rather extensively discussed by comparing the practices of live 
reef fish capture fisheries on two islands. At the end, I analyze how path-dependence, as 
represented by lock-in of fishing methods, might influence institutional dynamics in this 
region.  
Finally, under the concluding chapter six, I conclude four aspects in which institutional 
dynamics occur. The processes through which institutions emerge, persist, and change 
are discussed under this chapter. Finally, this chapter highlights some conclusions and 
implications of employing process approach and the concept of complex adaptive 
system to future research and management policy, especially with regard to the 
prevalent or upcoming implementations of the Coral Triangle Initiative and Indonesia’s 
second blue revolution in Spermonde Archipelago. 
1.7. Terminologies 
Some administrative terms, such as municipality (kotamadya), regency (kabupaten), 
sub-district (kecamatan), kelurahan, and village (desa) are used in some parts of this 
thesis. Municipality and regency are lower administrative units under a higher 
administrative unit called province (provinsi). Municipality and regency are therefore 
units of the same level. The former is governed by a major (walikota), while the later is 
governed by a regent (bupati). Within each unit, there are lower administrative units 
called kecamatan (sub-district) which is consisting of several units of kelurahan. 
Kelurahan covers several lower administrative units called desa (village).  
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Terminologies in Bahasa Indonesia and local languages (Bugis or Makassar) were typed 
italic. In order to cope with grammatical issue in referring to singular or plural objects in 
local languages, an additional “s” or “es” (no italic) was added to the last character of 
each word to refer to plural objects. For example, the word sawis refers to plural objects 
as the opposite of sawi which refer to a singular object. Terminologies in Bahasa 
Indonesia and local languages of Bugis and Makassar are explained by footnotes. All 
names of informants in this text are kept anonymous for the reason of privacy and 
security of my research informants. 
   
Chapter 2. Methodology 
Ostrom (2005) and Bowles and Naidu (2008) conclude that institutions are the outcomes 
of repetitive interaction between actors. Accordingly, I assume that local institutions 
managing capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago, among others, are the outcomes 
of repetitive interaction between fishermen themselves and between fishermen and 
other actors in capture fisheries (for example, patrons and exporters) in this region. 
Nevertheless, routine, in this case the repetitive interaction between fishermen is not the 
only carriers of institution. Culture and social structure are other carriers of institutions 
(Scott, 1995) which may also be significant for institutional dynamics in the Archipelago. 
Institutions operating in particular situation may contain either cognitive, normative, or 
regulative structures or all of them and such structures matter in explaining how 
institutions emerge and persist over time (Scott, 1995). To anticipate the occurrence of 
various carriers and structures of the prevalent institutions in managing capture fisheries 
at the local level, I employed qualitative methods which imply an inductive approach 
(Creswell, 2009; Kalof, et al., 2008; Stainback and Stainback, 1988) in which iterative 
communication between observation and theories provides opportunities for extraction of 
new (middle-range) theories (Fox, 2008) to appropriately understand institutional 
dynamics in capture fisheries. Another reason for employing these methods is that 
qualitative methods are appropriate for exploring topics that are difficult, risky or even 
impossible to be explored by other means (Kalof, et al., 2008), such as illegal fishing 
practices in this region. Through qualitative methods, researchers have more chance to 
reach fishermen and gain their trust in order to collect valid data about the “sensitive” 
topic. 
My research consists of two main phases; fieldwork preparation and main research 
activity (fieldworks) through which most data were collected and analyzed. My main 
research activity or fieldworks employed the following strategies; 
1. Exploration and compilation of institutions managing two aspects in capture 
fisheries (i.e. fishermen’s interaction and the distribution of marine and coastal 
resources). Institutions were formulated into meaningful institutional statements 
base on a synthesis between relevant theories of institutions (for example the 
grammar of institutions) and empirical findings, and 
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2. Exploration of relevant milestones (especially historical events) that occur at 
local, regional and national levels, and examination of their contributions in 
altering the contexts in which institutions managing capture fisheries emerge, 
persist, and change over time.  
2.1. Fieldwork Preparation 
In the case researchers lack information about their research areas, a preparation of 
fieldworks is crucial for getting sufficient and reliable background information before 
conducting the main research activity. Hence, I allocated one and a half months of 
fieldwork preparation (from November to the middle of December 2007) for both 
methodological and practical reasons. 
It is very crucial to test and elaborate the a priori guidelines for interview constructed 
from second-hand information (for example scientific papers, reports, and theses). I 
found this stage was useful for updating and cross-checking information collected from 
researchers, NGOs workers, and government agencies (i.e. Agency for Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries) whose relevant works have previously taken place in this region. It is very 
crucial to get first-hand impressions about the prevalent ecological, social, economics, 
cultural, and local political settings in Spermonde Archipelago to elaborate guidelines for 
interview (see Annex 1).  
For practical reason, it is important to, at the very beginning, identify and select research 
locations and research informants, especially considering the geographical distribution of 
potential research locations in Spermonde Archipelago. Potential research locations and 
informants refer to small islands and individuals who could provide relevant data for 
answering my research questions and achieving my research objectives.  
Coping with practical matters in conducting social research is often the case that 
determines the success of the research. Practical matters may have methodological 
consequences that potentially put the validity and reliability of the collected data in 
questions. This is especially true when working with hierarchical community in South 
Sulawesi (Pelras, 2006) such as fishing community in Spermonde Archipelago. 
Selecting counterparts (with whom I and my research assistants stayed during 
fieldworks) on each island determined access to informants. Staying at the house of 
individuals from particular groups (for example particular patron-client group) increased 
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the accessibility to fishermen of those groups, but at the same time might reduce the 
opportunities to access information from other groups (see Pelras, 2000: 397). Hence, 
on each island, I identified “neutral” gatekeepers14 who could provide access to all 
potential informants.  
Fieldwork preparation took place on three most populated islands in this region; the 
islands of Kodingareng Lompo, Barrang Lompo, and Barrang Caddi (BPS, 2009a). Two 
research excursions were carried out on each island. Three to four days were spent in 
each excursion. Guidelines for interview (consisting of list of topics and guiding 
questions) were tested by interviewing wide range of informants (i.e. fishermen, elders, 
patrons, religious leaders, and government’s representatives on small islands). After 
several sessions of in-depth interview, some inapplicable questions and terms/concepts 
were modified or removed from the list. As an illustration, the term “hukum adat” 
(customary law) confused most informants, especially fishermen and housewives. The 
results of and experience from the previous in-depth interviews were used as basis to 
elaborate more appropriate and applicable guidelines for interview.15  
2.2. Selecting Research Locations 
Considering the relatively huge coverage area of Spermonde Archipelago, I selected six 
small islands (i.e. the islands of Barrang Lompo, Barrang Caddi, Kodingareng Lompo, 
Bonetambung, Langkai and Lanyukang) situated within the coastal water of Makassar 
Municipality (see Figure 2) as research locations. A criterion used for the selection of 
research locations is more than 90 per cent of the total number of households on each 
island depend on capture fisheries, such as fishing and trading of marine organisms. 
The selection of research locations according to the criterion above was carried out by 
assessing secondary data provided by the Center for Statistic or Badan Pusat Statistik 
(BPS), and by considering information collected through participant observations and in-
depth interviews with islanders. Accordingly, three islands did not meet the criterion and 
therefore were excluded (i.e. the islands of Samalona, Lae-lae, and Kayangan). One 
                                                 
14
 Those who can provide access to potential informants (Bedford and Burgess, 2001; Henn, et al., 2006). 
15
 Elaboration of guidelines for interview was practically an iterative process. Questions and especially strategies 
for delivering them were elaborated as fieldworks proceeded, especially as I became more aware of the prevalent 
social and cultural contexts, and gained more data from which I improved my understanding of the research 
problems. 
 21 
eligible small island, Lumu-lumu Island, was excluded for safety or health reason.16 
However, during fieldworks on Lanyukang Island (in July 2009), I interviewed some 
fishermen from Lumu-lumu island. Some sessions of individual and group interviews 
were carried out on the islands of Badi, Karanrang, and Saugi.17 The data collected on 
these three islands (which are situated in different administrative area) have been useful 
for data validation. 
Figure 2. Map of Spermonde Archipelago 
 
 
Note: The six research locations (black circles) and three islands visited for triangulation (red circles) (Map: 
Courtesy of Sebastian Ferse). 
2.3. Selecting Informants 
Informants consist of two categories; those who directly participate in harvesting activity 
(i.e. fishermen), and those who does not. The latter category consists of patrons, several 
                                                 
16
 Lumu-lumu Island has a considerably high prevalence of Leprosy—a contagious chronic skin disease caused by 
bacteria. For health security, I excluded Lumu-lumu Island from my research location. 
17
 Interviews on these islands were carried out during the bilateral Indonesian-German SPICE II (Science for the 
Protection of Indonesian Coastal Marine Ecosystems) research excursions organized by Leibniz-Center for Marine 
Tropical Ecology (ZMT) Bremen and The Center for Coral Reef Research (CCRR) Hasanuddin University. 
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prominent figures within community (elders and religious leaders, and gallarangs18), 
housewives, and government representatives (in Makassar and on small islands). On 
small islands, there are key informants; knowledgeable individuals who are able to 
provide articulate information about their community, for example historical data and the 
nuances of everyday life (Fetterman, 2008). In this study, key informants provided 
information on the prevalent local social, economic, cultural, and political settings which 
frame capture fisheries and influence institutional dynamics in this region. Many 
informants in this research involved in illegal fishing practices (i.e. blast and cyanide 
fishing). 
On each island, fishermen were selected by snowball procedure (see Stainback and 
Stainback, 1988). They were selected from several patron-client groups. The types of 
fishing methods they used at the time fieldworks was carried out was put into main 
consideration through the selection process. However, it does not imply the existence of 
a strict categorization or typology of fishermen according to the types of fishing methods. 
During fieldworks, I have found that it was impossible to categorize fishermen into 
distinct groups according to fishing methods because most of them periodically changed 
their fishing methods to adjust to the availability of particular target fish or to market 
demands (FGD19, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO20, Barrang Lompo Island, 
April 2008).21 The relatively unchanged attributes of fishermen were their status or 
position in their patron-client groups. Therefore, it was appropriate to categorize and 
select them (as informants) according to these attributes (see Table 1). However, I still 
found that it was relevant and important to interview fishermen with regard to fishing 
methods they were using, in order to collect information regarding the interaction 
between fishermen who fish using different fishing methods.  
A patron might have clients on other islands. Dealing with such issue, snowball is a 
useful procedure to select potential informants, especially in situation where the total 
number of potential informants in each interviewed patron-client group is relatively 
unknown (Morgan, 2008b; Thompson and Collins, 2002). To cope with potential bias in 
applying snowball sampling (that is eligible informants who are not linked to the previous 
                                                 
18
 Gallarangs were the rulers of the islands. They are believed to be the descendants of the royal families of the 
late Kingdom of Gowa.  
19
 FGD = focus group discussion. 
20
 PO = participant observation. 
21
 See Sub-chapter 3.2.4.2. 
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informants will be excluded in the study), I paid serious attention to include more or all 
patron-client groups on each island in interviews. The latter strategy (i.e. including all 
patron-clients groups) is feasible on smaller island with lower number of patron-client 
groups, for example on Bonetambung Island.  
Table 1. Total number and composition of research informants 
Categories of Informants 
By Patron-client By Social Roles 
No 
Research 
locations/Origins of 
Informants Pd Pl Sw1 Sw2 Pb El Im Gl Sy Hw Ot Gr 
Total 
1 Barrang Caddi 6 9 12 2 1 1 1   1 1 1 35 
2 Barrang Lompo 5 10 6   1 1 1  3  2 29 
3 Bonetambung 6 3 3 2  2    7 1 1 25 
4 Kodingareng Lompo 3 4 11 1 1       1 21 
5 Langkai 2 10 4 1 1     3 1  22 
6 Lanyukang 1            1 
7 Lumu-lumu  2 3          5 
8 Kondongbali  1 4          5 
9 Takalar   2          2 
10 Galesong   2          2 
11 Badi 1 2 2  1    2  1  9 
12 Karanrang 3           3 6 
13 Saugi 2     1     1 1 5 
14 Makassar            5 5 
  
Total  29 41 49 6 4 5 2 1 2 14 5 14 172 
Note: Interviews with informants from Lumu-lumu Island and Takalar took place on Lanyukang Island, while 
interviews with informants from Kondongbali Island and Galesong took place on Langkai Island. Pd: 
Punggawa Darat, Pl: Punggawa Laut, Sw1: Fishing Sawi, Sw2: Non-fishing Sawi, Pb: Pa’balolang, El: 
Elders, Im: Imam, Gl: Gallarang, Sy: Sayyed, Hw: Housewives, Ot: Others (merchant, midwife, etc), Go: 
Government’s representatives on Islands. For a detailed development of the patron-client terminology, see 
chapter 3.2.2. 
Resource exploitation at fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding of small islands 
and at near shores was observed to be dominated by fishermen who fished using the 
following fishing methods; handline fishing, modern boat liftnets, and blast fishing (PO, 
Barrang Lompo Island, November 2007; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, December 2007; 
PO, Kodingareng Lompo Island, December 2007). On the other hand, interaction 
between cyanide and blast, handline, and trap fishermen has been found to be a major 
issue in capture fisheries in this region (IV, Zmh, November 2008). Hence, the five 
fishing methods (i.e. handline fishing, modern boat liftnets, trap fishing, cyanide fishing, 
and blast fishing) were taken into consideration in studying institutional dynamics, 
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especially institutions managing interaction between fishermen who fish using different 
fishing methods. 
2.4. Period of Fieldworks 
Fieldworks and fieldwork preparation were carried out in four phases between November 
2007 and May 2010. The first phase, or fieldwork preparation, was carried out from 
November to the middle of December 2007. The second phase was carried out for nine 
months from March to November 2008. A total of six months of fieldworks was carried 
out between March 2009 and February 2010. The last phase of fieldworks was carried 
out only for one month (May 2010), and was mainly allocated for data validation. Total 
days spent for fieldworks in each location varied. The following table describes the 
number of excursion taken and total days spent only for data collection on each island 
during main research activity (i.e. fieldworks). 
Table 2. Research excursions conducted and days spent for data collection 
 
No Islands Number of Excursion (times) 
Days Spent for Data 
Collection 
1 Barrang Caddi 7 56 
2 Barrang Lompo 6 40 
3 Kodingareng Lompo 4 22 
4 Bonetambung 3 18 
5 Langkai 1 8 
6 Lanyukang 1 1 
7 Badi 3 10 
8 Karanrang 2 6 
9 Saugi 1 3 
 Total 28 164 
 
Under Table 2, it can be observed that more days were spent for data collection on 
islands visited during earlier phase of fieldworks. Number of days spent for data 
collection on other islands tended to decrease as fieldworks continued, especially on the 
islands of Langkai and Lanyukang. Data saturation was the main reason for this 
shortened duration of fieldworks. On Lanyukang Island, there were only ten households 
with one individual acted as patrons for a few numbers of fishermen living on that island 
(PO, Lanyukang Island, July 2009). Therefore, I spent only one day for interviewing 
seven informants. 
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I took a few days pause between excursions. By doing this, I had more time to analyze 
my data and made improvements for the following fieldworks (for example, elaboration 
of guidelines for interview and development of methods to collect and/or to validate 
particular data). I have also found that taking pauses between excursions was useful for 
extracting concepts and theories, and for evaluating the validity of my data. 
2.5. Methods for Data Collection 
This research employed common data collection methods used in qualitative research, 
such as in-depth interview and participant observation (Creswell, 2009; Henn, et al., 
2006; Stainback and Stainback, 1988), supported by data collection methods used in 
participatory approach (Chambers, 1999) such as historical timeline (see Berardi and 
Donnelly, 1999; Kalibo and Medley, 2007; Kelkar, et al., 2008), focus group discussion 
(see Burgess, 1996; Goss and Leinbach, 1996), resources mapping (see Chambers, 
1994; Ericson, 2006; Kalibo and Medley, 2007), and seasonal calendar (see Bett, et al., 
2009; Catley, et al., 2002; Ericson, 2006). As fieldworks proceeded, I developed 
guidelines for interview for mapping patron-client networks to reveal how patron-client 
relationships connect small islands in this region. In the following paragraphs, I explain 
each method with details; the procedures, tools and equipments used to carry out these 
methods, how these methods were actually implemented on the field, and how to cope 
with inherent technical or methodological constraints with regard to their 
implementations.  
2.5.1. Semi-structured Individual and Group In-depth Interviews 
In semi-structured interview, researchers and informants are free to develop or elaborate 
the discussed topics compiled in the a priori created guidelines for interview that consist 
open questions and/or some guiding topics (Ayres, 2008). In my fieldworks, semi-
structured in-depth interviews were carried out as individual and group in-depth 
interviews.22 During fieldworks, individual and group interviews complemented each 
other. Semi-structured group interview has been useful for validating data collected by 
individual in-depth interview, while on the other hand, individual in-depth interview has 
been useful for deepening information surfaced from group in-depth interview. 
                                                 
22
 I distinguish group in-depth interview from focus group discussion. In this research, group in-depth interview 
refers to in-depth interviews carried by involving more than two informants at the same time. On the other hand, 
focus group discussion refers to discussion carried out to explore specific issues or topics that emerge or surface 
as data collection progress.  
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Notes were taken during interviews. In order not to lose any data, notes were rewritten 
right after each interview session finished and, whenever possible, I used digital voice 
recorder to record interviews. This device was useful when interviewing groups of 
informants who often brought different information at relatively the same time. To avoid 
an obtrusive effect to the validity of the data, the device was only used when informants 
felt “comfortable” with the use of recording devices. I did not use digital voice recorder if 
informants refused their information to be recorded or if the use of this device might 
obstruct the process of interviews.  
Conducting both individual and group in-depth interviews on the six islands was not 
without constraint. Fishermen had relatively limited time. Most of their time was allocated 
for fishing (approximately nine hours a day). Interview could only be carried out for a 
limited time after they returned from fishing. In such a situation, informants were already 
tired. Hence, I had to arrange several sessions of interview for each informant. In 
average, each interview ranged from 30 minutes to one hour.  
The most conducive time for in-depth and group interviews was on Friday, when all 
fishermen did not go fishing. However, in many cases, it was difficult to make 
appointments at an exact time and place, especially for group in-depth interviews. It has 
appeared to me that, on most occasions, fishermen could not fulfill their appointments. If 
they do not go fishing, they are busy with fixing or preparing their fishing equipments. To 
my experience in organizing group in-depth interviews, most informants came at least 20 
minutes after the agreed time, and one or two fishermen did not come at all. Arranging 
in-depth interviews with fishermen in my research area was considerably more difficult 
than arranging in-depth interview at different settings (see Bibby, 2006; de Kort, et al., 
2007; Koenigsmann, et al., 2006).  
Group in-depth interviews were carried out after several sessions of individual in-depth 
interview. Through this strategy, I was able to collect necessary background information 
for elaborating group in-depth interviews. This made individual in-depth interview and 
group in-depth interview a useful combination (Morgan, 2008a). During my fieldworks, I 
found that group in-depth interview was an effective method for discussing “sensitive 
case”, such as illegal fishing practices and some issues regarding the structure of 
patron-client relationships (i.e. distribution of risks and benefits between patrons and 
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clients). Bringing fishermen all together within a larger group encouraged them to 
become more “out-spoken” about particular issue (Morgan, 2008a). 
2.5.2. Focus Group Discussion 
Instead of going deeper by interviewing individual informant, focus group discussion 
requires several informants who share similar background to engage in discussion about 
topics or issues researchers wish to understand (Morgan, 2008a; b). During fieldworks, I 
managed to carry out five sessions of focus group discussion on four islands. 
Table 3. Selected topics and number of participants in focus group discussions 
 
No. Topic Location Number of 
Participants 
Notes 
1. Seasonality, spatial and 
temporal variability of resources, 
and shifting of and preference 
for fishing methods. Rights over 
fishing grounds 
Barrang Caddi 
Island 
9 Topics were 
discussed within one 
session. Participants 
were those who at that 
time employed 
cyanide fishing. 
2. The structure of patron-client 
relationships 
Barrang Lompo 
Island 
5 Participants were 
those who at that time 
employed handline 
fishing. They were 
indebted to their 
patrons. 
3. Preference for fishing methods Kodingareng 
Lompo Island 
7 Participants were 
those who at that time 
employed blast 
fishing. 
4. Households’ coping strategy with 
food insecurity 
Bonetambung 
Island 
5 Participants were 
housewives 
5. Seasonality, spatial and 
temporal variability of resources, 
and shifting of and preference 
for fishing methods 
Bonetambung 
Island 
5 Participants were 
those who at that time 
employed trap fishing 
Focus group discussions were carried out through a more structured discussion where 
researcher defined the topics (see Morgan, 2008a). Nevertheless, I let opportunity for 
new topics or issues to be discussed by asking participants about relevant issues that 
might be still missing and needed to be discussed. A similar topic (i.e. preference for 
fishing methods) was discussed on three islands (i.e. the islands of Barrang Caddi, 
Kodingareng Lompo, and Bonetambung) to make a comparison and to find its pattern. 
Other topics were exclusively discussed on particular islands, and were selected by 
considering their relevance to informants on those islands. For example, I selected rights 
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over fishing ground as one of the topics to be discussed on Barrang Caddi Island 
because the majority of fishermen on this island, who most of the time employ cyanide 
fishing, have experienced exclusion from potential fishing grounds in Spermonde 
Archipelago. Picking particularly relevant topic to be discussed in different locations is 
the best strategy to make sure that the members of the focus group discussion share the 
same interest and therefore may discuss with enthusiasm (Bedford and Burgess, 2001).  
Homogeneity of group composition in a focus group discussion is the ideal design 
(Bedford and Burgess, 2001; Burgess, 1996; Morgan, 2008b). This is necessary for 
creating situations in which informants feel comfortable to express their thoughts and 
feelings about the research topics or issues (Morgan, 2008a), or to provide common 
ground for the discussion (Bedford and Burgess, 2001). Homogeneity of participants is 
however an ideal concept that its practicality can always be questioned, especially in my 
research location. To my experience, whenever it was possible to create a group of 
participants of relatively the same age, those participants were different from each 
others in terms of ethnicity, fishing methods or, in such hierarchical community, power 
relation (see Glaser, et al., 2010b). Therefore, in practice, it was nearly impossible to 
create groups of homogenous participants who shared exactly the same background as 
suggested by experts. This, in turn, raises the question on the definition of homogeneity 
in selecting potential group members (see Kneale, 2001).  
Within the hierarchical fishing community in Spermonde Archipelago, there are always 
factors responsible for unequal relationships between participants of focus group 
discussions. Some of those factors are age, marital status, ethnicity, wealth, and fishing 
experience (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009).  A decision on which aspects of identity is shared among participants is 
the key solution for establishing a group (Kneale, 2001). Hence, the shared-identity of 
participants in each focus group discussion was selected in consideration to the topic to 
be discussed. For example, in focus group discussion held on Barrang Lompo Island, 
the shared-identity of all participants was they were all, at the time, handline fishermen 
who were still indebted to their patrons. 
Although Bedford and Burgess (2001) suggest that focus group discussion is an efficient 
method for collecting data, designing and preparing it might be a challenging process 
through which researchers’ sensitivity to the prevalent social and cultural settings are 
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required. In comparison to other methods, focus group discussion was the most 
challenging method with regard to the prevailing culture and social structure on the 
islands and the availability of potential participants.23 Nevertheless, focus group 
discussion was a useful method for validating data collected by other methods, 
especially by individual in-depth interview and participant observation. In individual and 
group in-depth interviews, I might ask for further clarification but never challenged what 
my informants have informed. Meanwhile, in focus group discussion, one’s opinions 
might be questioned and/or confronted by researchers or by other participants (Bedford 
and Burgess, 2001).  
Figure 3. A session of focus group discussion on Barrang Caddi Island 
 
The dialogic character of this method gives researchers access to multiple and 
transpersonal understanding that characterize social behavior (Goss and Leinbach, 
1996) through which the why and how of occurring discrepancy between individuals are 
explained. I also found focus group discussion was capable of exploring complex social, 
political, economic, cultural and ecological dimensions of particular issues. 
Without moderation, particular informants tended to dominate the discussion while 
others tended to be silent (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, 
                                                 
23
 I eventually failed to manage one session of focus group discussion on Barrang Caddi Island in which several 
patrons were invited. The main reason was, as a young man, it was not polite to invite older and respected 
persons to come to a place for a discussion. Each them has politely or implicitly rejected my invitation (PO, 
Barrang Lompo Island, November 2008). 
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Bonetambung Island, August 2009). Moderation, through which participation of all 
participants is encouraged, is an aspect that distinguishes focus group discussion from 
group in-depth interview (Kneale, 2001). In moderating focus group discussion, I was 
helped by research assistants for coping with “dominant participants” and for highlighting 
crucial information. The latter role was crucial especially when participants were 
competing in providing information, for example, when participants were arguing about 
particular issues. 
2.5.3. Participant Observation 
In my open participant observation (that is when informants are aware of my role as 
researcher), I maintained a moderate type of participation (see Stainback and Stainback, 
1988), that is to participate only in some doable activities. I regularly switched my role 
from participant-as-observer to observer-as-participant, and to complete observer (see 
Creswell, 2009; McKechnie, 2008; Stainback and Stainback, 1988). Through this 
strategy, I have been able to “measure” the influence of my presence to the 
trustworthiness of the data collected. In other words, I could observe their level of 
acceptance to me as an outsider or as a researcher. Hence, I managed to decide to 
which informants and in which activities I could employ this method.  
Activities in which I participated are different from island to island. On Barrang Caddi 
Island, for example, I helped cyanide fishermen preparing their fishing equipments (i.e. 
painting boats and loading logistics onto their boats). To directly engage in fishing 
activity was not possible due to the limited capacity of their boats. I observed activities at 
two fish landing sites, where live reef fish were sorted and treated before being 
transported to Makassar. Meanwhile, on Langkai Island, I joined handline fishermen and 
helped a group of fishermen setting up a fish aggregation device. Whenever possible, 
unstructured interviews complemented this method (McKechnie, 2008). In order to avoid 
or to minimize obtrusive behavior, data were memorized and were transcribed into 
fieldnotes only after activities finished. In accordance to that, very limited pictures were 
taken during participant observations. 
There are several challenges in employing this method. McKechnie (2008) documents 
two challenges which are relevant to the settings of my research locations. With regard 
to the practice of illegal fishing methods, it was crucial to establish credibility among and 
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gain trust from blast and cyanide fishermen and their patrons. Inherent personal 
characteristics of researchers (for example sex, age and ethnicity) matter in this case. 
Further, McKechnie argues that this method is challenging when employed to study 
large groups or population like those in Spermonde Archipelago. This is why, whenever 
employed as main data collection method, participant observation is mostly employed to 
research small or relatively reachable population (see Bhorade, et al., 2009; Conrad, 
1988; French, et al., 1972; Oeye, et al., 2007). 
There are some methodological debates around the use of participant observation as 
data collection method. Critiques relate to the consideration of participant observations 
as ‘unscientific’, the deconstruction of the insider/outsider dualism, and the ethical 
dilemmas surrounding field relationships between researchers and informants (Walsh, et 
al., 2009). The debates usually stem from the widespread practice through which 
participant observation is contrasted with other positivist techniques (Black, 1983). 
Nevertheless, participant observation contributes to the inclusion of the voices of those 
who are being marginalized in public debates (Schostak, et al., 2010) by understanding 
social facts from the perspective of subject’s own frame of reference (Black, 1983). 
Despite the methodological problems associated to participant observation, I have found 
that this method suited situations where researchers do not have a lot of knowledge 
about settings of situation (for example what are significant variables and how they 
relate to each other), or in conditions where phenomena of interest are not readily 
available to public view (Kurz, 1983; McKechnie, 2008). During fieldworks, participant 
observation has appeared as a crucial complementary method to in-depth interview, 
through which I was able to compare what informants said and what they actually did 
(McKechnie, 2008).  
2.5.4. Mapping of Patron-client Networks 
This method was designed to capture spatial aspect of patron-client groups that forms 
networks of small islands and group dynamics. I developed this data collection method 
during fieldworks as I found that spatial aspects of patron-client networks and group 
dynamics influenced capture fisheries and marine and coastal resources exploitation in 
this region. For this method, I purposively selected one to three patrons operating live 
reef fish capture fisheries on the islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung. They were 
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patrons with the highest number of fishermen. A list of open questions was asked to 
each informant (see Annex 2). 
2.5.5. Seasonal Calendar and Resource Mapping 
Seasonality (i.e. the cycle of monsoon) has been observed as an important factor 
influencing socio-economic on small islands in Spermonde Archipelago. Seasonality 
relates to the occurrence of particular target fish and to the accessibility to particular 
fishing grounds in this region. Hence, seasonality influences fishermen’s decisions about 
resources they want to harvest, fishing grounds they will exploit, and about fishing 
methods they want to employ. Through seasonal calendar, I documented inherent 
constraints and opportunities of monsoons, and explored fishermen’s strategies to cope 
with them.  
This data collection method requires flipcharts, board markers, and a map. Fishermen 
were first asked to mention the prevalent monsoons within a year, and to define the 
duration of each monsoon according to their knowledge. They were asked to discuss 
some physical characteristics of each monsoon, such as the frequency and intensity of 
precipitation, intensity of wind, and height of wave. Influence of such characteristics on 
fishing activity and the coping strategies were discussed. Inherent opportunities in each 
monsoon, for example the occurrence of target fish and the possibility to perform fishing 
migration, were explored. During the discussions, fishermen were asked to make free 
lists of what they thought were important. Challenges and opportunities were ranked, for 
example, the occurrence of target fish was ranked as very abundant, abundant, 
moderate, and scarce. Average time spent for daily fishing activity in each season was 
asked. 
2.5.6. Historical Timeline 
Historical timeline aims at reconstruction of the development of capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago. This method was designed to gather relevant historical events 
or milestones that can explain the emergence, persistence, and change of institutions in 
this region (see Schensul, 2008). Historical data collected during fieldworks cover local 
events occurring at community’s level, regional, national, and international levels. Such 
data (i.e. historical events) were collected not only from key informants, but also from the 
literature.  
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Despite the “standardized” data collection methods in participatory approach (see 
Chambers, 1994; 1999), their application depends on and must fit to local settings. 
During data collection by historical timeline, I often started with key informants’ personal 
memories of their own life and related such information to the development of capture 
fisheries on their own islands and in Spermonde Archipelago in general. I have found it 
as an effective strategy rather than asking key informants to recall their memories 
regarding events considered important by researchers themselves. Data from key 
informants were then triangulated with relevant social, economic, and political events 
occurring at regional, national, and international levels, mostly, through literature study. 
Key informants were interviewed individually. I provided flipcharts, post-it-notes, and 
board markers and digital voice recorder to record the data. A line was drawn on a 
flipchart, and relevant historical events were written on post-it-notes (one event on each 
post-it-note) as key informants proceeded with their stories. Key informants were then 
asked about the exact year of each event, which was found to be the most challenging 
task for informants. Most key informants experienced difficulties to recall the exact year 
of past events. In order to help them recall their memories, I created time periods such 
as before 1945, between 1945 and 1968, and between 1969 and 1998, and since 1998 
to the present. This clustering follows major political events occurring in Indonesia; 
before independence, Indonesia under Soekarno’s era, Indonesia under Soeharto’s era, 
and the era of reformation, respectively. Empirically, it was easier for key informants to 
recall their memories when the occurrence of certain events was compared to the 
occurrence of some regional and national events. I also found it helpful to relate certain 
events to their personal and/or families’ life cycles, for example the birth, death, or 
marriage of individuals related to them. By applying this strategy, key informants were 
able to “position” each event at an approximate or even exact time (i.e. year) on the 
timeline.  
Key informants sometimes provided background information (e.g. political events or 
decisions taken at national level) behind the occurrence of particular local events, by 
which the approximate or exact year of those events could be traced in literature. After 
all events were labeled with exact or approximate year, they were put sequentially on a 
timeline. Key informants were then asked again to check the sequence of those events. 
By using post-it-notes, it was very easy for key informants to rearrange the sequence of 
each event according to what they considered the right arrangement. 
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Table 4. List of key informants by research location 
 
No Initial of 
Informants 
Age 
(years) 
Name of Island 
1 Jrm 55 Barrang Lompo 
2 Dhm 60 Barrang Lompo 
3 Ndr 40 Barrang Lompo 
4 Rtb 66 Langkai 
5 Rfg 57 Langkai 
6 Ngs 70 Bonetambung 
7 Uns 80 Bonetambung 
8 Pml 40 Bonetambung 
9 Alj 50 Lanyukang 
10 Nma 63 Barrang Caddi 
11 Hls 80 Barrang Caddi 
12 Zmh 40 Barrang Caddi 
2.5.7. Literature Study 
Literature study was carried out to collect secondary data. It was found to be mainly 
crucial for supporting data collected through historical timeline. Other than journals, 
books, and legal documents (i.e. act, government’s regulation, and regional regulation), I 
also collected relevant historical data from some old archives available at ANRI (Arsip 
Nasional Republik Indonesia/National Archives of Republic of Indonesia) Jakarta and 
Makassar.24 Data in fisheries production and trading were collected from documents 
available at Dinas Perikanan dan Kelautan Kota Makassar (Makassar Agency for Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries), Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Makassar (The Center for Statistic, 
Makassar), and Departemen Perdagangan dan Industri Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan 
(Department of Trade and Industry South Sulawesi Province). 
2.6. Data analysis 
Data in this study consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data consist of textual 
data (i.e. transcripts of interview and fieldnotes), graphs (i.e. photographs, sketches), 
and both text and graphs (i.e. tables, charts, and illustrations). Transcripts of interviews 
are also textual representation of audio data collected through individual and group in-
depth interviews and focus group discussion by using digital voice recorder. Fieldnotes 
compile transcripts of interviews and textual data collected through participant 
observation, including a compilation of descriptive elements that in-depth interview 
                                                 
24
 I would like to especially thank Sebastian Ferse for collecting and translating archives written in Dutch. 
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cannot capture (for example settings of situation during interview, researchers’ 
impression, assumptions, and reflections), events, and details of informants (Brodsky, 
2008).  
Fieldnotes consist of three parts; background information (i.e. name and age of 
informants, time and location of interviews, and settings of situations25), data, and 
memo. The latter compiles assumptions, reflections, impressions, conceptual or 
theoretical ideas constructed from the data, and some emerging questions. This is very 
important to keep the three parts separated in fieldnotes in order to avoid bias. Data 
were exported to ATLAS.ti (version 5.2.18) by which data were analyzed. At textual 
level, ATLAS.ti was very useful for coding.  
The practice of qualitative analysis requires iterative process, where data collection and 
analysis are interwoven and must not be carried out as two separated stages as widely 
practiced in quantitative research. Moving back and forth between data collection and 
data analysis means that data collection, data analysis, and interpretation are done 
simultaneously. This iterative process benefits data analysis because, during such 
process, conceptual relationships between objects of analysis are developed and 
elaborated, and are becoming more lucid, through which theory generation and data 
interpretation become feasible. 
2.6.1. Codes and Coding 
I started textual data analysis with coding through which concepts and ideas were 
searched in and were developed from transcripts of interviews or raw data (see 
Benaquisto, 2008). At the beginning of analysis, I used three a priori codes (i.e. 
conventions, norms, and rules) derived from theories of institutions (see Vatn, 2005). 
Nevertheless, coding strategy in this analysis is also inductive which means other codes 
were constructed during data analysis (i.e. open coding). By reading transcripts of 
interviews several times, I began to sense key ideas and concepts, created new codes, 
and constructed relationships among them.  
The a priori codes and the emerging codes, if necessary, were elaborated as I acquired 
new data and new insights during the development of my analysis (see Benaquisto, 
                                                 
25
 In this part, I put information about the setting of interview which might influence the process of interview or the 
way informants reacted to particular questions. 
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2008; van den Hoonaard and van den Hoonaard, 2008). As an illustration, more relevant 
and specific codes were derived from a single code. In general, the analysis was open 
for the possibilities of new codes to emerge or for a priori codes to be elaborated. 
Decision on which codes were used to label certain concepts and ideas must be kept 
consistent through out coding activity (Kalof, et al., 2008). Hence, descriptions or 
definitions were made for each code. Those definitions or definitions might refer to 
relevant theories or might refer to ideas and concepts emerged during data analysis.  
2.6.2. Developing Conceptual Relationships between Codes 
Developing conceptual relationships between codes, quotations (phrases and/or 
sentences containing ideas or concepts that explain problem under study), and memos 
is one of the most crucial stages in qualitative analysis. At this point, I encountered 
constraints with using computer software for data analysis. Despite its useful features for 
coding at the textual level, at the conceptual level (that is when conceptual relationships 
between codes are constructed) ATLAS.ti is not always able to anticipate more complex 
and non-linear relationships between objects of analysis (i.e. codes, quotations, and 
memos). This, I would argue, relates to wide range of theories and perspectives 
employed in my analysis. I have found that the available set of relationships was not 
sufficient for developing conceptual relationships between objects of analysis. This is 
one criticism in using computer software for qualitative analysis, by which analysis might 
potentially be constrained (see van den Hoonaard and van den Hoonaard, 2008). 
2.6.3. Constructing Institutional Statements 
Some informants (i.e. mostly key informants) explicitly mentioned some existing 
institutions in the form of statements. However, institutions are not always in the 
consciousness of actors (Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010) and are often taken for granted 
as part of daily activities (Scott, 1995). In other words, despite fishermen’s knowledge on 
how to behave or act in particular situations, in daily life, institutions were rarely 
articulated through statements. This especially occurred to institutions stemming from 
cognitive structures. To extract institutions from the data and construct them into 
meaningful institutional statements26, I adopted and elaborated the grammar of 
                                                 
26
 Institutional statements refer to linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advices actions or 
outcomes for actors, which are spoken, written, or tacitly understood in a form intelligible to actors in an empirical 
setting (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). 
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institutions developed by Crawford and Ostrom (1995). Therefore, most of the 
formulated institutional statements appearing in this thesis are not necessarily spoken by 
fishermen as they are written in this monograph. 
2.7. Unit of Analysis 
Institutional dynamics in capture fisheries in this region have prevailed at two levels; at 
patron-client group level and at community level. At community level, dynamics have 
occurred to institutions managing interaction between fishermen and to institutions 
managing distribution of marine and coastal resources, especially those in the 
immediate surrounding of small islands. Dynamics occurring at both levels shaped 
capture fisheries in this region, because institutions and institutional dynamics at one 
level influence other level. As an illustration, institutions regarding profit-loss sharing 
between patrons and clients have been found as a driving factor for fishermen’s 
exploitative behavior. Such a behavior has altered institutions managing interaction 
between fishermen and institutions managing distribution of marine and coastal 
resources in the immediate surrounding of small islands.  
Through an iterative process, I decided to incorporate the two levels as units of my 
analysis in this study. Consequently, I am aware that the whole analysis in this study 
tends to “jump” between units of analysis. However, I argue that particular phenomena 
can appropriately be observed and understood when analyzed at particular levels. To 
comprehensively understand institutional dynamics in capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago, all relevant and linked levels must be explored. Employing single unit of 
analysis in this research, which seems to be a common practice in social research, 
would provide a partial insight through which the whole institutional dynamics in capture 
fisheries in this region would hardly be understood.  
2.8. Being an Outsider: Tackling the Issue of Data Validity 
I realize that spending one and a half months (for fieldwork preparation) in Spermonde 
Archipelago was not sufficient to build a good rapport—that is the degree of comfort in 
the interactions between researcher and informants (Morgan and Guevara, 2008). The 
total time spent was too short for sufficient interaction with islanders and potential 
informants. Being an outsider who neither shared similar culture and ethnicity nor spoke 
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local languages might influence the validity27 of my research findings. Although almost 
all of my informants were able to communicate in Bahasa Indonesia, there were 
variations and discrepancy of meanings creating misunderstanding between me and 
informants.28 My research assistants (Soenarto and Abdul Hafeez Assad) helped me to 
cope with this “communication gap”. After spending a few days engaging in intensive 
conversation, I finally understand my informants better.  
Coping with communication gap was not the only challenge for me as an outsider. To be 
trusted and “accepted” by informants are among the central concerns in qualitative 
research. Both influence the validity of the data collected (Henn, et al., 2006; Stainback 
and Stainback, 1988). Therefore, to be accepted by my informants and to gain their 
trust, I preferred to stay at the houses of islanders whose social roles and credibility 
made them acceptable to community, especially to different patron-client groups.  
Throughout fieldworks, I kept improving my rapport to gain informants’ trust. 
Nevertheless, I also employed three triangulation strategies to ensure the validity of my 
data, such as investigator triangulation, methodological triangulation, and triangulation 
by data sources (see Rothbauer, 2008; Stainback and Stainback, 1988). With regard to 
the first triangulation strategy, five research assistants29 (Soenarto, Abdul Hafeez Assad, 
Umar, Sunardi Hawi, Gunardi Hamdani Hakim) helped me (during all or in some 
excursions) to collect “comparative data” by which  the validity of my data was 
measured. Data collected by all investigators were compiled, compared, and discussed 
daily at the end of the day.  
I applied methodological triangulation by employing several data collection methods, 
through which consistency of research findings were verified and validated. In 
methodological triangulation, I incorporated two strategies such as convergence (i.e. 
each method is assigned to collect exactly the same data), and complementary (i.e. data 
collected by different methods informed or complemented to each other) (Nightingale, et 
al., 2009). The last triangulation strategy, triangulation by data sources, was applied by 
                                                 
27
 Validity refers to the trustworthiness, credibility, authenticity, and plausibility of research findings which can be 
improved through continual verification of findings and self-reflection (Miller, 2008).  
28
 People on small islands spoke Bahasa Indonesia with very thick local dialect and accent. Some words and 
phrases refer to different meanings than those suggested by a standardized Bahasa Indonesia. Variation in the 
way Bahasa Indonesia is spoken is not unique to South Sulawesi, it also occurs everywhere in a multicultural 
Indonesia.  
29
 My research assistants were students of Anthropology Department at Hasanuddin University, South Sulawesi. 
As also Bugis and Makassan, those students spoke local languages, and better understood the social and cultural 
settings of my research locations. 
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interviewing or collecting data from wide range of informants. Through the latter strategy, 
this study gains variety of perspectives.  
Lastly, the validity of data was ensured through verification of research findings. Through 
verification, the process of the research itself was checked to ensure that research 
findings were a true representation of what actually occurred or were clearly derived 
from data analysis (Ballinger, 2008). Hence, on some occasions during fieldworks, I 
presented my research findings to key informants and asked for their comments. 
2.9. “The Point” Where I (Finally) Decided to Finish 
Unlike quantitative approaches, qualitative research does not have an exact rule about 
when and how to stop collecting data or when to finish fieldworks. While many books 
provide explicit conceptual and technical guidelines about how to start and carry out data 
collection in qualitative approach (see Creswell, 2009; Henn, et al., 2006; Kalof, et al., 
2008; Stainback and Stainback, 1988), none of them explicitly tells readers when and 
how to stop. The only (and probably the most) mentioned notion about when to stop is 
when data reach the point of saturation, that is the point where little or no new and/or 
relevant information is provided by informants, or point where informants continue 
reporting essentially the same ideas (Firmin, 2008; Saumure and Given, 2008). This 
concept, I would argue, is still very abstract. It potentially creates pitfall for researchers 
who happen to collect data only from particular groups of informants without being aware 
of other groups of informants who perhaps do not share similar ideas or opinions.  
During fieldworks, I kept collecting particular data until they reached the point of 
saturation as is explained by Saumure and Given (2008). Nevertheless, I have found it 
very crucial to compare and to confront data from wide range of informants which were 
collected by several methods. In this case, data triangulation and verification must be 
seriously considered along with data saturation.  
Point of saturation defined in this research is not only about all informants agreeing 
about particular phenomena, but also about understanding how discrepancy in 
understanding exactly the same phenomena prevailed among informants. In practice, I 
always took two to three “extra” informants after certain data were considered saturated 
and valid. Working with open questions (i.e. guidelines for interview), interviews often 
revealed new and even surprising findings from which new questions emerged. 
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However, limitation has to be made. In doing so, I checked whether all research findings 
have sufficiently answered research questions and have addressed research objectives. 
At this point, I stopped data collection. 
2.10. Research Generalizability and Benefit 
This research was carried out in Spermonde Archipelago, where the prevailing and 
unique social, cultural, and ecological systems contribute to the shape of local socio-
economic with capture fisheries as its backbone. In capture fisheries, a mode of 
production was created through interactions between local social system (i.e. patron-
client system) and markets, especially global markets. At the same time, institutional 
dynamics in capture fisheries emerged from the interactions between these unique 
social, cultural, and ecological systems and natural resources management policies and 
market development occurred at local, regional, and global scales. This specific mode of 
production and institutional dynamics are context-specific emergent phenomena. This 
raises questions to the generalizability of this research and, consequently, benefit this 
research could contribute for marine and coastal resources management in other parts 
of Indonesia or in different countries. 
The issue of generalizability of results generated by qualitative method is an object of 
criticism. Qualitative methods are criticized for their limitations in creating sufficient 
generalizability —that is the ability to draw conclusions—from a single context-specific 
case (Kalof, et al., 2008). Hence, qualitative methods are accused of being insufficient 
for creating organizational knowledge for academic or policy purposes (Chell, 2004). On 
the other hand, Berkes (2006) criticizes how most research on common pool resources 
sought for simplicity of community-based resource management cases to develop 
theory—which raises the question: how reliable are those generalized theories for the 
management of regional and global commons, where new issues and factors involve? 
Donmoyer (2008) argues that qualitative research cannot apply traditional 
generalizability as is embraced by quantitative method30, and hence, generalizability 
must be redefined in more commonsense question such as: why will knowledge of a 
specific case be useful to other cases in other potentially different social and biophysical 
environments? In accordance to this, Berkes further suggest to approach this debate by 
                                                 
30
 In quantitative tradition, researchers are concerned that their findings will apply to other situation that the study’s 
sample supposedly represents (Donmoyer, 2008). 
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posing the issue of commons’ management as the management of complex adaptive 
systems which emphasizes emergent phenomena—that is phenomena emerge from 
interaction among relatively simple components (Johnson, 2009), for example actors, 
markets, and resources.  
Applying theories and approaches of complex adaptive system (especially by focusing 
on understanding emergent phenomena) could be a potential solution for coping with the 
issues of generalizability of qualitative research and its usefulness for policy making. 
Similar phenomena may emerge from similar processes that prevail in different social, 
cultural, political, and biophysical settings. For example, increasing poverty, marginality 
and exploitation of natural resources occur in capture fisheries and forestry sectors. 
They emerge, partly, from the integration of local systems into broader economic 
systems (i.e. international markets) and/or the implementation of exclusionary policy in 
natural resources conservation (see Peluso, 1992; 1993; Robbins, 2006).  
This study approaches capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago as a complex 
adaptive system. Institutional dynamics are phenomena emerge from interactions 
among various actors under continuously changing circumstances driven by social, 
cultural, economic, political, technological and biophysical dynamics at local, regional, 
and global scales. By focusing on emergent phenomena, we may understand the 
impacts of cross-scale interactions on local practices of natural resources management. 
This should be an epistemological contribution of this study. 
Chapter 3. Looking Back, Redefining the Present: Redefining the State of Capture 
Fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago 
3.1. Spermonde Archipelago in the Past: Historical Construction of Capture Fisheries  
3.1.1 Spermonde Archipelago until the 19th Century 
The geographical position of Makassar brought advantage to local socio-economic when 
global economy began with the exploitation and monopoly of spices by Portuguese in 
Maluku (east of Sulawesi) (Amal, 2007; Knapp and Sutherland, 2004). The arrival of 
VOC (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), a conglomeration of several Dutch 
business companies, by the end of 16th century forced the Portuguese to depart from 
Maluku (Amal, 2007). VOC then took over monopoly of spices (Knapp and Sutherland, 
2004). At the beginning of 17th century, when VOC ruled most harbors in Java and 
Maluku, many traders from Java and western part of Indonesia switched their trading 
route to the west part of South Sulawesi’s coastal zone, and established new landing 
and trading sites in that area (Poelinggoman, 2002). This situation supported trading 
activities between South Sulawesi’s traders and traders from all parts of Java, Sumatra, 
Malacca, India and Arabs, by which vibrant socio-economic on many small islands in this 
region was fueled (Mattulada, 1994). Makassar then became an important transit site 
and trading harbor in the east part of Indonesia (Poelinggoman, 2002); a situation that 
later on motivated VOC to conquer Makassar and establish a new colony in this area. 
This triggered a substantial migration throughout small islands in the archipelago (Knapp 
and Sutherland, 2004). 
The control of VOC over trading in Makassar continued to decrease by 1776 and, after 
experiencing the worst financial condition in 1787, VOC was officially closed by the 
Dutch government in January 1800 (Poelinggoman, 2002). Consequently, VOC 
surrendered all of its colonies to Dutch government, including Makassar. The Dutch 
continued to implement monopoly and high-tax policy in all VOC’s former colonies 
(Amal, 2007). However, with the weakening influence the Dutch had and the existence 
of Singapore as a more competitive market for traders, the Dutch finally abolished 
monopoly and high-tax policy in 1847 (Poelinggoman, 2002). This appears to be factor 
that enhanced the development of trading in Makassar. 
Abolition of monopoly and high-tax policy stimulated trading activity, especially between 
the locals and Chinese traders. During trading period of 1824 and 1846, demand for sea 
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cucumbers and turtle shells reached 400 tons and 2 to 3 tons per year, respectively 
(Poelinggoman, 2002). Business between local traders of Makassar and Chinese started 
in the early 16th century; long before the Europeans came to Indonesia (Poelinggoman, 
2002; Poesponegoro and Notosutanto, 1993). Such a business relationship was once 
terminated in 1667 when VOC, as the ruler of Makassar, forbade chinese traders to 
trade in Makassar (Poelinggoman, 2002). However, as tea became an important 
commodity in Europe, VOC started to “normalize” its relationship with Chinese traders 
and let their trading ships—the jung or wangkang—entering Makassar (Sutherland, 
2000) in 1736, as officially recorded for the first time (Poelinggoman, 2002).  
Chinese traders demanded various kinds of marine products, such as sea cucumbers, 
shark fins, turtle’s shells, pearls, and agarose (Amal, 2007; Poelinggoman, 2002). When 
Chinese traders came, they lent money to the local traders who later on bought various 
kinds of marine products from fishermen and sold those products to those Chinese 
traders (Poelinggoman, 2002). Demand for marine products inrcreased when the price 
of spices at the international level fell in 1850 (Amal, 2007). This situation should provide 
motivation for about 5000 thousands fishermen living in this region (Veth, 1868) to 
exploit the demanded marine commodities. 
3.1.2. Spermonde Archipelago in the 20th Century 
The development of capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago is influenced by 
political and economic upheavals at national level, which is shaped by economic 
pathway chosen by the elites. In the years following Indonesia’s independence in 1945, 
national government started to put more efforts to develop capture fisheries (and other 
strategic sectors) in Indonesia. Unfortunately, a continuing struggle for sovereignty as a 
nation (until 1949) might have impeded the development of capture fisheries in 
Indonesia. A fishery report dated to 1946 recorded that more than 6000 fishermen living 
on 20 islands in Spermonde Archipelago were still fishing by using traditional fishing 
methods, such as handline, traps, and bamboo-made fences (Pel, 1946). Exploration of 
fishing grounds depended on boats powered by pedals and karoro; traditional sails 
made of woven grass. Thus, fishermen fished mainly in fishing grounds situated in the 
immediate surrounding of their islands or in fishing grounds adjacent to their islands (IV, 
Nma, November 2008; IV, Uns, August 2009). 
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By the middle of 1950s, Indonesia—under Soekarno’s regime (Indonesia’s first 
president)—established Djawatan Perikanan Laut to manage marine fisheries. This 
governmental body, which was established at provincial level, signaled a raising 
awareness of the utilization of marine and coastal resources for the economic of the 
young republic. In Makassar, three fish landing sites (Tempat Pelelangan Ikan or TPI) 
were established in 1952.31 The establishment of these facilities has favored marine 
capture fisheries as an economically promising sector in Makassar, including for those 
who did not invest in fishing activity, such as individuals who were called punggawa ikan. 
There were at least 50 punggawa ikans32—to whom all fish must be sold—at two fish 
landing sites. Those punggawa ikans acted as both collectors and protectors for 
fishermen. At that time, stealing and/or robbing fishermen’s catch were common 
phenomena that even the police found difficult to deal with.33 Hence, fishermen needed 
protection from punggawa ikans (IV, Nma, November 2008).  
The overall production of fisheries, including from marine capture fisheries, continued to 
increase from 1960 to 1967 when the era of president Soekarno ended (see Figure 4). 
Nevertheless, the contribution from marine capture fisheries to the total fisheries 
production became more significant after Soeharto ruled Indonesia (as the second 
president of Indonesia). Soeharto has empirically ruled Indonesia since 1967. When he 
officially came into power in 1968, he adopted “a more rational economic principle” by 
which Indonesia projected an increasing fisheries production by 40 per cent during the 
first 1969/1970 – 1973/1974 “Five Years Development Plan” (Rencana Pembangungan 
Lima Tahun or REPELITA) (BAPPENAS, 2009).  
Modernization of capture fisheries through mechanization, introduction of large-scale 
fishing methods, facilitation of foreign investments, and increment of exports  (see 
BAPPENAS, 2009) were among implementations of the rational economic principle in 
fisheries. This program, which was officially launched in the 1968, is known as 
Indonesia’s first blue revolution. The impact of this blue revolution on the development of 
marine capture fisheries was significant. Despite a consistent trend in the annual growth 
of fisheries production from 1960 to 1974 (i.e. 2.4 per cent per year (Direktorat Jenderal 
Perikanan, 1974), a more significant contribution from capture fisheries to the total 
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 ANRI, Makassar No. 232. 
32
 ANRI, Makassar No. 232. 
33
 ANRI, Makassar No. 231. 
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fisheries production was eventually achieved during the era of Soeharto. Marine 
fisheries started to contribute a bigger portion to the annual production of fisheries since 
1967, which was 65 per cent of the total annual production (Direktorat Jenderal 
Perikanan, 1974).  
Modernization policy in capture fisheries finally reached Spermonde Archipelago in the 
middle of 1970s. In 1975, Agency of Fisheries in Ujung Pandang (a former name of 
Makassar) officially recorded 292 motorized boats of the total 2,500 recorded boats 
(Dinas Perikanan, 1975). In the same year, this agency also reported three fish landing 
sites and five ice factories (capable of producing 70 per cent of the total production of ice 
blocks in South Sulawesi) operated to support capture fisheries in this region. This 
established Makassar as an important market destination for fishermen from neighboring 
areas. At the present time, fishermen from Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency, for 
example, still prefer to sell their fish to Makassar (PO, fish landing site Paotere, July 
2009). 
Figure 4. Total fisheries production at national level from 1960 to 1974 
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(Source: Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan, 1974). 
Increasing fisheries production at national level related to the increasing number of 
motorized boats and the use of large-scale fishing methods such as trawls and purse-
seine nets (Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan, 1974). In Makassar, however, the use of 
motorized boats in the middle of 1970s was exclusive to fish collectors from Makassar 
who regularly visited small islands to collect salted-dried fish.  
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The development of capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago is also partly supported 
by innovations and transfer of knowledge occurring at the local level. In 1960, fishermen 
in Spermonde Archipelago began to use fish aggregation devices called rumpon mandar 
(IV, Rtb, July 2009). The device is named after an ethnic group originally living in the 
west of Sulawesi (i.e. Mandar) who, until the present, is believed to be the inventor of 
this device (Alimuddin, 2005). At about the same time in the 1960, fishermen in this 
region also began to use stationary liftnet platforms or bagang tancaps. 
Figure 5. One of the remaining stationary liftnet platforms erected in the coastal water of 
Makassar 
 
In 1978, boat engines were becoming more accessible for fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago and they began to equip their boats with engines in this year (IV, Nma, 
November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). Using motorized boats, moving to remote fishing 
grounds has become feasible and fishing migration (sawakung) has become an 
important phenomenon (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Fishing migration, through which fishermen 
from particular islands stayed on other islands surrounded by spacious fishing grounds, 
is triggered by the variability of temporal and spatial occurrence of particular target fish 
(PO, Langkai Island, July 2009; IV, Bc, July 2009; IV, Rtb, July 2009) and technological 
change. 
The Islands of Langkai, Lanyukang and Bonetambung were among the most visited 
sites of fishing migration in Spermonde Archipelago in the early 1980s (IV, Rtb, July 
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2009; IV, Ngs, August 2009). However, during my fieldworks, I have only observed the 
islands of Langkai and Lanyukang as the most visited sites for fishing migration the 
coastal water of Makassar, especially during the southeast monsoon when anchovies 
and narrow-barred mackerels are abundant near these islands (PO, Langkai Island, July 
2009). The occurrence of spacious fishing grounds and the availability of freshwater on 
Langkai Island have turned this island into one of the most preferred locations for fishing 
migration in Spermonde Archipelago at the time (IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Nma, November 
2008). On the other hand, Bonetambung Island lacks of space and fresh water (PO, 
Bonetambung Island, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
Figure 6. Fishermen from Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency performed fishing migration 
on Langkai Island during the southeast monsoon 
 
The existence of pa’sawakung (fishermen who performed sawakung) on the hosting 
islands provides cash income for many households who provide shelters and daily 
needs for pa’sawakungs. Fishing migration facilitates cooperation between 
pa’sawakungs and local islanders who temporarily act as patrons. It also facilitates the 
transfer of knowledge and skills of particular fishing methods and valuable information 
regarding capture fisheries (for example markets, market demands, prices for particular 
marine commodities) (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009; PO, Lanyukang Island, July 2009; 
IV, Uns, August 2009). 
 48 
Nma and Rtb remember that many improvements in capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago happened during the 1970s. The existence of boat engines was soon 
followed by a new fish landing site in Makassar (i.e. TPI Rajawali) (IV, Nma, November 
2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). The establishment and operation of new ice factories in 1975 
(Dinas Perikanan, 1975) seemed to make ice blocks more available not only for 
fishermen but also for individuals who wanted to take benefits from trade in capture 
fisheries. At the end of 1970s, more individuals from the city of Makassar and 
neighboring regencies came to small islands in Spermonde Archipelago to buy fresh fish 
from fishermen and sold them to Makassar (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Those individuals are 
now known as pa’balolangs.  
Figure 7. A modern boat liftnet 
 
The availability of more powerful boat engines has triggered another innovation of fishing 
methods at the local level. Fishermen of Sinjai34 have successfully invented modern boat 
liftnets (locally called bagang lopi or bagang) and, in Spermonde Archipelago, this 
fishing method was adopted and used for the first time by fishermen of Balang Lompo 
Island (in Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency) in 1978 (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Rtb, 
July 2009).35 This information is confirmed by an official record made by the local 
                                                 
34
 Sinjai is a regency at the east coast of South Sulawesi Province. It is located, more and less, 200 km from 
Makassar Municipality. 
35
 In an observation, there were at least 30 bagangs observed only at the south part of Balang Lompo Island (PO, 
April 2010). That number exceeded the number of bagangs on other islands in this region. The number of bagangs 
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government. The use of modern boat liftnets was officially recorded for the first time in 
1978, when over 100 modern boat liftnets were operating in the coastal water of 
Makassar (Dinas Perikanan, 1978).  
3.1.3. The Origin of Illegal Fishing Practices 
A reconstruction of the development of capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago is 
incomplete without discussing the origin of illegal fishing practices in this region. With 
nearly 70 per cent of fishermen involved in both blast and cyanide fishing practices, 
Destructive Fishing Watch Indonesia (2003) nominates Spermonde archipelago as “hot 
spot” of destructive fishing in Indonesia.  
3.1.3.1. Fishing with Explosive Materials 
The practice of blast fishing method in the archipelago is probably older than the republic 
itself. Fishermen have practiced blast fishing since the World War II (Pet-Soede, et al., 
2000). It was the Dutch army (during the colonial era) who introduced this method to 
fishermen in this region (IV, Muhammad Neil, March 2009). They trained local fishermen 
to harvest fish for the celebration of Princess Juliana’s birthday in Makassar. This 
method was then widely practiced by local fishermen. The explosives were taken from 
World War II ammunition shells (Pet-Soede, et al., 2000). Rtb, a former blast fisherman 
of Langkai Island confirmed that; 
“I learned blast fishing from several Japanese who still frequently came to Langkai 
Island after Indonesia’s independence (i.e. in 1945). At the time, we used amunisi 
perang (war ammunition shells).” (IV, Rtb, July 2009).  
He further informed that blast fishing was, at that time, a widely practiced method among 
fishermen of Langkai Island, by which they exploited fishing grounds adjacent to their 
island. However, not all fishermen in this region practiced blast fishing. Blast fishing was, 
according to local institutions crafted by gallarangs, a prohibited fishing method for 
fishermen of the islands of Barrang Caddi and Barrang Lompo (IV, Jrm, November 2007; 
                                                                                                                                                 
belonging to residents of this island reflects the fact that fishermen of Balang Lompo Island are the first fishermen 
to adopt this fishing method. 
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IV, Rtb, July)36. Gallarangs also prohibited this method for exploiting fishing grounds in 
the immediate surrounding of those small islands.  
Fishermen on the islands of Barrang Caddi and Barrang Lompo only started practicing 
blast fishing in the middle of 1970s, that was after the traditional leadership led by 
gallarangs ended (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Centralization policy, through which the central 
government in Jakarta implemented a centralized and standardized administrative 
system in all regions of Indonesia since the early of 1970s, was the reason for the fall of 
those traditional islands rulers (IV, Zmh, November 2008).  
When fishermen were running out of war ammunition shells, they found the alternative. 
Blast fishermen in this region started using ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate-Fuel Oil) bomb—a 
mixture between ammonium nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil (Global Security, 2009). None of 
my key informants know for sure when fishermen in this region began to used ANFO 
bomb. However, Rtb suggested that the use of ANFO bombs were first introduced by 
fishermen from Taiwan (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Nma, who was interviewed on a separate 
occasion, supported this statement. 
“There was a Taiwanese ship, fully loaded with illegal sacks of fertilizer, caught by 
the police of Makassar. One of the crews told [fishermen] about how to make fish 
bomb. [To make fish bomb] fertilizer is mixed with kerosene….” (IV, Nma, November 
2008). 
Since the early 1980s, the practice of blast fishing has become more intensive. This was 
partly triggered by the use of diving masks, hookah, and air compressors. These 
equipments have enabled fishermen to conduct blast fishing in deeper coastal waters.37 
With abundant fish resources at that time, blast fishing appeared to be a fast and 
effective method for harvesting (IV, Rtb, July 2009). However, this situation was about to 
change. The new regime of Soeharto provided not only new technologies and markets. 
Along with this “modernization package”, government prepared a strict regulation for 
                                                 
36
 Jrm is a descendant of the last gallarang of Barrang Lompo Island. Gallarangs are believed to be part of the 
royal family of the late Kingdom of Gowa. They are also believed to have supernatural power to foresee future 
events and somebody’s fortune and to make communication with the late ancestors. In their time, a gallarang 
managed many socio-economic aspects, including natural resources on and in the surrounding of an island. A 
gallarang, for example, had the right to prohibit the practice of particular fishing methods, for example blast fishing 
method (IV, Jrm, November 2007). 
37
 Previously, fishermen conducted blast fishing only at coastal water at certain depth where their divers could 
collect fish by using simple equipments. Diving masks, hookah and air compressors have enabled their divers to 
dive deeper and this time with better sight. Hence, blast fishing at deeper coastal water has become feasible (IV, 
Rtb, July 2009). 
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protecting marine and coastal resources from illegal fishing practices. Indonesia 
stipulated its first fisheries act in 1985 (i.e. Undang-undang Republik Indonesia tentang 
Perikanan No. 9 Tahun 1985). According to this act, all kinds of fishing activity using 
materials or equipments that potentially destroy marine and coastal ecosystems are 
illegal or against the law. Hence, any violations will be punished by imprisonment (to a 
maximum of 10 years) or fine. An increasing intensity of monitoring activity for blast 
fishing practices in Spermonde Archipelago took place after the issue of the act. 
However, instead of being directly sent for prosecutions, blast fishermen were 
blackmailed or were beaten if they did not provide the police with money (IV, Rtb, July 
2009).  
Prior to 1985, Rtb and other former blast fishermen of Langkai Island believed that blast 
fishing was not an illegal fishing practice, especially during the era when Soekarno ruled 
Indonesia (i.e. in the 1960s).  
”Blast fishing was not prohibited [by government] during the era of Soekarno. [This 
was because] no fishermen have ever been jailed for doing this activity during that 
time.” (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
Unable to resist such situations, fishermen of Langkai Island soon stopped practicing 
blast fishing (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Nevertheless, on other islands in Spermonde 
Archipelago fishermen keep employing blast fishing method to the present time. 
3.1.3.2. Fishing with Poisonous Materials 
As some fishermen of Langkai Island stopped practicing blast fishing, other started to 
use poisonous material for catching, mainly, reef fish. The use of potassa’ (i.e. tablets of 
potassium cyanide) began in the middle of 1980s (IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Rfg, July 
2009). They call this fishing method mapotassa’.38 Fishing by using poisonous material 
is not a new method for fishermen of South Sulawesi. They have traditionally employed 
this method for catching reef fish. They used a kind of woody plant (liana or climber) 
called akar tuba (i.e. Derris spp.) for stupefying reef fish.39   
                                                 
38
 The practice of ma’potassa was conducted by stuffing a fraction of potassium cyanide tablet into fish’s gut 
(usually low economic pelagic fish). Fishermen then deployed those fish to the water as baits. 
39
 ANRI, Makassar No. 1536 
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Mapotassa’ spread throughout small islands in Spermonde Archipelago because, at that 
time, market demand for dried-salted reef fish was high. At that time, groupers and other 
species of reef fish were still demanded as dried-salted fish (IV, Ns, June 2008; IV, Nma, 
November 2008). Until 1989, mapotassa’ was among fishing methods preferred for 
catching groupers (IV, Rtb, July 2009). However, the practice of this method in 
Spermonde Archipelago did not last long. Conflict with handline fishermen (who 
considered this method a threat for their activity) was the main reason (IV, Rtb, July 
2009). 
Fishing by using poisonous materials once again began when fishermen in this region in 
1990, when the capture of live reef fish initiated by orang Hong Kong (men from Hong 
Kong)40 began in the Archipelago (IV, Ns, June 2008; IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, 
Gmd, August 2009). Live reef fish capture fisheries in this region is part of the live reef 
fish industry in Hong Kong and Singapore (Bentley, 1999). Fishermen were introduced 
to a new fishing method using exactly the same material (i.e. potassium cyanide), only 
this time with a different technique to be able to deliver live reef fish to consumers. 
Tablets of potassium cyanide are dissolved into water to make solution they called bius 
(IV, Zmh, November 2008).  
My research informants agreed that live reef fish capture fisheries began on Lae-lae 
Island where the kapal Hong Kong first landed and where the first groups of cyanide 
fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago were formed. However, on this island, live reef fish 
capture fisheries underwent labor shortage. The orang Hong Kong recruited more 
fishermen from the islands of Bonetambung and Barrang Caddi (IV, Nma, November 
2008; IV, Uns, August 2009). Most of the recruited fishermen were young. They were 
paid on monthly basis for IDR 300,000 (which was equal to USD 150 at that time) and 
with additional bonus depended on the total fish they could catch. This monthly salary 
basis attracted many fishermen to join this industry, either as cyanide fishermen or as 
other supporting crew (IV, Zmh41, November 2008). In their fishing operation, cyanide 
fishermen were organized into groups consisted of one boat’s operator and three to five 
divers (IV, Bt, August 2009).  
                                                 
40
 Orang Hong Kong and kapal Hong Kong are terms islanders in Makassar use to refer to entrepreneurs and their 
fishing vessels, respectively, they believed as, coming from Hong Kong. A report also mentioned Hong Kong as 
the origin of those entrepreneurs (and their fishing vessels) who initiated the capture of live reef fish in Spermonde 
Archipelago (see Bentley, 1999: 46) 
41
 Zmh was among the young islanders who tried his fortune as chef on a Hong Kong’s vessel. 
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In the development, Barrang Caddi Island has become an important island for 
supporting live reef fish capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago. One company, for 
example, set dozens of floating cages (keramba) in the surrounding of this island (IV, 
Nma, November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). At the present time, Barrang Caddi Island is 
an important “transit port” for live reef fish before being delivered to the city.42  
In 1990, the use of bius was limited only to those who worked for the companies. 
Cyanide fishermen themselves did not have any knowledge about the material they were 
using. Companies prepared potassium solution (i.e. bius) secretly. However, in less than 
two years, the secret leaked to fishermen. Some richer islanders and fishermen finally 
decided to independently organize live reef fish capture fisheries (IV, Zmh, November 
2008). It appears that, to anticipate losing their fishermen (and hence losing their 
business), live reef fish companies offered financial capital (i.e. debt) to those islanders. 
There were only few islanders brave enough to take the offer. They become collectors 
from whom companies nowadays buy the fish. Since 1992, live reef fish capture 
fisheries has been organized by the locals with previous companies serving as providers 
of financial capital and exporters (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
Since fishing activity was organized by the locals, the magnitude of live reef fish capture 
fisheries has significantly increased in terms of the number of fishermen involved in the 
industry. More fishermen from various small islands in the archipelago were recruited as 
cyanide fishermen—something that would be difficult (if not impossible) if the capture 
fisheries were managed through the previous “boss-employee” type of relationship. The 
recruitment was facilitated by the prevalent hierarchical social structure of patron-client 
relationships, through which patrons were able to recruit more fishermen without 
necessarily paying them on monthly basis. Accordingly, patron-client relationships have 
lowered the expenditure for recruiting new clients. Hence, patrons could recruit more 
clients (i.e. fishermen).  
This recruitment system prevails to the present time. Patron-client system, I argue, is the 
media for extending the business of live reef fish capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago. In many cases, patrons recruited influential fishermen or islanders as their 
collectors on particular islands, where these people used their influence to recruit more 
                                                 
42
 Under Chapter 5, I propose three theories for explaining the emergence of this island as an important site for the 
live reef fish capture fisheries in this region. 
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fishermen. The increasing production of live reef fish from the eastern part of Indonesia 
in 1992 and in the following years (see Bentley, 1999: 29) might be caused by the 
increasing number of fishermen involved in live reef fish capture fisheries since 1992.  
3.2. Spermonde Archipelago at Present 
3.2.1. A Very Brief Overview of Some Biophysical, Social, and Economic Aspects 
Spermonde Archipelago is located along the west coast of South Sulawesi, particularly 
in the southeast of Makassar strait (Tomascik, et al., 1997: 903). This region covers 
mostly marine and coastal water of Makassar Municipality and Pangkajene Kepulauan 
Regency. Local islanders name this area Sangkarang. This area is affected by the rainy 
northwest monsoon prevailing from December to March and the dry southeast monsoon 
prevailing from May to September (Tomascik, et al., 1997). Both monsoons contribute to 
ecosystem dynamics in this region’s coastal zones (Erftemeijer and Herman, 1994; 
Tomascik, et al., 1997). Flood, coastal erosion and sand migration are common 
phenomena on small islands, especially, during the northwest monsoon (IV, Zmh, 
November 2008; PO, Karanrang Island, May 2010). On most small islands, coastal 
erosion has appeared to be a serious threat, especially for islanders whose houses are 
built adjacent to the the coastal line. In January 2008, several houses were relocated to 
the middle Barrang Caddi Island due to a severe coastal erosion during the nortwest 
monsoon (IV, Zmh, November 2008). On this island, coastal erosion has destroyed a 
desalination installation that previously supplied fresh water not only for islanders of 
Barrang Caddi Island, but also for inslanders from neighboring islands (PO, Barrang 
Caddi Island, November 2008).  
Spermonde barrier comprises the largest reef area in Sulawesi (more than 4,000 km2 or 
27 per cent of its total reef area), and stores high level of biodiversity (Cleary, et al., 
2005; Tomascik, et al., 1997). Of the 160 submersed coral reef, 35 per cent of them 
enclose small islands in this region (Pet-Soede, et al., 2001b). This high biodiversity 
serves as the only reliable support for local economic in this area. In Kelurahan 
Kodingareng, for example, 95 per cent of adult males engaged in capture fisheries, 
either as fishermen, traders, or fishing labors (Kelurahan Kodingareng, 2009). This, 
however, is not the case for islanders on small islands adjacent to Makassar, such as 
the islands of Lae-lae, Kayangan, and Samalona. On these islands, most islanders rely 
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on tourisms, transportation, or work in various sectors available in Makassar. On these 
islands, only few households rely on capture fisheries (IV, Nma, November 2008; PO, 
November 2008).  
On small islands, land is limited in terms of space and fertility. Fresh water is scarce on 
particular islands, especially during the dry southeast monsoon. However, islanders still 
can cultivate coconuts, breadfruits, jackfruits, bananas, cassavas, and a few species of 
legumes for a subsistence amount of vegetables and carbohydrates (PO, Barrang 
Lompo Island, April 2008; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). Ecosystem on small islands, 
however, can support household-scale poultry (chickens and ducks) and goat keeping 
(PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2009; PO Bonetambung Island, July 2009). 
Makassar and Bugis are two largest ethnics populating small islands in this region, 
followed by Mandar and Bajau. Smaller groups, who claim themselves as Chinese and 
Arab descent, live among those ethnic groups (IV, Jrm, November 2008; IV, Mfd, May 
2010).  They are probably the descendants of the Chinese and Arab traders who came 
to and inhabited small islands in Spermonde Archipelago in the 18th century (Mattulada, 
1994).43 Despite their smaller proportion, the Arab descendants—who call themselves 
the sayyed—hold important social and economic roles on particular islands in 
Spermonde Archipelago.44 On Kodingareng Lompo Island, believed to be the first group 
to inhabit the island, the sayyed own most of the land and, hence, control its distribution 
(IV, Abd, November 2008). On Badi Island, the sayyed families have traditionally taught 
islanders about Islam (IV, Mfd, May 2010) and the reading of Koran (PO, Badi Island, 
May 2010). On the latter island, this group has appeared to be a powerful political group. 
They could “mobilize” islanders to vote for particular candidates in public elections (for 
example in the election of village’s leader), and to resist a development project that 
brings no (financial and social) advantages to their group (PO, Badi Island, March 2009; 
PO, Badi Island, May 2010). 
                                                 
43
 The existence of smaller neighborhoods called Kampung Arab and Kampung Cina (the Hamlets of Arab and 
Chinese) on Barrang Lompo Island is an evidence of their arrival and residence in Spermonde Archipelago.  
44
 The sayyeds claim themselves as the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. The sayyed or sayyid (see Ilias, 
2007; Kathirithamby-Wells, 2009) population in Spermonde Archipelago is part of a larger Hadrami diaspora who 
began their migration (through trading activity) to Southeast Asia, especially to Malay-Indonesia, in the 18th century 
(Kathirithamby-Wells, 2009). Although they originally come from Hadramawt Arabs, the language is no longer their 
main identity, nor their phenotype and cuisine (Heiss and Slama, 2010), except their nasab or lineage (Alatas, 
1997). As in other places in Indonesia, the Hadramis (Indonesians Arab descents) in Spermonde Archipelago hold 
important social roles in economic and religion (see Heiss and Slama, 2010; Slama, 2010). 
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Religion shapes the prevalent social structure and capture fisheries. The fact that almost 
all islanders on each island embrace Islam as their religion (IV, Dhm, May 2008; IV, 
Nma, November 2008; IV, Uns, August 2009; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009) has 
positioned imam45 or imang as an important figure within community (i.e. as religious 
leader). Dhm, an imam of a mosque on Barrang Lompo Island, is often asked by 
fishermen to lead religious ceremonials in which he prays for fishermen’s good fortunes 
(i.e. abundant amount of catch and safety). Such ceremonies are especially held when 
fishermen are going to fish at remote fishing grounds (IV, Dhm, May 2008; PO, Barrang 
Lompo Island, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
Beside to imams, fishermen also go to persons they believe as having supernatural 
power, for example to Jrm. Fishermen go to Jrm when they plan to fish at fishing 
grounds or reef they believe as being guarded or inhabited by evil spirits (IV, Jrm, 
November 2008). Jrm helps fishermen preparing goods (i.e. bananas) as an offer to the 
spirits (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, November 2008). Fishermen on Barrang Lompo 
Island believe that Jrm owns such an ability because he is a descendant of the last 
gallarang who are known to have such an ability (IV, Kde, May 2008). The ritual of 
preparing the offer is also practiced by trap fishermen of Bonetambung Island (PO, 
Bonetambung Island, July 2009). Syncretism—a mixed practice between religion and 
local belief—appears to be a common phenomenon among Moslems (i.e. fishermen) in 
this area (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, November 2008, PO, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009). 
3.2.2. Redefining Patron-client System in Capture Fisheries 
Capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago is organized through a patron-client 
system, which is defined by Christian Pelras as; 
“Relationship […] characterized generally as an unequal (but theoretically 
nonbinding) relationship between a superior (a patron or leader) and a number of 
inferiors (clients, retainers, or followers), based on an asymmetric exchange of 
services.” (2000: 16) 
                                                 
45
 In Spermonde Archipelago, imam refers to persons (adult males) given the authority to lead the prayers in a 
mosque and in other religious rituals. They are considered to be the most knowledgeable persons about various 
aspects of Islam (IV, Dhm, May 2008). Hence, they are considered to be the most religious persons. 
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Scholars researching various aspects of patron-client relationships within the community 
of South Sulawesi called such relationship punggawa-sawi relationships (see Sallatang, 
1982; Pelras, 2000; 2006), in which punggawa is a patron and sawi is a client.46 Several 
recent works in Spermonde Archipelago (e.g. Chozin, 2008; Neil, 2008; Baitoningsih, 
2009; Martens, 2009) also quote punggawa-sawi, as the system through which 
relationships and interaction between patrons and clients are built. The use of this term 
in those recent works is probably influenced by the works of Pelras and Sallatang which 
remain the most influential works on the patron-client system in South Sulawesi.  
Pelras and Sallatang researched different communities at different times and places.47 
Therefore, adopting this term to the present capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago 
might be inappropriate without redefinition—something absence in recent works in this 
region. My research findings suggest that patron-client system in this area has actually 
developed along with the continuing development of capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago. Without redefinition, applying the term punggawa-sawi to capture fisheries 
in Spermonde Archipelago, I would argue, will potentially lead to a misunderstanding, 
that patron-client system in South Sulawesi is static relationships resistant to internal 
and external changes.48 In fact, the structure of patron-client relationships in Spermonde 
Archipelago has developed over time, creating differences between this system in the 
past and at present.  
Pelras (2000) and Salman (2006) have found that patron-client system in South 
Sulawesi has survived over time through changing, that is by accommodating necessary 
structural and functional changes as responses to social, political, economic, and 
cultural dynamics. Adjusting to the socio-economic contexts in which this system is 
operating (Salman, 2006), patron-client system in Spermonde Archipelago differs to 
those operating in the mainland of South Sulawesi. In Spermonde Archipelago, new 
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 The words punggawa and sawi are translated from Sanskrit by Matthes, a missionary who visited South 
Sulawesi in the 19th century (Pelras, 2000; Sallatang, 1982), where punggawa refers to ship’s captains or military 
leaders, for example the military commanders of the late Kingdom of Bone (Andaya, 2004) while sawi refers to 
ship’s crews or followers (Pelras, 2000). 
47
 Sallatang’s case study was conducted in 1982, researching one patron-client group in Jeneponto Regency who 
was collectively fishing by using nets (see Sallatang, 1982), while Pelras started carrying research on patron-client 
system in the late 1960s, focusing on patron-client groups in the mainland of South Sulawesi (see Pelras, 2000). 
48
 There are also tendencies to replace the concept of patrons with middlemen (see Halim, 2002; Knittweis and 
Wolff, 2010). Without further explanation, this would mislead readers to understand patrons as those who concern 
only with economic intention (i.e. gaining financial benefit from capture fisheries by “connecting” fishermen to 
potential markets). Hence, patrons are pure economic entities, without any social and cultural obligations towards 
fishermen who happen to be their clients. 
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influential actors exist in patron-client groups, changing the structure of patron-client 
relationships. 
3.2.2.1. Many Kinds of Patron 
According to the structure of patron-client relationships, patrons are obliged to provide 
social, economic and political protections for their clients, who will in return “pay” those 
protections with services, goods, and loyalty to their patrons (Pelras, 2000). Patrons, in 
general, are those who have followers (Pelras, 2006) and, hence, clients are those who 
have someone to follow. According to the hierarchy within patron-client groups (i.e. 
groups established and operated according to patron-client system), a patron could 
simply be another follower or client of a more influential or powerful actors49 within the 
group. Accordingly, several kinds of patron (with different levels of influence and 
authority) exist within a patron-client group. 
1. Punggawa Bonto or Punggawa Lompo 
Punggawa bonto or punggawa lompo refers to patrons who live on small islands, from 
where they finance fishing activity (i.e. providing fishing equipments and materials). The 
term bonto, which literally means land (darat) relates to the fact that this kind of patrons 
do not directly involve in fishing and, therefore, stay on islands. Hence, despite their 
capability to provide financial assistances, those who still actively involve in fishing 
activity are not called punggawa bonto. Lompo, on the other hand, literally means great 
(besar). This refers to the amount of money a punggawa has and/or the number of his or 
her50 clients (IV, Nma, November 2008). During fieldworks, I have found that fishermen 
and islanders on research locations used punggawa bonto and punggawa lompo 
interchangeably to refer the same individuals (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, May 2008; 
PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
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 In this area, patrons’ influence stems from accumulation of financial capital, political capacity (i.e. capacity to 
protect their clients in possible social conflicts and from legal prosecution), and social attributes (i.e. social status 
and kinships). 
50
 Although patrons on small islands of Spermonde Archipelago, in almost all case, are men, my research assistant 
(Soenarto) and I have found an exceptional case of a female punggawa bonto on Bonetambung Island (PO, 
Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
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According to the kinds of business and/or according to the kinds of capture fisheries their 
clients participate in, fishermen classify punggawa bontos into punggawa pa’balolang51 
and punggawa pengumpul. Dc, a punggawa pa’balolang, explained that punggawa 
pa’balolangs refer to punggawa bontos whose main business is collecting any kinds of 
fresh fish (i.e. dead fish) from fishermen (IV, Dc, November 2008).  
Clients of punggawa pa’balolangs consist of handline fishermen and pa’balolangs.52 The 
latter refers to clients whose responsibility is to collect or to buy dead fish from any 
fishermen or to deliver catch to fish landing sites (PO, Bonetambung Island, August 
2009; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008).  
Punggawa pengumpul or often called pengumpul is a punggawa bonto whose clients 
catch live reef fish or ornamental corals and fish (IV, Uns, August 2009). The word 
pengumpul (Bahasa Indonesia) literally means collector. My research findings suggest 
that fishermen and islanders have started to use this term since the beginning of the live 
reef fish capture fisheries. This term is probably introduced and used by non-local 
entrepreneurs who simply recognized patrons as one of the chains in the global live reef 
fish industry; that is as collectors. It is very likely that fishermen and islanders in this 
region have adopted this term ever since. The process of adoption of terms in Bahasa 
Indonesia by fishermen and islanders is explained under the following section. 
2. Bos 
Fishermen and islanders, at the beginning, exclusively applied the term bos53 to the so-
called orang Hong Kong who provided punggawa bontos with money for running live 
reef fish capture fisheries on small islands or those who hired fishermen and paid them 
on monthly salary basis (IV, Zmh, November 2008). The use and adoption of new terms 
(such as bos and pengumpul) have appeared to be among the results of interactions 
between the locals with non-local actors involve in capture fisheries. Greg Acciaioli, in 
his research at Lake Lindu in central Sulawesi, also found that the word “bos” was first 
used by the Lindu inhabitants when Chinese descents and Bugis entrepreneurs—to 
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 Pa’balolang is named after balolang—a type of traditional boats which were extensively used by fish traders in 
Spermonde Archipelago (interview with Rtb, July 2009). Nowadays, none of the existing pa’balolangs in this area 
used this type of boat. 
52
 Fishermen and islanders also use the term pa’balolang to refer to individual entrepreneurs who buy dead fish 
from fishermen and sell the catch to the markets.  
53
 The term “bos” stems from the English word “boss”, and has been officially adopted as a word in Bahasa 
Indonesia. Both “boss” (in English) and “bos” (in Bahasa Indonesia) have exactly the same meaning, which is a 
person who supervises and gives order to the supervised (i.e. employees). 
 60 
whom the term “bos” is applied—entered this area (Acciaioli, 2000). He further suggests 
that the use of Indonesian terms, which replaces the use of local language terms, is 
partly due to multi-ethnic participation in such activity.  
In this region, fishermen consider particular patrons to be boses if they can provide 
financial assistance and protections from legal prosecution for punggawa bontos. In 
other words, boses are patrons for punggawa bontos. Boses can also provide punggawa 
bontos with fishing licenses, including special fishing license for catching IUCN’s 
protected species, such as Napoleon wrasse (Cheilinus undulatus).54 Of all names 
mentioned by informants as boses, all referred to individuals whose businesses were 
collecting and exporting live reef fish. This probably relates to the fact that the term bos 
exists only after live reef fish capture fisheries began in this region. 
3. Punggawa Laut (Punggawa Perahu) 
Punggawa lauts (sea punggawas) or punggawa perahus are those who own boats, 
engines, and fishing equipments and directly involve in fishing activity. They are also 
individuals who only captain boats or fishing vessels (owned by punggawa bontos) and 
lead several fishermen in fishing activity. The latter type of punggawa lauts is called 
captain (nahkoda or kapten). They lead groups of fishermen who employ large-scale 
fishing methods, such as modern boat liftnets. 
3.2.2.2. Clients: The Sawis 
Sawis are fishing laborers or workers. They contribute to fishing by providing man-
power. They do not contribute to providing materials or equipments required and used in 
fishing. According to their main role in capture fisheries, my research findings have 
found two types of sawis exist in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. The first 
type is those who directly involve in fishing activity, and another type is those who do not 
involve in fishing activity and are responsible for managing the catch. In order to 
differentiate the both types, I call the first type fishing sawis and the latter non-fishing 
sawis.  
Fishermen further distinguish non-fishing sawis according to their tasks or 
responsibilities. A non-fishing sawi whose task is only to deliver catch to fish landing 
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 I would like to thank Soenarto, my research assistant, for providing this information. 
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sites (as I have explained before) is called pa’balolang. A non-fishing sawi whose task is 
to sort live reef fish is called pa’sais. Classification of fishing sawis according to their 
tasks is even more diverse. In his thesis, Chozin (2008: 68 - 70) provides a complete 
classification (he calls it job divisions) and description of fishing sawis within a group of 
blast fishermen. 
3.2.2.3. They are Pa’boyas, and are not Sawis 
Some recent works generally refer all fishermen involving in Spermonde Archipelago’s 
capture fisheries to sawis (see Baitoningsih, 2009; Chozin, 2008; Martens, 2009). This is 
a misconception. In Spermonde Archipelago, not all fishermen are willing to be called 
sawis (i.e. fishing sawis). During my fieldworks, neither punggawa bontos nor boses 
called their fishermen (i.e. those who directly involve in fishing activity)  sawis.55 A bos 
on Barrang Caddi Island did not call his fishermern sawis, but pa’boyas instead. 
“Sawis are not similar to fishermen. Sawis are laborers, they do not contribute 
anything [to fishing equipments and materials] except their labor. That man who sorts 
groupers [at my fish landing site] (he pointed to a man) is an example of a sawi. 
Those who seek for fish are all fishermen […] they are called pa’boya (pencari).” (IV, 
Nma, November 2008). 
Without a punggawa laut, fishing sawis cannot go fishing because they do not have any 
means for fishing (i.e. boats and fishing equipments), except man-power and skills. On 
other occasion, Bh, a cyanide fisherman, argued that; 
”I am not a sawi […] I am a pa’boya [because] I own my boat, engine, and fishing 
equipments….” (IV, Bh, November 2008). 
Within each group that consists of several fishermen (at least two fishermen), there is 
one punggawa laut or kapten who lead one or several fishing sawis. Together, they form 
a fishing group called pa’boya56 (Makassar Language) or pa’sappa (Bugis Languange) 
which literally means seeker57 or pencari (Bahasa Indonesia). The number of fishing 
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 Referring fishermen to sawis, they argued, is a mere of researchers’ “immature conclusion” (IV, Nma, November 
2008; IV, Zmh, November 2008; IV, Dsm, November 2008; IV, Rfg, July 2009). 
56
 These groups are also called pa’sappa in Bugis language. However, during fieldworks, the term pa’boya was 
used more often by informants. This is probably due to the fact that Makassar language is more widely used in 
Spermonde Archipelago. 
57
 By seekers, they mean those who seek fish and catch them (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
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sawis in each group depends on fishing methods they are using. The term pa’boya is 
also applied to those who fish individually, for example a handline fisherman (IV, Nma, 
November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). The term pa’boya, therefore, does not refer to 
individuals or groups fishermen. It actually refers to functional unit who conducts fishing; 
they can be groups or individuals fishermen. Pa’boyas are named according to the 
methods they are using for fishing, such as, pa’pekangs (handline fishermen), pa’bubus 
or pa’bus (trap fishermen), pa’biuses (cyanide fishermen), pa’baracungs (blast 
fishermen), and pa’bagangs (modern boat liftnets fishermen).  
The importance of acknowledging the existence of pa’boyas as groups or functional 
units is more than just an effort to contextualize information, or to put information as 
were given by informants (which is a tradition in qualitative research). The existence of 
pa’boyas in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries is an evidence of, what Salman 
(2006) suggests as, the ability of patron-client system to adjust to socio-economic 
contexts. Pa’boyas, for example, do not exist within patron-client groups of traditional 
ship makers (see Salman, 2006). Pa’boyas or seekers appear to exist only among 
patron-client groups whose livelihoods depend on seeking for fish (i.e. capture fisheries). 
Sallatang (1982) also indentified the existence of pa’boyas within patron-client groups of 
capture fisheries in Jeneponto Regency.58 
The use of new terms with regard to the existence of new actors (or groups of actors) 
signal a change in the nature of relationships between the superiors and the inferiors 
(Acciaioli, 2000) in patron-client relationships. This is another rational to highlight the 
existence of pa’boyas (and boses) in this study. As functional units, pa’boyas form sub-
groups (see Figure 8) whose influence within patron-client groups in which they are part 
of is greater than the influence of punggawa lauts or fishing sawis per se. The existence 
of this sub-groups adds dynamics into the structure of patron-client relationships 
(discussed with detail under the following section).  
3.2.3. The Structure of Patron-client Relationships 
Within each patron-client group, a patron and clients interact with each other according 
to sets of unwritten but well-defined roles, rights, and obligations (see Table 5), through 
which power is exercised. Those roles, rights, and obligations shape the structure of 
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 However, he did not discuss how these groups influence the structure of patron-client relationships. 
 63 
patron-client relationships—that is how actors in patron-client groups interact with each 
other. To understand the structure of patron-client relationships in capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago, one must first recognizes hierarchy within this group (see 
Figure 6).  
3.2.3.1. Redefining the Patrons and the Clients 
Boses are positioned at the highest position in the group’s hierarchy. They act as 
patrons for their clients; punggawa bontos. Punggawa bontos are patrons for punggawa 
lauts and non-fishing sawis.  Despite their relatively higher position over fishing sawis, 
punggawa bontos, in fact, do not directly interact with fishing sawis. It has been 
observed during fieldworks that punggawa bontos, for example, did not directly give 
money (and order) to fishing sawis (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, 
Bonetambung Island, August 2009). Being recruited by punggawa lauts, fishing sawis 
are therefore followers or clients of punggawa lauts.  
Figure 8. Typology of patron-client groups in Spermonde Archipelago 
 
Note: (A) Hierarchy and relation between actors within patron-client groups, and (B) illustrations of different types 
of pa’boyas with regard to their fishing methods and number of fishermen. 
Patron-client lines, as is described in Figure 8 above, determine relation between two 
actors in which one acts as patron and one acts as client. The whole patron-client 
relationships within groups are constructed from direct patronage59 and indirect 
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 I limit the definition of patronage to the act of fulfilling patrons’ obligations to clients. 
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patronage. This direct and indirect patronage stems from the multi-level patronage within 
patron-client groups in capture fisheries in this region. 
Fishing sawis are connected to punggawa bontos through intermediaries, in this case 
through punggawa lauts. Hence, fishing sawis are indirect clients to punggawa bontos 
(or, punggawa bontos are indirect patrons to fishing sawis). This is also relation through 
which punggawa lauts are connected to boses, that is through intermediaries (i.e. 
through punggawa bontos). Punggawa lauts and non-fishing sawis are actors who are 
not connected to each other; neither by direct nor indirect patronage.  
Direct and indirect patronages establish a unique structure between actors in patron-
client groups. Both types of relationship (direct and indirect patronage) facilitate the 
distribution of money and/or protection from boses to punggawa bontos and to those at 
lower positions within groups (i.e. punggawa lauts, fishing and non-fishing sawis). Us, a 
punggawa laut on Bonetambung Island illustrated that in situation where punggawa lauts 
cannot fulfill their obligations to fishing sawis (for example to provide money or 
subsistence for fishing sawis during particular situations), punggawa lauts will go to 
punggawa bontos to borrow some money, and give the money to fishing sawis.  
“It does not matter how our financial situation is, we must be able to help our clients 
(sawis) at anytime needed. Sometime [when I did not have any money], I went to my 
punggawa [bontos] to borrow some money for my clients (anggota). But, they (i.e. 
fishing sawis) should not notice this (that he did not have any money and therefore 
needed assistance from his punggawa bonto). Otherwise, it could disrepute me [as a 
punggawa laut]. All they need to know is that I am always capable of providing help 
when needed.” (IV, Us, August 2009). 
This is also the case for punggawa bontos who sometimes go to boses for some amount 
of money they do not have, for example, for releasing their pa’boyas who happen to be 
caught by police for illegal fishing (IV, Gmd, August 2009).  
In the reversed direction (from actors at lower position to actors at higher position in the 
hierarchy), these direct and indirect lines transfer fish to and accumulate money for 
those at higher position in the hierarchy. While direct and indirect patronages are 
capable of facilitating the fulfillment of patrons’ obligations to those at lower positions in 
groups, it appear that both relationships (especially indirect patronage) can no longer 
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transfer the most crucial reward expected by those at higher positions; that is clients’ 
loyalty.  
3.2.3.2. Redefining Loyalty 
Shifting in group’s orientation (into a more economic group) has changed clients’ idea 
about loyalty. Nowadays, loyalty very much depends on the exchange of economic 
resources between patrons and clients. This has been the main medium in which power 
is exercised between actors in order to gain influence over each other. My research’s 
findings suggest that loyalty lasts only as long as each party is capable of performing 
their obligations (see Table 5) to other party. Patrons earn loyalty (from their clients) only 
“as much as” their socio-economic importance. Loyalty, accordingly, is equal to 
economic dependency, which is measured by the amount of money each party can 
contribute to the other. Rfg, a punggawa bonto on Langkai Island, for example, has in 
the past “fled” from several boses, all for one reason; that those patrons priced his fish at 
a lower price (IV, Rfg, July 2009). Gmd, a punggawa bonto on Bonetambung Island, 
would not think twice to leave his current bos (to whom he has worked for more than 10 
years) if only he had enough money to pay his financial debt (IV, Gmd, August 2009).  
Generosity of patrons, a reason for which clients devote their loyalty to patrons (Pelras, 
2000), in this case is no longer free. This generosity is calculated by patrons and is 
added into clients’ debts (to patrons). Even the costs of fulfilling political obligations 
assigned to every punggawa bontos (i.e. protecting their clients from legal prosecution) 
are added to clients’ debts (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Bt, August 2009). In 
Spermonde Archipelago, debts have become a crucial factor by which fishermen are tied 
to punggawa bontos or by which independent fishermen60 and punggawa bontos are tied 
to boses. 
Being indebted to patrons brings consequences. Punggawa lauts indebted to punggawa 
bontos are obliged to sell their catch only to their punggawa bontos who will pay the 
catch at lower price (usually a half price of the normal price offered by markets) (IV, Bh, 
November 2008; IV, Bt, August 2009). This lower price, some punggawa bontos argued, 
is to compensate their help for punggawa lauts and their fishing sawis and the cost for 
transporting the catch to fish landing sites in Makassar (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, 
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 See Box 2. 
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Rfg, July 2009). However, Hls, an eighty-year old fisherman, explained that such 
obligation and consequence (i.e. to sell their catch only to patrons for a lower price) is an 
aspect that occurs only recently. 
”When I was young, pa’boyas (fishermen) might borrow money from our punggawa 
without necessarily being obliged to sell our fish (catch) to them. We usually paid 
back the money [with cash].” (IV, Hls, November, 2008) 
Nowadays, as long as clients are indebted to patrons, they cannot leave or quit their 
groups. To leave, they must pay all their remaining debts. In the case clients are able to 
pay their debts; patrons cannot prevent their clients from leaving their groups (IV, Nma, 
November 2008).  
Fishermen accumulate their debts from costs relate to producing and non-producing 
activities. Producing costs relate to inherent costs in providing equipments and materials 
for harvesting activity. In the case of illegal fishing practices, producing costs might also 
include the costs for protecting fishermen from legal prosecution. On the other hand, 
non-producing costs relate to costs for fulfilling of fishermen’s (and their families) daily 
subsistence (PO, Barrang Caddi Island November 2008; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). 
The prevalent profit-loss sharing rules between patrons (i.e. punggawa bontos or boses) 
and fishermen (i.e. punggawa lauts and fishing sawis) are found to be among factors 
responsible for the accumulation of fishermen’s debt. There are two kinds of profit-loss 
sharing rules depending on types of relationship between punggawa bontos and 
pa’boyas. They are “business owner-operators” and “money lender-money borrowers” 
relationships. 
1. Business Owner-operators Relationship 
This type of relationship is applied to large-scale fishing methods, such as modern boat 
liftnets and blast fishing. Groups of modern boat liftnets fishermen (pa’bagangs) and 
blast fishermen (pa’baracungs) act as operators (with punggawa lauts as captain) on 
fishing vessels/boats owned by punggawa bontos. As owners, punggawa bontos must 
bear all expense (ongkos) for fishing while on the other hand, pa’boyas, as operators, 
contribute nothing to production costs. Hence, this type of relationship does not put 
fishermen on the risks of having loss. All risk of having loss goes to business owners—
punggawa bontos. Fishermen’s debts, however, accumulate from non-producing costs. 
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Fishing with large-scale fishing methods often requires several days of fishing 
expedition. While they are away during the expedition, fishermen need to provide 
subsistence for their families. In most case, punggawa lauts borrow money from their 
punggawa bontos to buy, for example, rice, eggs, and other goods for their families and 
for families of their fishing sawis. Some punggawa bontos have kiosks from which their 
clients may take whatever supplies they need for their families (PO, Bonetambung 
Island, August 2009). Providing subsistence for their families has been found to be the 
main source of their debts, especially when fishing ended up with unsatisfying amount of 
catch. For blast fishermen, another source of debt stems from the money their 
punggawa bontos spent for protecting them from legal prosecution. 
2. Money Lender-money borrowers Relationship 
According to this type of relationship, fishermen are considered (by punggawa bontos) to 
be business owners because they own their boats, engines, and fishing equipments they 
use for fishing. In many cases, boats, engines, and fishing equipments were bought by 
using the money they borrowed from punggawa bontos. This is often the first debts 
through which fishermen are tied to punggawa bontos.  
Punggawa bontos simply lend money asked by fishermen who will have to bear all 
fishing costs and possible loss (IV, Nma, November 2008). This type of relationship 
occurs between punggawa bontos and handline fishermen (pa’pekangs), cyanide 
fishermen (pa’biuses), and trap fishermen (pa’bus). Through observation on the six 
research locations, it appears that the majority of fishermen were tied to punggawa 
bontos by this type of relationship.  
3.2.3.3. Redefining Power-relations 
With patron-client groups undergo reorientation into economic groups; hierarchy within 
groups represents mainly the accumulation of financial capital and social status. The 
higher their hierarchy, the more money they accumulate the higher social status they 
have. Hierarchy, however, does not tell about the accumulation of power and power 
relation among those within groups.  
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Table 5. Roles, rights, and obligations of each actor within patron-client groups 
Obligations to Clients Actors Roles Rights over Clients61 Social and Economic Political 
Bos - Collectors and/or 
exporters 
- Protectors for 
punggawa bontos 
- Provider of financial 
capital for fishing 
- To buy and set price for 
their clients’ catch 
- To lend money to their 
clients 
- To protect their clients from legal 
prosecution (i.e. in illegal fishing) 
- To provide their clients with special 
fishing licenses (e.g. licenses for 
collecting Napoleon wrasse) 
Punggawa bonto - Provider of financial 
capital for fishing 
- Fish collector 
- Protector for pa’boyas 
- To buy and set price for 
their clients’ catch 
- To set or choose profit-
loss sharing rules 
- To recruit punggawa 
lauts and non-fishing 
sawis 
- To provide subsistence and 
money for clients in case of 
contingencies (e.g. illness, 
accidents) 
- To provide means of 
production for fishing for their 
clients (whenever asked by 
clients) 
- To contribute to clients’ life 
cycle ceremonials (e.g. 
marriage, birth, death) 
- To protect their clients from legal 
prosecution (in illegal fishing) 
- To protect their clients in horizontal 
fishing-related conflicts 
Punggawa laut - Leader in fishing 
activity 
- Mediator/intermediary 
between punggawa 
bontos and fishing 
sawis 
 
 
- To decide which fishing 
methods to be employed 
- To decide fishing 
locations 
- To recruit fishing sawis 
- To set or choose profit-
loss sharing in their 
groups 
- To provide subsistence and 
money for clients in case of 
contingencies (e.g. illness, 
accidents) 
- To protect their clients in horizontal 
fishing-related conflicts 
Fishing sawi - Fishing labor (not available) - To participate in fishing 
activity 
(not available) 
Non-fishing sawi - Labor (not available) - To manage fishermen’s 
catch 
(not available) 
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 Because fishing and non-fishing sawis are positioned at the lowest level within groups’ hierarchy, they do not have clients. Please notice that the rights clients may claim 
from their patrons are implicitly contained in “Obligations to Clients”.  
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Being established for economic interest, producing has become a central aspect in 
patron-client groups. Without producing, patron-client groups cannot survive. Holding the 
key role in producing, therefore, has granted punggawa lauts greater power than before. 
There are two situations that amplify the power of punggawa lauts within patron-clients 
groups, especially power and influence over punggawa bontos. Punggawa lauts can leave 
their groups and join other groups often for more interesting financial benefit offered by 
other patrons or exporters in the city (see Box 1).62 Even though with financial capital they 
own punggawa bontos may recruit new punggawa lauts, this by fact is no longer an easy 
task. With patron-client groups flourish in Spermonde Archipelago, competition among 
punggawa bontos in recruiting punggawa lauts has become more intense (PO, Barrang 
Lompo Island, April 2008; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). At the same time, 
recruiting (and maintaining) punggawa lauts cost punggawa bontos more effort and 
expenses. This is not to mention that, selecting potential fishermen (to be recruited as 
punggawa lauts) is a risky task. Gdn, a relatively new punggawa bonto of Barrang Caddi 
Island, mentioned that a few of his newly-recruited punggawa lauts, who happened to live 
on other islands, were unmotivated or dishonest fishermen who secretly sold their catch to 
other buyers for higher price (IV, Gdn, November 2008). 
During my fieldworks, I observed that punggawa lauts hold “control” over their fishing 
sawis (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, April 2008; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; 
PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). If a punggawa laut decides to leave his punggawa bonto, 
he will leave with all of his fishing crew (IV, Us, August 2009). Because fishing sawis are 
the followers of punggawa lauts, fishing sawis will automatically leave their current patron-
client groups when their punggawa lauts decide so. Bst, a fishing sawi of a group of trap 
fishermen said that, “If my punggawa [laut] decide to join other punggawa bonto, [then] I 
will follow my punggawa [laut].” (IV, Bst, August 2009). Another reason for fishing sawis to 
follow their punggawa lauts (in case their punggawa lauts decide to leave their current 
groups) is that they simply do not have any choice. This is, I would argue, a consequence 
of the indirect relation between fishing sawis and punggawa bontos. In a dispute between 
punggawa bontos and punggawa lauts, fishing sawis will tend to support decisions taken 
by punggawa lauts; their direct patrons. This is another situation that amplifies the power 
of punggawa lauts over punggawa bontos. 
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 One patron-client group on Barrang Caddi Island collapsed because a significant number of pa’boyas left their 
group for some reasons (IV, Zmh, November 2008). 
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Box 1. The rise of patron-client groups in capture fisheries 
 
 
 
 
“I was the only punggawa [laut] on Bonetambung Island,” said Uns, an eighty-year 
old fisherman, in August 2009. “I fished with four [fishing] sawis [….] I was not 
punggawa bonto. Those we called punggawa bonto [at that time] were people who 
lived in Makassar, to whom we sold our catch.” 
This was the answer given by Uns, when I asked him about the existence of punggawa 
bontos on his island, and in Spermonde Archipelago in general, in the past. What Uns 
wanted to inform was there were no punggawa bontos on Bonetambung Island and in 
Spermonde Archipelago in the past. He further explained that, punggawa bontos have 
existed on Bonetambung Island since the live reef fish capture fisheries began.  
Live reef fish industry has facilitated the creation of patron-client groups on small 
islands in this region. Several entrepreneurs (i.e. the so-called orang Hong Kong) 
facilitated this by providing money for some islanders on the islands of Barrang Caddi, 
Barrang Lompo, and Bonetambung (who later on became known as punggawa bontos) 
so that they recruited fishermen and supported them with equipments and materials for 
catching live reef fish (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Uns, August 2009).  
The collapse of some patron-client groups is followed by the rise of new ones. At least 
four punggawa bontos of live reef fish are identified only on an island as small as 
Bonetambung (PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009; IV, Uns, August 2009). This 
situation has caused a more intense competition between punggawa bontos in 
recruiting potential fishermen, especially with the prevalent tendency for fishermen to 
work directly for boses in Makassar (PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). On the 
other hand, punggawa lauts also compete for fishing sawis (IV, Us, August 2009). 
“I was the only punggawa [laut] on Bonetambung Island […] and the others were 
my [fishing] sawis. Although there were fewer people living on this island, I was the 
only punggawa [laut], so I have a lot of [fishing] sawis.” (IV, Uns, August 2009) 
Nowadays, recruiting and maintaining punggawa lauts cost punggawa bontos more 
expenses. Nma, a bos on Barrang Caddi Island, experienced the impact of such 
competition in 1995;  
“I was confused. Dozens of my pa’boyas (fishermen) came to me, and paid their 
debts. Later on I noticed that Wk (an exporter of live reef fish) gave them that 
money. He offered my pa’boyas better price, so that they preferred to work for him. 
I then called Wk and told him to stop taking my pa’boyas.” (IV, Nma, November 
2008)  
To stop the “exodus”, Nma increased the price for every live reef fish his fishermen 
managed to catch. Nowadays, he often calls other boses and punggawa bontos to 
check the price they offer to their fishermen. If Nma found that he paid less, then he 
would adjust to the highest price offered by others. He also gives his fishermen bonus 
depending on the total amount of live reef fish each fisherman can deliver in every 
month (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
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3.2.4. Dynamics of Patron-client Groups 
Dynamics of patron-client groups, in this study, refer to changes in group size and 
diversity. The emerging structure of patron-client relationships (from exercises of rights 
and obligations between actors) has provided space for each actor to independently make 
decisions with regard to their participation in and contribution to groups. Under the 
following sub-chapters, I explain how such structure facilitates dynamics of patron-client 
groups, and how such dynamics influence capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago. 
3.2.4.1. Changes in Group Size 
Group size is the total number of bos, punggawa bontos, punggawa lauts, fishing sawis, 
and non-fishing sawis within a group. The size of each group changes from time to time, 
partly as the result of patrons’ decisions (to recruit and/or expel their clients) and partly as 
the result of clients’ decisions (to leave or join in group). Such decisions made by patrons 
and clients are found to be based on consideration of the following factors. 
Honesty, diligence, and fishing skills are factors on which patrons rely their decisions 
either to recruit, maintain, or to expel their clients (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Rfg, July 
2009; IV, Gmd, August 2009). Patrons prefer to recruit and maintain fishermen who can 
impress them with those three factors. For most patrons, honesty appears to be the most 
important factor. Patrons tend to expel dishonest fishermen despite their acknowledged 
diligence and fishing skills (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Dsm, November 2008). On the 
other hand, clients in general consider honesty, wealth, and generosity as important 
characteristics all patrons must have. By generosity, clients expect that patrons will 
provide them with money or subsistence and buy their catch at better price (IV, Kde, April 
2008; IV, Bh, November 2008). On each island, my research findings suggest that clients 
prefer to work for patrons they consider the richest and the most generous persons. For 
blast and cyanide fishermen, the capacity to protect clients from legal prosecution or to 
release them from jail are a crucial feature all patrons must have. Without such protection, 
no fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago will dare employing illegal fishing methods (FGD, 
Barrang Caddi Island, 2008). Blast and cyanide fishermen, therefore, prefer to work for 
those reputed to have greater capacity to provide their clients with this kind of protection 
(IV, Dsm, January 2010). 
Cheating (jekong) is considered the most dishonorable conduct. Patrons will expel 
fishermen they notice to sell all or some of their catch to other patrons (for higher price) 
(IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Rfg, July 2009). On the clients’ side, they need to be 
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convinced that their patrons do not lie to them regarding the appropriate price for their 
catch or regarding the amount of their debts to patrons.63 Having their relationship relies 
on unwritten agreements; honesty has become the most important factor through which 
patron-client relationships are nurtured. Fishermen reputed as cheaters will be rejected by 
other patrons and patrons reputed as dishonest persons will be abandoned by their clients 
and no fishermen will join their groups. In particular cases, clients also leave their patrons 
for another reason; that they want to start their own business as independent fishermen. 
3.2.4.2. Changes in Group Diversity 
Group diversity is the variety of types of pa’boyas constituting a patron-client group. In 
Figure 6, I illustrated three types of pa’boyas with regard to their fishing methods, such as 
a handline fisherman (pa’pekang), a group of trap fishermen (pa’bus), and a group of 
cyanide fishermen (pa’bius). While changes in group size are the result of independent 
decisions made by each individual (boses, punggawa bontos, punggawa lauts, fishing 
sawis and non-fishing sawis), changes in group diversity depend mainly on decisions 
taken by punggawa lauts (see rights given to punggawa lauts under Table 5). 
Changes in group size do not necessarily change group diversity64, while changes in 
group diversity may change group size. This is because particular fishing methods require 
a minimum number of fishing crew (see Table 6). Hence, group size will change as 
punggawa lauts decide which fishing methods will be employed. By changing fishing 
methods, punggawa lauts will need to recruit new fishing sawis or expel current fishing 
sawis. 
Dynamics of patron-client groups (either in size and diversity) may occur permanently or 
temporarily. Temporal dynamics have been observed to be driven by seasonal patterns of 
occurrence of particular target fish in Spermonde Archipelago (IV, Rhm, May 2008; PO, 
Barrang Lompo Island, May 2008; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008, PO, 
Langkai Island, July 2009). Seasonality in the occurrence of particular target fish has 
motivated fishermen (i.e. punggawa lauts) to temporarily change their fishing methods 
(FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; FDG, Bonetambung Island, August 2009).  
                                                 
63
 In Spermonde Archipelago, almost all fishermen never take notes regarding the amount of their debts to their 
patrons. They tend to leave the calculation of their debts to their patrons (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November; PO, 
Barrang Lompo Island, November 2008). It often becomes source of conflict between clients and patrons, which 
often ends up with clients leave their groups and join other groups (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
64
 In Spermonde Archipelago, some punggawa bontos specify their business only in one commodity, for example live 
reef fish. Hence, one might easily find a relatively bigger patron-client group consisting of a relatively homogenous 
groups of pa’boyas fishing by using the same fishing method. 
 73 
Box 2. Social class struggle: The rise of independent fishermen 
 
As an illustration, a punggawa laut of cyanide fishermen targeting on live reef fish 
changes their fishing method into handline fishing from June until September because 
narrow-barred mackerels are abundant in the archipelago during this period (FGD, 
Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). The method for fishing narrow-barred mackerels 
requires only hook and line and one person on a boat (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). 
 “In South Sulawesi, [at least one of the] four factors entitles a person as karaeng 
(nobleman); blood lines (garis keturunan), courage (keberanian), position in 
government’s office (pangkat), and wealth (kekayaan). Through the first and the 
second factors, the title karaeng can be transferred to their children, but it cannot 
[be transferred] through the third and the fourth factors […] Children of the former 
karaengs will only be called karaeng if they could maintain [at least a similar level 
of] wealth [as their parents had] or if they could earn the same position (pangkat) 
[as their parents did].” (IV, Mfd, May 2010). 
While social hierarchy is common to all societies (von Rueden, et al., 2008), social 
status matters most among the hierarchical people of South Sulawesi (Pelras, 2000; 
2006). Accordingly, struggle for social class has appeared to be a common 
phenomenon in Spermonde Archipelago. Such struggle is facilitated through capture 
fisheries, most notably, through live reef fish industry. Through the latter, fishermen 
strive to accumulate wealth; the source of nobility everyone nowadays could possibly 
achieve (IV, Us, August 2009; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
In their efforts to accumulate wealth, shortening the intermediary chains of catch 
distribution (that is by selling their catch directly to boses in Makassar) has been a 
strategy employed by fishermen (IV, Nma, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009). Shorter chains mean bigger margin of benefit (IV, Us, August 2009). 
Fishermen who employ the strategy are seen as independent fishermen or nelayan 
bebas. 
By independent (bebas), fishermen and islanders are not tied or indebted to any 
patrons on small islands. However, those independent fishermen are not as 
independent as one might think. To be independent fisherman, one must first pay their 
debts to punggawa bontos or boses on small islands. To do this, fishermen in almost all 
of the cases, borrow money from boses, to whom they are then indebted (PO, 
Bonetambung Island, August 2009). However, fishermen believe that moving their 
debts to boses should make a significant difference. Us, one of the independent 
fishermen, believed that being an independent fisherman is a small step he must take 
for a greater leap; that is being a rich and a nobleman. He called such a decision as 
self-supporting or berdikari. It has appeared that the main idea of being an independent 
fisherman is to no longer be inferior to anyone on the island. Hence, their social status 
is considered improved. 
“If [one] wanted to improve the [economic] condition of his family, [then] berdikari is 
the only way. [As an independent fisherman], I cannot be considered similar with 
fishermen indebted to punggawa [bontos] on this island. I am an independent 
fisherman, [while] they are not. Nobody can tell me what to do now. […] This makes 
me proud.” (IV, Us, August 2009).  
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Therefore, to shift from cyanide to handline fishing, a punggawa laut has to abandon his 
only fishing sawi. This is also the case for punggawa lauts of trap fishermen who prefer to 
use smaller boats to seek for octopus during the northwest monsoon (FGD, Bonetambung 
Island, August 2009) and, accordingly, temporarily abandon their fishing sawis.  
Changing fishing methods changes the diversity and size of the whole group. Hence, a 
patron-client group known as a “dynasty of cyanide fishermen” might appear as a group 
consisting of mainly handline fishermen during the southeast monsoon (i.e. from June 
until September). On the other hand, those who are recognized as handline fishermen 
during the southeast monsoon are actually one of fishing sawis in groups of blast 
fishermen during another monsoon (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, April 2008; IV, Rhm, April 
2008). 
Figure 9. Monsoons and the seasonal occurrence of three target fish 
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(Source: FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008 and FDG, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
3.2.4.3. The Impact of Group Dynamic on Marine and Coastal Resource Exploitation 
With regard to fishing methods they are using, each type of pa’boyas occupies a particular 
“niche” in capture fisheries in this region. Such niche, in this study, is defined as spatial, 
temporal, and biological resources utilization of marine and coastal areas. Groups of 
modern boat liftnets (pa’bagangs) are found to occupy a niche in which they have a 
broader range of biological resources to be exploited (i.e. any pelagic fish), but within 
relatively narrower spatial and temporal ranges. Niches of each pa’boyas, of which 
overlapping is possible, compiled under Table 6. 
According to their niche, each type of pa’boyas delivers different impacts on the present 
and future states of marine and coastal ecosystem in this region. The different impacts 
relate to their spatial and temporal utilization of marine and coastal zones, and the fishing 
equipments, materials, and techniques they are using for harvesting biological resources. 
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Blast fishing, for example, has contributed to a significant decrease in coral reef diversity 
and live coral cover in Spermonde Archipelago (Jompa, et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
an estimated decrease in live coral cover caused by cyanide fishing activity in Indonesia 
ranged between 0.05 and 0.06 m2 per 100 m2 of reef per year65  (Mous, et al., 2000). 
Handline fishing, although constituted 59 per cent of the total fishing effort in Spermonde 
Archipelago, contributed only five per cent to the total catch (Pet-Soede, et al., 2001a). 
Table 6. Niches of pa’boyas with regard to their fishing methods 
 
Fishing Time 
 No Types of Fishing Method/Pa’boya 
Fishing 
Zones by 
Depth (m) Within a Year In a Day 
Number of 
Fishermen 
Required 
Target 
Fish 
1 Modern boat liftnets/Pa’bagang 45 – 60 
Throughout the 
year (except 
during full moon) 
18:00 – 06:00 7 – 15 
Any 
pelagic 
fish 
3 Handline fishing  
 Pa’pekang 7 – 60 Throughout the year 06:00 – 18:00 1 Any fish 
 Pa’tinumbu 15 – 60 June – September 06:00 – 18:00 1 
Skipjack 
mackerels 
 Pa’gurita Max. at 15 January – April 06:00 – 18:00 1 Octopus 
4 Blast fishing/Pa’baracung 7 – 60 
Throughout the 
year 06:00 – 17:00 
3 or 
4 – 666 
Any reef 
and some 
pelagic 
fish 
Max. at 15 Throughout the year 06:00 – 18:00 4 – 6 
Live reef 
fish 5 Trap Fishing/Pa’bu 
Max. at 15 Throughout the year 
17:00 and 
6:00 1 – 2 
Any reef 
fish 
6 Cyanide Fishing/Pa’bius Max. at 15 
Throughout the 
year 06:00 – 18:00 2 
Live reef 
fish 
(Source: FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008, FGD, Kodingareng Lompo Island, May 2010, IV, Rtb, July 
2009). 
Niches occupied by pa’boyas contribute to the “niches” of their patron-client groups. The 
higher group diversity, the broader niche those groups occupy. A patron-client group 
consisting of different types of pa’boyas is able to exploit marine and coastal ecosystems 
at broader spatial and temporal ranges and to harvest various target fish. As an 
illustration, Dsm’s patron-client group consists of individuals fishermen who fish by using 
handline and groups of blast fishermen, cyanide fishermen, and modern boat liftnets 
fishermen (PO, Kodingareng Lompo Island, November 2008; PO, Kodingareng Lompo 
Island, May 2010). Hence, it can be predicted that this group could deliver wider range of 
impact on marine and coastal ecosystems than a patron-client group that consists of only 
                                                 
65
 These estimations were lower than the published rates of natural coral recovery. Nevertheless, differences in 
growth rate between species of hard coral would cause coral reef to take longer time to recover from the effects of 
cyanide fishing (Mous, et al., 2000). 
66
 Number of fishermen required in blast fishing depends on types of boats used. Smaller-scale blast fishing requires 
smaller boats with three persons (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009), while larger boats (i.e. jolloro) carry more crews, 
for example six fishermen (PO, Kodingareng Lompo Island, May 2010). 
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cyanide fishermen or handline fishermen. In the case punggawa lauts permanently or 
temporarily decide to change their fishing methods (and therefore change their niches), 
then niche of the whole group will also change. This will change the patterns of marine 
and coastal resources exploitation. Dynamics of patron-client groups in capture fisheries 
are, therefore, a significant aspect through which marine and coastal resources 
exploitation in this region is affected. 
3.2.4.4. The Emerging Networks 
Boses, punggawa bontos, and pa’boyas of the same patron-client group may live on 
different islands. Patron-client relationships between them have created networks67 by 
which small islands are connected to each other. One patron-client group can connect 
several small islands to one island that acts as network’s hub. Figure 8 illustrates how one 
patron-client group creates a network through which six islands are connected to one 
island.68 The network covers a relatively huge area in Spermonde Archipelago because 
the bos has successfully increased his group size by recruiting more fishermen from other 
islands (IV, Nma, November 2008). What is drawn as flat, two-dimensional network 
actually holds important spatial and socio-economic aspects that influence marine and 
coastal resource exploitation in the archipelago.  
This network covers areas in Makassar Municipality and Pangkajene Kepulauan by linking 
the islands of Barrang Caddi (as network hub) to the islands of Barrang Lompo, Badi, 
Bonetambung, Lumu-lumu, Sarappo Lompo and Kodingareng Lompo (Figure 8). With its 
geographical coverage, this single network is able to facilitate the distribution of means of 
production (fishing equipments and money) and fuel a more vibrant socio-economic in 
Spermonde Archipelago.69 This network also mobilizes live reef fish from all over fishing 
grounds within (and outside) Spermonde Archipelago to a single small island where more 
money is accumulated (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November; PO, Barrang Lompo Island, 
November 2008).70 
                                                 
67
 Network is a set of nodes and set of lines between pairs of nodes through which two-directional flow of tangible 
and intangible materials occurs between nodes (Johnson, 2009; Nooy, et al., 2005).  
68
 The data I used to construct Figure 8 were collected from interviews with Nma on November 2008. Nma is among 
the first islanders who established patron-client groups following the beginning of live reef fish capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago. During my field stay on small islands in Spermonde Archipelago, I have found that Nma 
organized the largest patron-client group specialized in the capture of live reef fish (IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Bt, August 
2009; IV, Gmd, August 2009). Network drawn in Figure 8, for a technical reason, excludes 50 pa’boyas of cyanide 
fishing (equals to 100 fishermen) living on Barrang Caddi Island and all non-fishing sawis working to this network. 
69
 An Approximate of 238 households on seven small islands rely their socio-economic on this network. 
70
 On small islands where many punggawa bontos and/or boses live, one could easily find huge, concrete-made, 
two-story houses surrounded by smaller, semi-permanent houses made of woods (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, 
November 2008; PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). On Barrang 
Lompo Island, there is a small neighborhood called Kampung Dollar (The Hamlet of Dollar). This is a neighborhood 
where richer punggawa bontos and/or boses built their houses (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, May 2008). 
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Covering a relatively large area in Spermonde Archipelago, boses and/or punggawa 
bontos are capable of influencing marine and coastal resources exploitation in Spermonde 
Archipelago through their patron-client networks. My research findings suggest that, for 
example, networks of this kind have facilitated the adoption, distribution, and persistence 
of illegal fishing practices in this region (see Sub-chapter 5.2.2).71 
Figure 10. An illustration of a patron-client network specialized in live reef fish capture 
fisheries 
 
(Source: IV, Nma, November 2008). 
3.3. Integration into Global Markets: The “Unintended Effects” 
The establishment of Makassar Industrial Park (Kawasan Industri Makassar or KIMA) by 
the end of 1980s has, to some extent, strengthened relationship between fishermen in 
Spermonde Archipelago (through patron-client groups) and global markets. Until 2006, 
KIMA has facilitated 12 companies exporting various marine commodities from Makassar 
to countries in Asia, Africa, Australia, America and Europe (KIMA, nd). To support this 
sector72, government, through Natural Resource Conservation Council (Badan Konservasi 
                                                 
71
 It partly explains the persistent of illegal fishing practices in Spermonde Archipelago despite the implementation of 
World Bank’s funded project (COREMAP) between 2001 and 2007 in Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency (COREMAP, 
2009). Allocating all of project resources to, among others, stop illegal fishing practices in Pangkajene Kepulauan 
Regency, I argue that the project has been “deceived” by the boundary of problems they devised for the project. 
Assuming problems to be local in origin, the project aimed to solve only “manageable” problems (which were 
rendered technical and, therefore, responsive to technical interventions) and not others; setting aside their relations 
to broader social and economic systems (Li, 2007), or, in our case, the geographical coverage of networks of patron-
client groups and relation with global markets. The project could not “see” that the actors behind illegal fishing 
practices (i.e. punggawa bontos or boses) reside outside its administrative project’s boundaries (i.e. Pangkajene 
Kepulauan Regency). 
72
 Fisheries, including capture fisheries, was the third sector that contributed to the USD 500 millions earned to 
regional petty cash of South Sulawesi (BPS, 2009b). Hence, this sector is nominated as an important leading sector 
in South Sulawesi. Contribution of this sector to regional income continues to increase from year to year 
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Sumberdaya Alam or BKSDA) of South Sulawesi, has so far issued 39 licenses for 
exporting mostly edible commodities until 2007 (BKSDA Sulawesi Selatan, nd). This is a 
policy that supports annual increase in the value of the fisheries exports of South 
Sulawesi (Figure 11) and integration of Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries into 
global markets in the 20th century. 
Figure 11. The value of fisheries export of South Sulawesi from 2006 to 2009 
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(Source: modified from Departemen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan, 2008; 2010). 
Integration into global markets is not without consequences. Increasing resources 
exploitation and ecosystem degradation in Spermonde Archipelago are among the 
“unintended effects” of the integration. Demand and supply chain have turned previously-
untargeted species into marketable commodities for global markets. Extensive harvesting 
of sea bamboos (bambu laut or Isis hippuris) which began in the middle of 2000s (IV, Rfg, 
July 2009) is one recent example. Piles of sea bamboos were wasted on small islands 
(PO, Karanrang Island, March 2009; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009), leaving ecologically 
important species invaluable harvest. This signals over-exploitation of the species. Glg, 
one of the very few divers on Langkai Island explained that; 
“Collectors do not want to buy [those sea bamboos] because they say that the size 
(the diameter) is too small. I did not dive for sea bamboos anymore […] because even 
though collecting sea bamboos is an easy task […] it is very difficult to find big size 
(large diameter) sea bamboos nowadays….” (IV, Glg, July 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Departemen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan, 2008; 2010), which implies a continuation in the increasing of 
production and, at the same time, exploitation of marine and coastal resources.  
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Increasing vulnerability to food insecurity is another effect of integration into global 
markets. Such phenomenon has been observed, at least, in four research locations (PO, 
Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008, PO, Langkai Island, July 2009, PO, Lanyukang 
Island, July 2009; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). Fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago have long been exposed to monsoons that provide them with both challenges 
and opportunities. Northwest monsoon, for example, constrains fishing activity. Strong 
wind and heavy rain force fishermen to migrate to fishing grounds outside Spermonde 
Archipelago or to stay on their islands and fish for subsistence in the surroundings of their 
islands. During the northwest monsoon, many households became susceptible to food 
insecurity (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, April 2008; Barrang Caddi Island, November 
2008).73 Such vulnerability, nevertheless, is exacerbated by fishermen’s tendency to fish 
species they do not eat and send their catch to consumers living in other countries; 
leaving themselves with economically less valuable side-catch. A more lucrative offer (i.e. 
higher prices) has motivated fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago to fish for fulfilling 
demands of global markets (see Box 3).74 
As a trade-off for cash money they obtain from selling their catch, fishermen experience a 
situation in which their households are becoming more dependent on goods imported 
from the city (i.e. Makassar) (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009; PO, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009). An ironic phenomenon was observed on the islands of Barrang Lompo and 
Barrang Caddi where supply of protein for many households depended on irregular supply 
of milkfish from mainland of South Sulawesi (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, November 2008; 
PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). Such a dependency, I would argue, alters 
vulnerability because connection between small islands and the mainland (i.e. Makassar), 
from which foods are imported, is problematic during northwest monsoon. Of the six 
researched islands, only three islands (i.e. the islands of Barrang Lompo, Barrang Caddi, 
and Kodingareng Lompo) were supported by regular ferries. Transportation to the other 
islands (i.e. the islands of Bonetambung, Langkai and Lanyukang) relied on fishermen’s 
boats (PO, Makassar, August 2009).  
                                                 
73
 Vulnerability to food insecurity is altered because monsoonal cycle and resources availability (as described in 
Figure 6) have become unpredictable (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; FGD, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009). During my field stay on the islands of Langkai and Lanyukang in July 2009, Lpa, Mtf, and Awl 
(fishermen from Kondongbali Island, Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency) informed that anchovy has eventually 
aggregated for spawning in the coastal water of these islands after disappearing for two years; something that never 
occurred before. Previously, anchovy always aggregated in the coastal water of these islands and in the coastal 
water of Kondongbali Island between June and September every year. Unfortunately, no anchovy aggregated at the 
surrounding of Kondongbali Island that year (in 2009). 
74
 After the establishment of KIMA, narrow-barred mackerels, for example, is priced according to its weight and size. 
Thus, fishermen earn more financial benefit than before (IV, Nma, November  2009). 
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Islanders in Spermonde Archipelago are reluctant to go to Makassar (either by regular 
ferries or fishermen’s boats) during northwest monsoon, in order to avoid any worst 
situation that could happen anytime.75 Hence, some families often stock insufficient 
amount of goods (for example rice, noodles, eggs, and sugar) and, when they are running 
out of their stocks, they rely on whatever resources available in the surroundings of their 
islands (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2007; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009; IV, 
Kde, April 2008; IV, Rfg, July 2009). 
Increasing vulnerability also stems from the prevalent mode of production76 in capture 
fisheries in this region through which fishermen are marginalized. This mode of 
production, I argue, emerges from interaction between the structure of patron-client 
relationships and the capitalistic economic system brought by global markets. The latter 
system is characterized by tendencies to devour natural resources, widen inequality 
between entities chained to economic of this kind, and its design to maximize returns to 
capital owners (Barnes, 2006; Glyn, 2006). Through this mode of production, money and 
risks are unevenly distributed between actors. In this system, more money are distributed 
to actors at higher hierarchy (i.e. punggawa bontos and boses), while, on the other hand, 
risks accumulate to those at lower hierarchy (i.e. punggawa lauts and fishing sawis).77 
The diminishing margin of profit experienced by fishermen relates to lengthen chains in 
patron-client groups. Integration into global markets through live reef fish industry has put 
new actors at local level, such as boses and punggawa bontos (see Box 1), with whom 
financial benefits must be shared. As an illustration, punggawa bontos buy live groupers 
from pa’boyas at 50 to 75 per cent lower price than the price punggawa bontos will get 
from their boses in Makassar.  
 “I sell a super-size sunu78 to my bos for 300 thousands rupiah (equals to USD 30)79. I 
take (buy) the fish [from my fishermen] at the price only 150 thousands rupiah.” (IV, 
Ns, August 2009). 
                                                 
75
 In a visit on Badi Island, it was reported that a regular ferry sank when approaching the island, causing five 
peoples died (IV, Mfd, May 2010). To fish during northwest monsoon is as risky as to sail to Makassar. Fishermen 
could be trapped in heavy rain and lost in the sea. Dln, a handline fisherman of Langkai Island was once lost in the 
sea during northwest monsoon (IV, Dln, July 2009). 
76
 Referring to Robbins (2006), I define mode of production as a combination of key social and material elements 
(e.g. technology, capital, etc) and the interrelations among them, which creates different ways of making a living from 
nature. 
77
 See the rules of profit-loss sharing on page 66-67. 
78
 Sunu is particular species of groupers. Fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago classify groupers into sunu and 
kerapu.  Sunu refers to groupers with bright colors (orange to red), while kerapu refers to groupers with dark colors 
(brown to black) (PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). Kerapu, in general, is cheaper than sunu. Kerapu, for 
example, was bought from pa’boyas at the price USD 3, and was sold to bos only for USD 5 (IV, Ns, June 2008). 
79
 To ease on calculation USD 1 equals to IDR. 10,000. I used this conversion rate in this monograph. 
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Further marginalization has occurred to fishermen, as they are losing control over the 
pricing of their catch. Again, I take an illustration from live reef fish capture fisheries. 
Pricing mechanism applies to live groupers is depending on the species of the groupers 
and the individual’s weight of the fish. Accordingly, each grouper is categorized into one of 
the following categories; bebi, super, and ekoran (IV, Ndr, November 2008; IV, Smr, 
August 2009). Groupers of the same species, but are different in size, have different 
prices (see Table 7). To most cyanide fishermen, pricing mechanism for live reef fish has 
appeared to be coming “out of the blue”. The best idea they have about pricing 
mechanism in live reef fish industry is, as mentioned by Us, “The price of live groupers is 
set by punggawa [bontos], (and) it (the price) also depends on (the price set by) boses in 
Makassar.” (IV, Us, August 2009).  
Table 7. An example of pricing mechanisms for live groupers at the level of punggawa 
bonto on Bonetambung Island in 2008 
 
Categories Weight per individual Price (IDR) 
Bebi 0.2 – 0.49 kg 50,000/kg 
Super 0.5 – 1 kg 175,000/kg 
Ekoran > 1 kg 150,000/kg 
(Source: courtesy of the Students Association of Anthropology, Hasanuddin University, Makassar). 
Such a categorization under Table 7 above might relate to consumer’s preference for 
consuming groupers of certain range of weight (see Bentley, 1999: 104). Higher price 
applies to groupers of category super (although smaller than ekoran) probably relates to 
the inherent aesthetical aspect attached to groupers of this size: that they looked nice 
whenever served on plates for consumers (IV, Muhammad Neil, August 2011). 
Nevertheless, indications of marginalization to fishermen through pricing mechanism 
surface from the following findings.  
Pricing mechanism for live groupers at Singaporean restaurants differs to those applied at 
punggawa bonto and boses levels in Spermonde Archipelago. In his report, Bentley 
explained that discrepancy in pricing of groupers at various restaurants in Singapore 
related to the species of groupers and the “class” of the restaurants (i.e. elite or cheaper 
class restaurants) serving those groupers. Groupers of the same species were offered to 
consumers at exactly the same price for every kilogram demanded (Table 8) and 
categorization according to range of weight, as in Spermonde Archipelago, was not 
applied at Singaporean restaurants. 
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Categorization and pricing of groupers in Spermonde Archipelago is not standardized. 
Different punggawa bontos on different islands applied different ranges of weight for 
categorization. It also changes from time to time. Ndr, a punggawa pengumpul on Barrang 
Caddi Island, applied different ranges of weight for categorizing groupers than those 
applied on Bonetambung Island (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). In 
November 2008, Ndr categorized groupers into super to individual fish weighted between 
0.6 – 1.2 kg. Accordingly, categories bebi and ekoran were applied to individual groupers 
weighted between 0.2 – 0.59 kg and heavier than 1.2 kg, respectively. Such discrepancy 
in categorizing live groupers was also found to be a prevalent phenomenon at different 
fish landing sites in Makassar (Radjawali, accepted). Two of my informants (one is a bos 
on Badi island) reported that such pricing mechanism has been applied to groupers since 
the late 1990s. Previously, the price for every kilogram of live groupers is priced only 
according to their species (IV, Aks, May 2010; IV, Idr, May 2010). 
Box 3. A special dinner on Bonetambung Island 
 
According to these findings, I suggest that the prevalent pricing mechanism for groupers 
in Spermonde Archipelago is not driven by size-preference among consumers in 
On one occasion in August 2009, my research assistant (Soenarto) and I were having 
a dinner with Us and his family. That dinner was special, as the small family was 
celebrating the safe return of Us (and his fishing sawis) after days of fishing. The menu 
served for both of us was nice. Unlike the days before (when we mostly consumed 
eggs), that night Us’s wife served grilled groupers for each of us. It was a rare occasion 
indeed, considering that I was never served with groupers during my field stay in 
Spermonde Archipelago. However, that night, there were two bebi-sized groupers 
served for me and my assistant. Us, his wife, and their daughter were happy with the 
economically less valuable species such as trigger and parrot fish.  
In the morning after, when I was having a session of focus group discussion with a 
group of housewives, I finally noticed that they rarely cooked groupers, tunas, narrow-
barred mackerels, octopus, mackerels, snapper, sea cucumbers, or other valuable fish 
for their families. They only did that on special occasions. None of them had ever 
cooked or eaten sea cucumbers as their menu. It was not their delicacy they said 
(FGD, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
“It is much better to sell those kinds of fish to punggawa [bontos], [because] their 
prices are good. We cooked them rarely, except for wedding party. [However], we 
did not serve them for all quests, only for family or for particular persons, for 
example our husbands’ punggawas. We also served them if we have special guests 
coming to our island or to our houses,” said one of them.  
Sy, a punggawa bonto on Bonetambung Island once said, “Since 1996, people [of 
Bonetambung Island] have stopped eating groupers.” (IV, Sy, August 2009). 
Considering this information, I could not agree more that the dinner we had that night 
was indeed a special one. 
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Singapore and Hong Kong, but is merely a strategy developed (most probably by boses in 
Makassar) to increase their benefits at the expense of fishermen’s loss. The strategy 
might be designed to cope with a diminishing margin of benefit stemming from an 
accumulated financial investments (capital) made by boses and the decreasing supply of 
live reef fish from this region (and from eastern part of Indonesia in general) since 1995 
(see Bentley, 1999: 29). Decreasing in the overall stock of groupers in Spermonde 
Archipelago has appeared to be an obvious phenomenon for fishermen, especially 
cyanide fishermen, in this region. This is especially observed by older fishermen or 
islanders. 
“Around the 1970s, I could catch to twenty sunu and kerapu (groupers) in one or two 
hours only by using hook and line. Nowadays, [if fishermen can catch] two [groupers] 
in one day, [then that] can be considered lucky.” (IV, Rfg, July 2009). 
Table 8. Prices of live groupers at Singaporean restaurants 
 
Species Price 
Spotted coral grouper SGD 60 – 90/kg (USD 53/kg) 
Leopard grouper SGD 70 – 100/kg (USD 67/kg) 
Humpbacked grouper SGD 180 – 240/kg (USD 160/kg) 
Other species of grouper SGD 5 – 60/kg (USD 40/kg) 
(Source: adapted and changed from Bentley, 1999: 104). 
On the other hand, decreasing in individual size of groupers has been observed at two 
fish landing sites on two different islands. It happened that cyanide and trap fishermen 
caught more bebi groupers than ekoran and super (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 
2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). The result of this observation is supported 
by statement made by cyanide fishermen who reported that, in compare to the past when 
the live reef fish capture fisheries began, their catch has continued to decrease in terms of 
total number and individual size of groupers (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 
2008). It appears that, by pricing bebi at the lowest price, punggawa bontos and boses 
would earn more financial benefits, while fishermen lose some money they should have 
earned. 
Integration into global markets has exposed fishermen to greater food insecurity and, at 
the same time, marginalized them through the pricing mechanism and the creation of 
mode of production in which risks are passed down to the fishermen. It is therefore 
predictable that fishermen extract more from marine and coastal ecosystems to balance 
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their loss (Robbins, 2006). This is an “alternative explanation” for the prevalent over-
exploitation and illegal fishing practices in Spermonde Archipelago. 
3.4. Chapter’s Conclusion 
Under this chapter, I examined the development of capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago from the 17th century to the present time. Such development is driven by 
complex social, economic and political upheavals occurring at international, national and 
regional levels. Historical evidence suggests that Spermonde Archipelago was once a 
geographically important region in Southeast Asia for facilitating global trade during the 
17th to the 19th century (Poelinggoman, 2002). This global trade spelled more vibrant 
socio-economic activities in this region (Mattulada, 1994) in which capture fisheries have 
become an important socio-economic sector for the locals. During the period, local 
businessmen enjoyed financial supports provided by foreign traders (especially the 
Chinese), by which they collected/bought various commodities from fishermen 
(Poelinggoman, 2002), especially agars, pearls, shark fins, turtle shells, and sea 
cucumbers (Amal, 2007; Poelinggoman, 2002). At the same time, people started to 
populate several small islands in this region (Knapp and Sutherland, 2004). Capture 
fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago, therefore, has long been an integrated part of the 
global markets.  
In the 20th century, a significant development in capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago began in the 1960s. In 1960, fishermen started to employ large-scale fishing 
methods, by adopting stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices. Previously, 
handline, gill nets, traps, and bamboo fences were dominant fishing methods used by 
approximately 6,000 fishermen who lived on 20 small islands in this region (Pel, 1946). 
The adoption of large-scale fishing methods was facilitated by national policy launched in 
1968 (i.e. blue revolution), through introduction of boat engines, and large-scale fishing 
equipments (for example purse-seine nets and trawls). At national level, a significant 
increase in the production of marine fisheries was recorded few years following the 
implementation of this policy (see Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan, 1974). The impact of 
Indonesia’s blue revolution in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries began to be 
prominent in 1975. That was the time when boat engines became available in this region. 
However, the use of boat engines was limited to those who lived in the city of Makassar, 
until they became available for fishermen in this region in 1978. With the availability of 
boat engines, fishermen moved to fishing grounds situated in remote areas. Ever since, 
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fishing migration has become more intense in this region. In 1978, fishermen in 
Spermonde Archipelago adopted new fishing innovation, such as modern boat liftnets.  
The development of capture fisheries has increased not only the diversity of fishing 
methods employed by fishermen, but has also altered change within groups by which 
capture fisheries are organized. Patron-client groups undergo changes in composition as 
new actors with distinctive roles came to take their parts in capture fisheries. Changing in 
groups’ composition has changed the structure within groups, especially as power relation 
between patrons and clients is redefined under the new circumstance. A shifting of 
orientation in the establishment of patron-client groups (as patron-client groups are then 
established mainly for economic interests) has also made producing a crucial activity for 
groups’ survival. Accordingly, fishermen, especially the punggawa lauts who organize 
fishing activity, gain more power within groups.  
The development of capture fisheries deals not only with the improvement of fishing 
methods and changes in the structure of patron-client relationships. An increasing 
integration into global markets is another prominent characteristic of this development. 
Establishment of Makassar Industrial Park in the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
live reef fish capture fisheries in the 1990s have strengthened relationship between 
capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago and global markets of fisheries. Integration 
into global markets, especially through live reef fish industry, has brought unintended 
effects. It turns particular species into marketable commodities. Fishing is now mainly for 
cash income. Fishermen send their fish to consumers living at distant places; leaving 
themselves with an increasing dependency on foods imported from the city. Integration 
into global markets, arguably, has marginalized fishermen through a system by which 
financial benefit accumulates to actors at higher positions (i.e. punggawa bontos and 
boses), while risk accumulates to fishermen. This has encouraged a more exploitative 
fishing behavior in this region. The development of capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago creates an ever-changing environment in which repetitive interactions 
between fishermen occur, especially between fishermen who fish using different fishing 
methods. 
Chapter 4. Capture Fisheries in Erratic Environments: Institutional Dynamics in 
Spermonde Archipelago 
4.1. Construction and Components of Institutions 
Institutions have many definitions. To encompass most contemporary views of institutions, 
Scott defines institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 1995: 33). As cognitive 
structure, institutions are a common frame of reference or a shared meaning to which 
human refer their actions. This structure is constructed through human subjective 
interpretation of the nature of reality. As normative structure institutions are system of 
values and conceptions of the preferred or the desirable standards of behavior (i.e. moral 
base). Finally, as regulative structure, institutions are system that constrains behavior by 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanism. 
Scott’s definition of institutions is very broad. It proposes cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures as three pillars (concepts) of institutions by which different sets of 
construct of institutions are covered. Nevertheless, Jentoft (2004) argues that fisheries 
need a broad concept of institutions that includes social and cultural aspects of 
management neglected by fisheries social scientist inspired by rational choice theory. 
Hence, to anticipate different constructs of institutions operating in Spermonde 
Archipelago’s capture fisheries, I use Scott’s definition as working definition of institutions 
in this thesis. 
As means that provide stability and meaning to social behavior, institutions—at 
operational level—function to coordinate behavior by creating regularity of actions, to 
support and maintain certain values, and to protect ones’ rights when interests are in 
conflict (Vatn, 2005). Accordingly, Vatn (2005) classifies institutions into three 
components. They are conventions, norms, and formally sanctioned rules80, where;  
“Conventions have the function of coordinating behavior through creating regularity—
that is supporting one type of behavior as opposed to all other possible ways of 
handling an issue […] Norms brings us from just coordinating behavior to issues 
                                                 
80However, the term “formally sanctioned rules” as rules backed by formalized power of “third party” enforcer (i.e. 
state) is not applicable in all social contexts. De facto institutions, as community’s self-created and self-enforced 
institutions, can be more powerful and legitimate than de jure (or state’s) institutions (Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). 
Further, the existence of formal rules implies the existence of informal rules. These terms, I would argue, are 
politically imbalance. The term formal rules, which refer to state’s law, imply superiority over informal rules 
(institutions crafted outside legal mechanisms, such as state’s legislative body). The use of formal rules as opposed 
to informal rules, hence, illegitimate the rights of local communities to craft institutions for managing natural 
resources at their surrounding. Such rights are actually protected by Indonesia’s constitution. Hence, I avoid using 
both formal and informal rules, and use only rules instead. 
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where specific values are accentuated or protected. A norm is a response to questions 
concerning what is considered right or appropriate behavior, […] formally sanctioned 
rules may cover all levels from the constitution of a society to […] rights to resources—
property rights […] These types of rules play a crucial role in situations where interests 
are in conflict, which is why formal sanctioning power is necessary. Such rules are 
backed by the formalized power and sanctions of the collective of “third parties” like 
the state.” (Vatn, 2005: 6-7). 
Departing from different constructs of institutions (see Vatn, 2005: 10), scientists often 
disagree about which components constitute institutions (see Crawford and Ostrom, 1995: 
589). To provide a common language, Crawford and Ostrom (1995) formulate a grammar 
of institutions, by which the components of institutions can be easily constructed and, at 
the same time, distinguished.  
The grammar of institutions works according to the syntax of institutions which consists of 
five elements called ADICO, where: 
− A is an “Attribute”, which  refers to groups or individuals to whom institutions apply,  
− D is a “Deontic”, which defines what those groups of individuals (Attribute) may 
(permitted), must (obliged), or must not (forbidden) do,  
− I is an “Aim”, which defines particular actions or outcomes to which the Deontic is 
assigned,  
− C is a “Condition”, which describes when, where, how and to what extent an Aim is 
permitted, obliged, or forbidden, and  
− O is an “Or else”, which defines potential or possible punishments to be imposed 
for not following institutions. 
According to the syntax, conventions81 can be written as AIC, norms can be written as 
ADIC, while rules can be written as ADICO.  
Despite the promising solution this grammar of institutions offers for bridging 
communication among institutional theorists of different disciplines (or schools of thought), 
applying it would require sufficient elaboration to fit social and cultural contexts operating 
within particular community. According to the syntax, Crawford and Ostrom have 
                                                 
81
 In their original text, Crawford and Ostrom (1995) do not use the word “conventions”, but they use “shared 
strategies” instead. However, Schlüter and Theesfeld (2010) criticize the appropriateness of using the term 
“strategies” to refer to one of institutions’ components. They argue that such strategy could apply to single individual 
without necessarily be shared among individuals within a community. Hence, it cannot be considered to be 
institutions. If a strategy is shared by nearly everybody, then it becomes a convention and therefore an institution 
(Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010).  Similarly, Vatn (2005) proposes convention as an alternative term for shared 
strategy. 
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suggested that only rules contain punishments that fit “or else” component, while 
conventions and norms do not. Delta parameter82 (i.e. guilt and shame) that stems from 
deontic does not fit “or else” component (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). This implies that 
norms and conventions do not contain sanctions or, in the grammar’s language, “or else” 
components. Hence, although they acknowledge that the grammar of institutions would 
increase analytical rigor and the ability to communicate among institutional theorists, 
Schlüter and Theesfeld (2010) see the grammar as problematic in its  interpretation of the 
“or else” component. According to them, non-compliance with conventions does have 
potential sanction. To end up in a tragic car accident for not driving on the left side of the 
road in UK83, is an “or else” condition by which actors’ compliance (to drive car on the left 
side of the road in UK) is self-imposed. Posner and Rasmusen (1999) call the latter “or 
else” condition automatic punishment.84  
In Spermonde Archipelago, non-compliance with conventions may result in severe 
consequences such as boat crash and, during the harsh northwest monsoon, death (i.e. 
automatic punishments). With regard to the latter consequence (i.e. death), therefore, in 
addressing particular convention, fishermen in the archipelago often added a deontic 
element such as “must”. Accordingly, in the archipelago, conventions do have “or else” 
component and are formulated with deontic component. Hence, the distinction among 
components of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago is not as clear-cut as indicated in 
the grammar of institutions (see Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010). 
As suggested by Schlüter and Theesfeld (2010), I constructed components of institutions 
in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries by incorporating types of sanction85 possibly 
imposed with regard to non-compliance with particular institutions. There are six types of 
punishment conceptualized by Posner and Rasmusen (1999) with the help of which I 
reconstructed and made distinction between the three components of institutions which 
are relevant to capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago’s. Those types of punishment 
are: 
                                                 
82
 Delta parameter or delta is moral and emotion based factors (Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010). 
83
 This, according to Ostrom (2005), is a shared strategy or a convention. 
84
 Posner and Rasmusen (1999) define norms as social rules that do not depend on government either for 
promulgation or enforcement. Social rules, according to them, range from table manners to standard practice in 
business. They may be independent of (state) laws or may overlap them. Their definition of norms is as general as 
the definition of institutions given by Scott and Vatn, and may cover all components of institutions operating in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries as analyzed in this monograph. Hence, I conclude that, what Posner and 
Rasmusen refer to as norms is similar to what Vatn and Scott refer to as institutions. Therefore, the construction of 
norms in this study (see Table 9) differs to those conceptualized by Posner and Rasmusen. 
85
 In common understanding, sanctions can either be positive or negative (Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010), but 
punishment is always negative. Later on in this text, I will use “punishments” to refer to negative sanctions. 
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1. Automatic punishments. This is a type of punishments where violator’s action 
carries its own penalty because the action is not being coordinated with the actions 
of others. Someone who drives on the wrong side of the road crashes into another 
car.  
2. Guilt. Violators feel bad about their violation as a result of their education and 
upbringing, irrespective of external consequences.  
3. Shame. Violators feel that their action has lowered them either in their own eyes or 
in the eyes of others.  
4. Informational punishments. Violators, through their action, convey information 
about themselves; information that they do not want other to know.  
5. Bilateral costly punishments. A violator is punished by a person whose right is 
violated.  
6. Multilateral costly punishments. This type of punishment is performed collectively 
by many other people.  
To construct the components of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries, 
it is crucial to contextualize the above types of punishment to the prevailing ecological, 
social, cultural, and economic contexts in this region. Posner and Rasmusen (1999) 
suggest that each type of punishment has a different capacity to ensure actors’ 
compliance with institutions. For example, they consider automatic punishments as 
inadequate. Nevertheless, in Spermonde Archipelago, each type of punishment has a 
quality of disincentive fishermen would prefer to avoid. Crash between boats and losing 
fishing equipments are significant for fishermen. The former may result in death, 
especially if it occurs during the stormy northwest monsoon.  
The way types of punishment differ from each other may differ from definitions and 
differences given by Posner and Rasmusen and from those actually prevail in Spermonde 
Archipelago. For example, in the archipelago, guilt differs from shame. Guilt is an internal 
delta, which is individuals’ internalized moral values and preferences (Schlüter and 
Theesfeld, 2010), while shame, in Spermonde Archipelago, appears to be an external 
delta which relies on social (or shared) values and preferences, and is therefore a social 
mechanism (Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010). Among the people of South Sulawesi in 
general, shame is part of a broader concept they called siri’ which may be defined as 
shame, pride, dignity or honor (Idrus, 2005; Pelras, 2006). The concept of siri’ is a shared-
concept entrenched into the life of the people of South Sulawesi (Idrus, 2005; Pelras, 
 90 
2006). Individual or family’s siri’ is considered the same.86 Siri’ has significance among the 
people of South Sulawesi because social status (dignity and honor) matters the most 
(Idrus, 2005; Pelras, 2006). Hence, as part of siri’, shame even serves as a strong 
punishment for violating institutions. In Spermonde Archipelago, I have found that guilt 
and especially shame are “unpleasant situations” fishermen strive to avoid. Guilt and 
shame have served as factors by which fishermen’s compliance with institutions is 
maintained.  
Delta parameter stems from values and preferences which are also influenced by 
prevalent religious belief (or thought). As the dominant religion embraced by islanders in 
Spermonde Archipelago, Islam introduces sin as another delta which is considered (by 
fishermen) to be different from guilt and shame and is often quoted by fishermen as the 
basis for their compliance with particular institutions. According to fishermen, guilt and 
shame stems from fishermen relation with others, while sin stems from human relation 
with God. Statement given by Nma (when I asked him about cheating fishermen) 
represents what other fishermen argued regarding their compliance with particular 
institutions. 
“[You] cannot do that (selling fish to those who are not your patrons), the man (the 
patron) will be angry. Even if you tried to sell the fish to me, I would not buy them 
because I am afraid of God than of men....” (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
Fishermen agree that stealing and cheating are the act of sin from which their sins87 
accumulate. It is generally known by fishermen that, according to the holy Koran 
(Moslems’ holy book), sin (dosa) can send them to hell. For fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago, avoiding being burned in hell (as written in the holy Koran) is a good reason 
to comply with particular institutions. 
In Spermonde Archipelago, non-compliance with rules would bring social punishments. As 
an illustration, if a fisherman is considered a cheater (e.g. for selling his catch to other 
parties than his punggawa bonto), he will be expelled from his patron-client group and 
would be rejected by other groups (i.e. patrons). Such exclusion is a very serious 
                                                 
86
 During my field stay on Kodingareng Lompo Island in January 2010, I witnessed a mobilization of polices and 
armies to this island. I was told by one of my informants (Abd) that two families were in a conflict regarding siri’. 
Several adult males were going to attack a man (and his family) who “kidnapped” a woman of their family’s 
members. The woman was not actually kidnapped, explained Abd. She actually escaped with the man she loved—
her “kidnapper”. In South Sulawesi, women are the symbol of siri’ they have to protect (Idrus, 2005), often by any 
means including by killing (see Pelras, 2006: 252). 
87
 I would like to make a distinction between committing sin as an act (i.e. the act against God’s will or the act of 
breaking religious law) and sin a noun (i.e. a intangible object). Among the Moslems, sin is an abstract object. It will 
be weighted (by God) in the day after. Having a lot of sin will make them be sent to hell. 
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punishment in situation where fishermen’s survival in this region partly depends on social 
networks (i.e. patron-client groups). 
In their work, Posner and Rasmusen (1999) emphasized only on the normative structure 
of institutions where a violation of a norm could be punished by more than one type of 
punishment or even by all of the six. They neither discussed conventions nor rules. 
Hence, the construction (and hence the distinction) of components of institutions in 
Spermonde Archipelago (i.e. conventions, norms, and rules) must be conceptualized from 
the relevant types of punishment (i.e. punishments that empirically operate in Spermonde 
Archipelago’s capture fisheries) applied following non-compliance conduct with particular 
function of institutions, to which each component of institutions is designated.  
The function of conventions, norms and rules follows definition of institutions 
conceptualized by Vatn (2005) (see page 86 – 87), in line with the cognitive, normative, 
and regulative structures of institutions (Scott, 1995). Because I exclude state’s law (de 
jure institutions) in this research, the definition of rules needs to be redefined. My working 
definition of rules is, therefore, institutions that—in Spermonde Archipelago—function to 
protect private and common properties. 
Table 9. Classification and construction of components of institutions in Spermonde 
Archipelago 
 
Delta parameters Components 
of Institutions 
Automatic 
punishments Guilt Shame  Sin 
Informational 
punishments 
Bilateral 
costly 
punishments 
Multilateral 
costly 
punishments 
Conventions √ √      
Norms  √ √ √ √   
Rules   √ √ √ √ √ 
According to my research findings, failure to comply with institutions that function to 
coordinate behavior by creating regularity of actions (i.e. conventions), fishermen in 
Spermonde Archipelago will be punished by automatic punishments, for example, boat 
crash (and/or losing of fishing equipments) and consequently guilt for crashing other 
fishermen’s boats. If—in an interaction with other fishermen during fishing—fishermen 
performed particular conduct that does not conform appropriate values or behavior that 
must be accentuated in that particular situation (as supported by norms), fishermen will be 
punished by shame and sin. Through gossip, other fishermen will also talk about violators’ 
inappropriate conduct or behavior (i.e. informational punishment). Finally, failure to comply 
with rules will make violators be punished by informational punishment, bilateral 
punishment and multilateral costly punishment. Bilateral costly punishment occurs when 
those whose rights are violated punish violators on their own expense and risk. The last 
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punishment occurs when other individuals within violators’ groups (i.e. patron-client 
groups) and/or community (i.e. families or neighbors), due to its severe violation on rules, 
voluntarily join punishing activity. The example of this type of punishment is social 
exclusion from patron-client groups. Severe violation on rules gives violator the feeling of 
shame and, as part of violators’ religious belief, sin. 
4.2. Institutions at “Earlier Stage” 
Chapter 3 described how capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago undergo changes 
over time. Some changes tend to be irreversible and divergent. Modernization in capture 
fisheries through introduction of boat engines and large-scale fishing equipments since 
1968 (i.e. Indonesia’s blue revolution) has facilitated innovation of new fishing methods 
and, at the same time, improvement of the existing fishing methods in this region. Social 
organization in capture fisheries (i.e. patron-client groups) also undergoes changes in 
both structure and motivation. It is partly driven by technological changes and altered 
economic scale to which fishermen are connected. Marine and coastal resources, 
although theoretically are reversible or renewable resources, continue to deplete and 
degrade in the eye of fishermen. Monsoonal period remains cyclical but its pattern and 
duration have become unpredictable. Environments in which capture fisheries take place 
keep changing as a result of social, economic, political, and ecological changes. Such 
changes are driven by interaction between local and non-local factors. Fishermen in the 
archipelago have to manage capture fisheries under such circumstances.  
Data collected through in-depth interviews with key informants suggest that, capture 
fisheries in this archipelago in the past was “simpler” than it is at present, in terms of 
number of fishermen involved in capture fisheries, types fishing method they were using, 
and institutions managing capture fisheries. In the past, fish were relatively abundant and 
there were fewer fishermen fishing by using traditional fishing methods (i.e. handline 
fishing or gill nets). Alj, an influential figure and the only patron on Lanyukang Island, 
explained that fishermen fished by using, what he called, simple equipments (alat-alat 
sederhana) in the surroundings of his island. 
“There were [fishermen fishing by using] gill nets (jaring), hook and line (pancing), and 
bamboo fences (bilah) and fish traps (bu)…. Those were all [fishing equipments] we 
used because the fish were still abundant.” (IV, Alj, July 2009). 
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“Now, it is very different. When I fished in the past, I would not say that I got [a lot of] 
fish if I caught only five tinumbus (narrow-barred mackerels)88. [I was able to catch] 
twenty, [or] thirty tinumbus […] by using banana leaves […], chicken feathers, [or] 
goat’s hair as bait. […] Langkai is the richest island [...] [and] fishermen have fished 
here for years. We (fishermen) used to be fewer, [fishing] at the east, west, and south 
[of this island]89….” (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
In such situations in the past, marine and coastal resources utilization was managed only 
through the following general conventions (abbreviated as GC): 
1. Fishermen are free to fish at any potential fishing grounds in Spermonde 
Archipelago (GC1), 
2. Fishermen are free to use any fishing methods at any fishing grounds (GC2), 
3. Fishermen may join collection of harvest caught through blast fishing (GC3), and 
4. Fishermen must keep the distance of their boats within sufficient range to other 
fishermen’s boats (GC4). 
With the main role of conventions to create regularity of actions (Vatn, 2005), the above 
conventions suggest no explicit regularities, in the sense that fishermen will act as they 
want; fish at any fishing grounds by using any fishing methods they can afford. However, 
there is a shared-idea that each fisherman shall notice other fishermen will act 
“irregularly”. By sharing this idea, the action taken by other fishermen will be, more and 
less, predictable for others. This makes the four prescriptions (i.e. GC1 - GC2) 
conventions (see Schlüter and Theesfeld, 2010). Such irregularity of actions, when shared 
among all of fishermen, would eventually create regularity. Even “no rules” is a rule. 
Therefore, although general conventions do not specifically tell fishermen where, when 
and how to fish, each fishermen or groups of fisherman, are becoming “specialized” to fish 
in certain area in marine and coastal zones, at certain times (see Table 6). These general 
conventions still exist at present. To prevent accident, they base their action on GC4. 
Among the core assumptions of institutions is that they create predictability of situations 
(March and Olsen, 2006: 4) by providing information for every actor about, among others, 
what possible action other actors could or would take in particular situations. This will be 
the basis on which actors make their decisions in order to reach their objectives (Johnson, 
2009). In our case in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries, two common objectives 
often mentioned by fishermen are to safely fish and harvest abundant amount of fish. In 
                                                 
88
 Handline fishermen on Langkai Island could catch one to maximum five skip jack mackerels per day (PO, Langkai 
Island, July 2009).  
89
 It means that each fisherman was separated to each other by a relatively wide distance.  
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an analogy given by Ostrom (2005: 4), each individual driving a car on a highway will 
receive maximum payoff (i.e. safely arrive at destination on time) if all driver comply with 
such a convention: driving on the left/right side of the road. However, it is common to our 
knowledge that car crashes still happen despite the existence of such a convention. The 
causes of car crash vary, but in general they stem from the unknown minor details in the 
variability of individuals’ driving attitudes and skills. Such variability at individual level 
accumulates greater uncertainty in the whole sensitive dependence interaction (see 
Smith, 2007: 8) between drivers. Hence, I argue, conventions can only provide actors with 
limited information from which a range of predictability of situation is generated. Back to 
our driving case, in real situation, strict driving regulations and additional traffic signs 
provide drivers with a predictability that, in particular situations, meets their level of 
acceptability (for both drivers and governments) of how institutions should be. Back to 
capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago, in particular situations in the past, these four 
general conventions met fishermen’s level of acceptability because they provided 
sufficient information (and hence predictability) for conducting fishing.  
Marine and coastal ecosystems in Spermonde Archipelago, where capture fisheries take 
place, have unique settings. Fish are unevenly distributed across spatial and temporal 
scales, and particular target fish school mostly or only at certain times and locations (see 
Figure 9). Narrow-barred mackerels and anchovy, for example, are abundant around the 
islands of Langkai and Lanyukang during southeast monsoon (FGD, Bonetambung Island, 
November 2008; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). Such conditions have made fishermen in 
this region aware that they need to let outsiders to fish around their islands, because in 
other time they will also need to fish in fishing grounds around other fishermen’s islands. 
“There was time when fishermen of Kondongbali Island forbad us to catch anchovy in 
their coastal water […] [that was why] we also forbad them fishing here (around 
Langkai Island). After that, it goes normal again (fishermen from both islands may fish 
around each other islands).” (IV, Rfg, July 2009).  
Together with inherent climatic constraints in southeast and northwest monsoons, 
fishermen are exposed to a quality of uncertainty they have to cope with, unless fishing 
activity will not be successful. The empirically best strategies to cope with such situations 
are to forage to different fishing grounds and employ different fishing methods at different 
time for catching different fish. Because general conventions support these strategies, 
hence, for fishermen they are appropriate institutions for managing capture fisheries. On 
the other hand, outsiders (e.g. policy makers or natural resources managers) might see 
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such institutions as means for exploitative fishing behavior that causes unsolved collective 
action dilemmas (see Prasetiamartati, 2006). However, I would argue, in areas where 
resources availability and accessibility are unpredictable, a generalist strategy is more 
beneficial for local resource users (see Davidson-Hunt and Berkes, 2003; Moran, 1982) 
and is therefore preferred. Generalist strategy performed by fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago (i.e. to fish at different locations and at different time by using different fishing 
methods), which is facilitated by general conventions, has provided them with sufficient 
“room” for developing and implementing coping strategies for livelihood security. 
General conventions (i.e. GC1 and GC2) manage the distribution of marine and coastal 
resources in a way that marine and coastal zones in Spermonde Archipelago, are all 
managed as open access zones (as is illustrated in Figure 10). According to GC1, all 
fishermen have the right to harvest fish, while, according to GC2, fishing grounds in 
Spermonde Archipelago are subject to exploitation of any kind of fishing methods. 
Figure 12. An illustration of open access zones in Spermonde Archipelago 
 
Note: Green area is open access zones (OAZs). (Source: IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Hls, November, 2008; IV, 
Rtb, July 2009). 
The notion of institutions (i.e. general conventions) as strategies for coping with 
environmental constraints and resources fluctuation lead us to idea of routines as carrier 
of institutions (see Scott, 1995: 54). According to this idea, institutions are crafted from 
actors’ day-to-day experience in and from observation on environments (Schlager and 
Ostrom, 1999) which is facilitated by repetitive interactions (Jost, 2005; Ostrom, 2005). In 
such a process, fishermen’s subjective interpretation about their environments (from 
Barrang Lompo 
Barrang Caddi 
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Lanyukang 
Kodingareng 
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Bonetambung 
Lumu-lumu 
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which meaning is inferred), has appeared to be very prominent. There are prevailing 
shared-views among fishermen in this region by which general conventions become 
reasonable institutions. Those shared-views (abbreviated as SV) relate to the ways 
fishermen view marine and coastal resources and their life.  
Neil (2008) documented three shared-views through which fishermen see and understand 
phenomena prevailing in their environments, including its dynamics. Fishermen (and also 
islanders) in this region believe that; 
1. Fish, reef, and other marine organisms belong to nobody, or belong to God. It was 
also mentioned that they belong to everyone (milik semua orang) (SV1) 
2. Fish are inexhaustible (tidak bisa habis), does not matter how much they are 
harvested. As long as there are leaves on the tree, there will be fish in the sea 
(selama masih ada daun-daun di pohon, maka pasti ada ikan di laut). (SV2) 
3. The fortune (nasib) of fishermen is a God’s given destiny. Hence, fishermen 
believe that one’s fishing activity will not influence other fishermen’s catch (SV3) 
During fieldworks, I also found that, fishermen believe that; 
4. The abundance of fish does not decrease but merely undergoes spatial and 
temporal fluctuations (SV4), and 
5. Marine and coastal zones in the archipelago are indivisible (laut tidak ada 
batasnya or laut tidak bisa dibatasi) (SV5). 
“Fish and reef in the surrounding of Langkai Island actually belong to nobody, 
[therefore] everybody (siapapun) may come [to the coastal zone of Langkai Island] 
and harvest [the fish].” (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
“Fishermen of Barrang Caddi Island can fish everywhere [in Spermonde Archipelago], 
and so can fishermen from other islands. The sea has no boundaries (batas)….” 
(FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
The two statements above illustrate relations between shared-views and general 
conventions; shared-views support general conventions. The first statement shows 
relation between GC1 and SV1, while the latter shows relation between GC1 and SV5 
(see Table 10). Shared-views serve as legitimate reasons for fishermen to conform their 
actions/decisions to general conventions. By resting their compliance with general 
conventions on particular shared-views, it can be concluded that those conventions were 
derived from those shared-views. However, none of my informants, including key 
informants, were arguing so.  
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 “We do not know how [those general conventions were crafted], but those regulations 
(aturan-aturan) (i.e. general conventions) have existed and have been practiced by 
our parents (orang-orang tua kita) since the past…. They are legacy from our 
ancestors (nenek moyang)….They are also regulations we conform to (ikuti) at the 
present” (Kde, handline fisherman, April 2008). 
Without knowing how, when, and why they were crafted and by who, fishermen keep 
conforming to general conventions until the present. The statement made by Kde, a 
handline fisherman of Barrang Lompo Island, reveals cognitive aspects of institutions in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries; that institutions are perceived to be part of 
their identity as fishermen and taken for granted (see Scott, 1995: 40-45). 
By emphasizing the existence and/or role of God, it can easily be predicted that SV1 and 
SV3 stem from religious thought, in this case Islam. According to their religion, it is 
considered to be a good practice to believe that their fortune is a God’s given destiny, 
which will make someone considered a good Moslem (IV, Dhm, Barrang Lompo Island, 
November 2008). The idea of God as entity who predetermines their destiny has been 
internalized by fishermen as a shared-belief. “The fortune of fishermen is determined by 
God (Tuhan),” said Mk, a trap fisherman of Bonetambung Island (IV, Mk, August 2009). 
The role of God (often mentioned as Allah and/or Tuhan) appears to be central. Of five 
general conventions, four relate to both SV1 and SV3. This, I would argue, informs us 
about the significance of religion or religious thoughts in the construction of general 
conventions in this region. It implies culture as another important carrier of institutions 
(see Scott, 1995: 53) in this region. 
In both general conventions and shared-views, there is no reflection of the idea of 
resources scarcity and competition between fishermen. While ecological economists, in 
their attempts to define appropriate institutional arrangement for managing the commons 
(or to understand user choices/decisions), assume resources scarcity and inherent 
competition between actors (see e.g. Aguilera-Klink, et al., 2000; Baumgärtner, et al., 
2006; Osés-Eraso and Viladrich-Grau, 2007; Vairavamoorthy, et al., 2008; Yang, et al., 
2003), fishermen in this region assume the opposite. Instead of assuming scarcity and 
competition, they rely general conventions on assumptions that marine and coastal 
resources are available for everyone’s need and, hence, cooperation (for example through 
reciprocal generosity and catch-sharing) is necessary to optimize resources utilization and 
distribution, enhance successful fishing activity and improve their coping ability in the face 
of resources uncertainty. 
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Table 10. Shared-views, general conventions, and relations between them 
Section A: General conventions (GCs) and shared-views (SVs) in Spermonde Archipelago’ capture fisheries 
GC1: Fishermen are free to fish at any potential fishing grounds in 
Spermonde Archipelago.  
 
SV1: Fish, reef, and other marine organisms belong to God/ everybody 
or belong to nobody. 
GC2: Fishermen are free to use any fishing methods at any fishing 
grounds.  
 
SV2: Fish are inexhaustible, does not matter how much they are 
harvested. 
GC3: Fishermen may join collection of harvest caught through 
blast fishing. 
 
SV3: The fortune of fishermen is a God’s given destiny. Hence, 
fishermen believe that one’s fishing activity will not influence 
other fishermen’s catch. 
GC4: Fishermen must keep the distance of their boats within 
sufficient range to other fishermen’s boats. 
 
SV4: The Abundance of the fish does not decrease but merely 
undergoes spatial and temporal fluctuations. 
 SV5: Marine and coastal zones in the archipelago are indivisible. 
 
Section B: Relation general conventions (GCs) and shared-views (SVs) inferred from Informants’ statements 
GC1 SV1, SV5 
GC2 SV1, SV2, SV3, SV4 
GC3 SV1, SV4 
GC4 SV3 
Section C: Shared-views (SVs) and general conventions (GCs) they supported 
SV1 GC1, GC2, GC3 
SV2 GC2 
SV3 GC2, GC4 
SV4 GC2, GC3 
SV5 GC1 
(Source: in-depth interviews).
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General convention GC3 promotes catch-sharing and cooperation. Rtb, who formerly 
performed blast fishing, explained that sharing or letting other fishermen and islanders 
collecting some of their catch was crucial. By doing that he expected that in situation when 
he could not go fishing, other would be kind enough to share him some of their catch (IV, 
Rtb, July 2009). On one occasion, I and my informant (Rtm, a handline fisherman) were 
given fish by a group of blast fishermen for simply being there at the location where they 
conducted blast fishing (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). Reciprocal generosity through 
catch-sharing is a prominent characteristic of communities whose livelihoods are exposed 
to resource uncertainty (Moran, 1982). 
4.3. When Situations Change, They Need More than just Understanding…. 
Three of my key informants (Rtb and Rfg on Langkai Island and Nma on Barrang Caddi 
Island) explicitly mentioned that there were few institutions applied to capture fisheries 
during the era of Soekarno (zaman Soekarno)90 and no serious fishing-related conflict 
ever occurred between fishermen. In their view, the four general conventions were 
sufficient for managing capture fisheries in the past and are still relevant until the present. 
“Understanding between fishermen became [an] important [aspect] in fishing [by 
which] misunderstanding between fishermen was solved.” (IV, Rfg, July 2009). 
“Those (i.e. general conventions) were all regulations in the past. [They are] still 
applied now. [In fishing], we just need to understand each other. No fight ever 
occurred [between fishermen] in the past [with regard to fishing]. But now, fishermen 
are easily provoked (gampang marah) and fight (berkelahi) because of fishing” (IV, 
Rtb, July 2009). 
“There were fewer fishermen, [and there were] few regulations (aturan-aturan)” said Nma 
(IV, Nma, November 2008). However, situations have changed since the beginning of the 
1960s. What appeared to be an adoption of new fishing methods (i.e. stationary liftnet 
platform and fish aggregation devices91) in 1960 was actually a unique development that 
changed the distribution of marine and coastal resources in Spermonde Archipelago. 
Stationary liftnet platforms or locally called bagang tancaps (see Figure 5) soon became 
the favored fishing method among fishermen in Makassar. In 1964, dozens of stationary 
liftnet platforms were erected in the surrounding of Makassar’s harbor.92 Until 1975, this 
method was one of the most employed large-scale fishing methods in the coastal water of 
                                                 
90
 Soekarno was the first president of Republic of Indonesia who ruled Indonesia from 1945 to 1968. What my key 
informants mean by the era of Soekarno or zaman Soekarno is time in between this period. 
91
 Fish aggregation devices are used by mostly purse-seine fishermen.  
92
 ANRI, Makassar No. 1185 
 100 
Makassar (Dinas Perikanan, 1975). Because this method requires certain amount of 
space, fishermen at the time started to claim some areas in potential fishing grounds in 
this region. This was also the case for fish aggregation devices. The existence of 
stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices have created novel situations 
where; 
1. Fish still belong to God (or belong to everybody), but if the fish congregate at one’s 
stationary liftnet platforms or fish aggregation devices, the owners of those 
platforms or devices have the most right to harvest them,  
2. Some areas within fishing grounds in Spermonde Archipelago have become 
permanently “occupied” by individuals or groups, and 
3. The marine and coastal zone has become physically divisible which goes against 
a shared-view (i.e. SV5). 
The owners of stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices soon prohibited 
other fishermen to fish near their platforms. Marine and coastal zones were no longer all 
open access zones. Some spots have been converted into private-restricted zones 
(PRZs) where only owners—a newly emerged concept of property rights in this region—
were allowed to fish. Access to and utilization of fishing grounds around those devices 
became limited for all fishermen. A new convention regulating the conversion of open 
access zones into private-restricted zones soon emerged following a wider adoption of 
these fishing methods/devices: 
• Fishermen can erect their stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices 
everywhere (NC1). 
This novel situation soon generated confusion and restlessness among fishermen in this 
region. Fishermen witnessed how, by using stationary liftnet platforms and fish 
aggregation devices, other fishermen could attract and harvest a massive school of fish 
and, at the same time, excluded other fishermen from taking their part in fishing those fish 
(IV, Ngs, November 2008). It appears that, since the time, fishermen have become aware 
that fishing as performed by other fishermen could actually influence the catch of other 
fishermen. Such a fact was probably less observable when capture fisheries were 
dominated by handline, trap, and gill nets fishing. Conflicts occurred between owners and 
non-owner fishermen, especially handline fishermen (IV, Rfg, July 2009; IV, Rtb, July 
2009).  
“They (handline fishermen who fish at night) approached the stationary liftnet 
platforms because fish were congregating in the surroundings [of those platforms]. 
[But] owners of stationary liftnet platforms tried to expel them [from their platforms]. 
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[But], they (handline fishermen) refused to leave […], because [handline fishermen 
argued that] the fish did not belong to them (the owners of stationary liftnet platforms). 
Very often they threw things, such as stones, to each other….” (IV, Rfg, July 2009).  
With changing situations in which conflicts manifested, capture fisheries in the archipelago 
at that time required institutions capable of preventing conflicts and, most importantly, 
redistributing marine and coastal resources to different groups of fishermen. The 
conflicting interests were complicated. The interests of the owners of stationary fishing 
platforms and fish aggregation devices were to harvest fish and to prevent others from 
taking benefit from their investments. On the other hand, other non-owner fishermen 
needed to ensure that their right over fish was not compromised. Conflict also surfaced 
between owners of stationary liftnet platforms and between owners of fish aggregation 
devices. Such conflicts were generated by insufficient distance between two platforms or 
two devices. While previously an understanding between fishermen served as the main 
basis for solving issues in capture fisheries, such basis was seen as no longer sufficient in 
the new situations. 
“People (fishermen) [started] fighting to each other…, [because] they [acted as though 
they] did not realize that their fortune (rezeki) came from (defined by) God (tuhan)….” 
(IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
The capacity of institutions to exclude “unauthorized” users or to manage the issue of 
excludability (Quinn, et al., 2007), manage potential conflicts (Bennett, et al., 2001), and 
distribute resources (Thorburn, 2000) under new circumstances becomes imperative for 
managing capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago, where institutions must have the 
ability to protect interests (Vatn, 2005). As situation changed in 1960, relying capture 
fisheries only on conventions has appeared to be no longer sufficient. After numbers of 
conflict, some rules were then agreed among fishermen in this region: 
1. Fishermen must not fish at others’ stationary liftnet platforms, or else93 the owners 
of the platforms will seize their fishing equipments along with the harvested fish 
(R1), 
2. Fishermen must not fish at others’ fish aggregation devices, or else the owners of 
the devices will seize their fishing equipments along with the harvested fish (R2), 
3. Fishermen who build their stationary liftnet platforms must set an appropriate 
distance between their platforms and those that have previously been built, or else 
they will have their fishing platforms knocked down (R3), and 
                                                 
93
 Because rules contain more than one type of punishments (see Table 9), each “or else” conditions written 
following all rules mentioned in this monograph were only bilateral costly punishments. 
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4. Fishermen who install their fish aggregation devices must set an appropriate 
distance from other devices that have previously been installed, or else their 
devices will be cut (R4). 
However, Rtb further explained that, converting areas that have been previously 
acknowledged as open access zones (OAZ) into private-restricted zones (PRZs) (zones 
within which fishing becomes exclusive to relatively small numbers of fishermen) was not 
without challenge (IV, Rtb, July 2009). Either in the past and at the present, power 
relations between groups of fishermen are not equal. Each of them assumes certain 
position within a hierarchy (see Table 13). Such relations influence the outcomes of 
interaction between groups of fishermen; in this case what institutions are crafted for 
regulating interactions between them. Positioned at the highest position in the hierarchy 
has meant that handline fishermen cannot be totally excluded from fishing within private-
restricted zones. Accordingly, back to 1960, fishermen crafted two new conventions that 
gave exception to handline fishermen for exploiting private-restricted zones. Such 
conventions still operate even at the present, they are; 
1. Handline fishermen are free to fish at any stationary liftnet platforms (NC2), and 
2. Fishermen may fish at any fish aggregation devices if they are not used by their 
owners (NC3). 
As new institutions could emerge, any existing institutions could also vanish or erode 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 1995). Process through which existing institutions experience 
deterioration is called deinstitutionalization (Zucker, 1988). It occurs because new 
circumstances render current practices of beliefs irrelevant. My research findings suggest 
that deinstitutionalization has occurred in the middle of 1970s.  
Prior to 1972, marine and coastal resources in the surrounding of the islands of Barrang 
Lompo and Barrang Caddi were managed according to rules crafted by gallarangs (the 
islands rulers). Such rules, by which blast fishing was forbidden for fishermen from both 
islands (see page 49), established marine and coastal water in the surrounding of the 
islands of Barrang Caddi and Barrang Lompo as island-restricted zones (IRZs); that is 
marine and coastal waters in which specific institutions are created by islanders of 
particular islands in order to restrict the exploitation of resources within those zones. As 
centralization established new rulers on the islands of Barrang Caddi and Barrang Lompo 
(i.e. who in this case represented central government), such situation, at some point in 
time, has rendered gallarangs illegitimate leaders. Hence, rules that prohibited blast 
fishing were deinstitutionalized by the middle of 1970s. 
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4.4. Non-compliance with Institutions and Punishments 
Rules R1, R2, R3 and R4 strictly forbid fishermen from behaving (or strongly encourage 
fishermen to behave) in particular manners in particular situations, or else they will be 
considered as violators (rules-breakers) and therefore deserve punishments. However, 
punishing do not always occur following violation of rules. Fishermen are aware that 
punishing is not without costs (Henrich, et al., 2006). Therefore, individuals carefully 
“calculate” before punishing those who violate their rights. In general, individuals avoid 
punishing other if the inherent costs are considered to be exceeding the present and 
future benefits. A patron, for example, prefers not to punish other patrons if it will 
jeopardize his future interest. In contrast, patrons tend to punish their clients (i.e. by 
seizing their fishing equipments and boat and, hence, expelling them from their patron-
client groups) if their clients are considered to be incapable of providing patrons with 
benefits or as cheaters (see Box 4).  
Such a “cost-benefit calculation” is more prominent among pa’boyas. Fishermen agree 
that punishing other fishermen (i.e. expelling others from fishing grounds, confiscating 
others’ fishing equipments and harvest) is costly. In general, they avoid performing 
bilateral costly punishment; that is when punisher has to bear the cost of punishing 
violator on his own. Fishermen are aware that other will also do the same to them in the 
future. Punishers may lose any possible help from fishermen they punished. As did some 
patrons, fishermen also argued that being a merciful person (by forgiving others) is better, 
and will increase the chance for getting help whenever needed. 
“The sea has no bone (tulang) [to which we may hold on], so [if our boats sink] we 
[will] easily be drawn…. Nobody will help except other fishermen. Hence, good relation 
(hubungan baik) with other fishermen needs to be maintained (perlu dijaga).”(IV, Bh, 
November 2008). 
Most fishermen are aware that punishing is as costly as being punished. Hence, their 
tendency to avoid punishing have appear to be as prominent as their tendency to comply 
with or to avoid doing violations on institutions (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 
2008). However, this is not the only factor on which their compliance with institutions is 
based. Compliance with institutions is also base on cognitive and normative structures; 
that institutions are prescriptions they follow because they are part of what they suppose 
to do during fishing (hence, taken for granted), and such compliance is a good conduct as 
religious persons. “Most of fishermen here are afraid of stealing […]. We are afraid of 
[having] sins” (IV, Bh, November 2008). 
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Box 4. What does it take to (or not to) punish violators? 
 
 
Cognitive and normative structures, by which fishermen’s compliance with institutions is 
encouraged, complement regulative structure which is represented by institutions 
containing different types of punishments. But, is it true that patrons and fishermen in 
Spermonde Archipelago really prefer not to punish violators and forgive them instead? It 
was quite obvious that fishermen and patrons, in particular case, avoid performing 
altruistic punishment; that is when the benefits of punishment are enjoyed collectively 
while its costs are borne individually (Jaffe and Zaballa, 2010). But, what if they could 
punish violators collectively? 
If a fisherman is reputed to be a cheater or unmotivated fisherman, or if a patron is 
reputed to be incapable (or unwilling) of protecting his or her clients, such information will 
I was informed about a conflict between Nma and Oks, one of the richest patrons of 
Barrang Lompo Island, occurring in the middle of 1990s. The conflict was triggered by 
the action of a group of blast fishermen who worked for Oks. The group harvested 
Nma’s fish aggregation device without asking his permission prior to harvesting activity. 
After noticing his fish aggregation device was harvested, Nma went to Barrang Lompo 
Island to punish those violators. However, Nma did not claim all the money he 
deserved nor seizing their fishing equipments. He preferred to solve the situation by 
referring to particular profit-sharing mechanism, through which Nma deserved one-third 
from the total money gained while Oks (acted on behalf of his blast fishermen) 
deserved two-third as he has spent some expenses for harvesting activity. Oks also 
apologized for what his fishermen have done. 
“It was better to forgive [those who violated your rights] […] [because] that 
(forgiving) is what our religion tells us to do…. My fishermen (pa’boyas) could also 
unintentionally make mistakes (i.e. breaking rules). If I give apologize others, [I 
expect that] other would also do the same for my fishermen.” (IV, Nma, November 
2008). 
On the other hand, Nma did punish his pa’boyas if they could not fulfill their 
responsibility which was regulated by set of institutions. To those he considered as 
unmotivated or cheated fishermen, Nma, without hesitation, expelled them from his 
group and seized their fishing equipments and boats (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
“I came to my fishermen and said; you better find a new punggawa [bonto], 
because I cannot finance you any longer…. [But] for diligent fishermen [who 
unfortunately catch less fish], I often forgive them [by abolishing their debts]…. This 
is also for my fishermen who died.”  
Nma’s statements convey his inconsistency with regard to punishing violators. His 
decision to “forgive” other violators (who happened to be as, more and less, influential 
as he was) and at the same time not to forgive his own pa’boyas might implicitly show 
a strategy of cost-benefit calculation. On the other hand, it might also show a complex 
decision making process in which economic, social, and cultural factors were taken into 
account. 
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spread on the island where they live and even in Spermonde Archipelago (this is 
informational punishment). As their bad reputation is known by others, they will be 
collectively punished by exclusion; no patrons would recruit such dishonest and 
unmotivated fisherman while, on the other hand, no fishermen would work for such patron 
(IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Dsm, August 2009). For fishermen in this region, being 
nobody’s client simply means no social insurances during harsh period (i.e. during 
northwest monsoon) when fishing activity is problematic. This is the worst “punishment” a 
fisherman could have. For patrons, having no clients simply means the end of their 
business. As an illustration, on Barrang Caddi Island, a patron was losing his business 
because almost all his fishermen left him (IV, Zmh, November 2008). 
By collectively giving punishment, fishermen or patrons (or punishers) also bear the cost 
collectively. Exclusion from patron-client groups and exclusion by fishermen fellows are 
multilateral costly punishment (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). By sharing the cost of 
punishing violators, each fisherman or patron seems to bear a considerably “lower cost” 
that each of them is willing to bear. Collective punishment has appeared to be a common 
and an effective measure to encourage fishermen’s compliance with institutions.  
Box 5. Different carriers of institution at different levels 
 
 
However, during fieldworks, it was found that compliance with institutions was also 
motivated by an internal delta which did not stem from religious values. Fishermen in this 
region believe in karma. They are certain about a causality that their inappropriate 
treatments to other fishermen will result in having themselves being treated by others with 
In patron-client relationships, each actor has their roles which inform what each actor 
must do to other actors at higher and/or lower position in the hierarchy within a group. 
Institutions are embodied in roles (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 91). Particular roles 
are applied only to particular actors in particular situations (Scott, 1995). 
Table 5 compiles role(s) of each actor (i.e. bos, punggawa bonto, punggawa laut, 
fishing sawi, and non-fishing sawi) which construct the structure of patron-client 
relationships. Roles confer rights and obligations (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). 
Through the structures, each actor is obliged to behave according to their roles in order 
to respect others’ rights and fulfill their obligations. Such obligations are regulated by 
rules, for example a punggawa bonto must provide all or some of means of production 
for their client (i.e. punggawa lauts), or else he or she will be abandoned by his or her 
client. 
Social structure in patron-client relationships is a carrier of institutions that manages 
interaction in patron-client groups according to the patterned expectations connected to 
networks of social positions or hierarchy (Scott, 1995). While routines and culture serve 
as carriers of institutions at the community level, social structure serves as carrier at 
patron-client or group level. 
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the same inappropriate treatments. Vice versa, doing a good did would make themselves 
be treated appropriately by others. There were many statements made by informants with 
regard to this concept. In general, they mentioned as what was mentioned by Btg, a 
handline fishermen from Bonetambung Island. “If we are kind to others, [then] others will 
also be kind to us. But, if we are wicked (jahat) [to others], [then] others will also be 
wicked to us.” (IV, Btg, August 2009). 
Game theorists argue that punishing (i.e. sanctioning institutions) is an effective 
mechanism to maintain or increase compliance with institutions and, therefore, maintain 
stability and cooperation within group (see e.g. Gürerk, et al., 2006; Henrich, 2006; Jaffe 
and Zaballa, 2010). Such argument, although may hold true in particular social and 
cultural contexts, gives too much weight on regulative structure of institutions. In 
Spermonde Archipelago cognitive and normative structures have appeared to be crucial 
factors that encourage compliance with institutions. By complying with institutions, 
fishermen expect that others will also do the same. Fishermen’s willingness to comply with 
institutions, as motivated by particular values (rooted in religion, culture, and reciprocal 
generosity), indicates that compliance with institutions in this region is more than just a 
result of economic calculation. 
4.5. Changing Spatial Institutional Regime 
Before having access to motorized-boats (i.e. prior to 1978), fishermen exploited mostly 
fishing grounds adjacent to their islands. Pedals and karoro (sails made of woven grass) 
enabled fishermen to access fishing grounds at some distance, but were insufficient for 
coping with storm. Hence, it was too risky to sail too far from their islands. Nevertheless, 
at that time, it was not necessary to fish at remote fishing grounds because fish were 
abundantly available in the surrounding of their islands (IV, Ngs, November 2008; IV, Rtb, 
July 2009; IV; Alj, July 2009).  
According to information collected from key informants on each island, I reconstructed and 
illustrated the spatial pattern of marine and coastal zones exploitation prior to the 
existence of boat engines (Figure 12). Fishermen on each island tended to utilize only the 
nearby fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding of their islands during both northwest 
and southeast monsoons (IV, Ngs, November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). As fishermen of 
particular islands frequently fished only in particular fishing grounds around their islands, 
particular areas are then considered to be an integrated part of particular islands (IV, Ngs, 
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November 2008, IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Alj, July 2009). “Batu dan taka94 (reef) situated at 
the surrounding of Langkai are parts of the island. [The area] belong to the people (orang-
orang) of Langkai.” (IV, Rfg, July 2009). A more complete information about such divisions 
was provided by Rtb.95 The following conversation between me (Rd) and Rtb (July 2009) 
illustrates some divisions of marine and coastal zones in Spermonde Archipelago and 
explanation behind such arrangement: 
“Rd: Which areas (daerah) belong to which islands? Rtb: Reefs (taka-taka) belong to 
the area of Langkai is Batu Ila’ and Taka Sangkarang…. Rd: What about Bone 
Luwara’? Rtb: Bone Luwara’ is part of Kodingareng Lompo…. Rd: Why Bone Luwara’ 
is part of Kodingareng Lompo when [according to the map] it is closer to Langkai? Rtb: 
That is how it supposed to be (begitu mi)…. On the map (kart), it is true that Bone 
Luwara is closer to Langkai, but if it is not on the map, [Bone Luwara’] is closer to 
Kodingareng Lompo….” 
Figure 13. Spatial pattern of marine and coastal zones utilization in Spermonde 
Archipelago prior to 1978 
 (Source: IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Hls, November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
                                                 
94
 Fishermen classify reef into two categories; batu and taka. They refer taka to fringing and patch reef influenced by 
tide, while batu refer to sub-merged hard coral (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
95
 As an ex-blast fisherman an ex-sailor, Rtb showed an outstanding knowledge on locations where fishermen used 
to fish. He could accurately point the directions and locations of all reefs (batu and taka) I asked, and clearly 
remembered which batu and taka situated next to each others and at which directions (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
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The last argument made by Rtb implies the significance of cognitive distance between 
islands and reef as basis for the divisions of marine and coastal zones in Spermonde 
Archipelago. What was before reachable fishing grounds (areas) from particular islands 
have then turned out to be rationale for such divisions, from which territoriality emerged in 
this region. Nevertheless, Spermonde Archipelago remained open access zones because 
the emerging territory at that time did not change the whole institutional arrangement in 
this region. Therefore, fringing and patch reefs in the surrounding of particular islands 
have become important fishing grounds for fishermen at neighboring islands whose 
islands lack of resources. 
 “[Talking] about the [abundance of] fish, no islands can compare Bonetambung. Think 
about it; [fish in] this area has been harvested for many years [….] by all fishermen 
including fishermen from Barrang Caddi. This [area] is where fishermen from Barrang 
Caddi and Barrang Lompo96 make their livings….” (IV, Ngs, November 2008). 
Figure 14. The emerging territoriality in Spermonde Archipelago 
 (Source: IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Ngs, November 2008; IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
The availability of boat engines has enabled fishermen to sail further than they could 
before. Each of them could literally explore most part of Spermonde Archipelago. 
Nowadays, cyanide fishermen of Barrang Caddi Island, for example, exploit all part of 
Makassar’s coastal water. They move to different fishing grounds in different seasons 
                                                 
96
 In comparison to Bonetambung Island, the islands of Barrang Caddi and Barrang Lompo were surrounded by 
relatively less fringing and patch reefs (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, Barrang Lompo Island, 
November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). 
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(see Figure 15 below), and even exploit fishing grounds in neighboring district, such as 
Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
Figure 15. Annual fishing movement performed by fishermen of Barrang Caddi Island 
within the coastal water of Makassar 
 (Source: IV, Hls, November 2008; FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
With an increase in the number of fishermen capable of moving to remote fishing grounds, 
while potential fishing grounds in Spermonde Archipelago tend to decrease (FGD, 
Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008), physical interaction between different groups of 
fishermen (i.e. fishermen who fish by using different methods) have become more intense. 
Such an interaction creates technological externalities; that is a situation in which the 
practice of particular fishing methods constrain the practice of other fishing methods (see 
Schlager and Ostrom, 1999). As an illustration, a group of blast fishermen cannot conduct 
blast fishing if a cyanide fisherman is diving in the same area, and vice versa.  
Technological externalities also occur between fishermen of the same fishing methods. 
Groups of blast fishermen, for example, cannot fish at the same place at the same time 
(IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Dsm, January 2010). Handline fishermen who fish with particular 
technique for catching narrow-barred mackerels must not sail across other fishermen’s 
track (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). Only handline fishermen fishing for reef fish can fish 
within a relatively near distance (approximately five to 20 meters) to each other (PO, 
Langkai Island, July 2009). Table 11 compiled the very basic nature of interactions 
between fishing methods. According to Table 11, not all interactions between fishermen 
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will create technological externalities. Neutral, non-rivalry, or positive interaction can exist 
between fishing methods. In the latter interaction, one fishing method is benefited while 
another method is neither lost nor benefited.  
Table 11. A matrix of the basic nature of fishermen’s interactions with regard to 
technological externalities 
 
Fishing 
Methods/Fishing 
Time 
Handline 
fishing/Day 
and Night 
Blast 
Fishing/Day 
Trap 
Fishing/Day 
Fishing 
Platform/Night 
Cyanide 
Fishing/Day 
Cyanide 
Fishing/Day - - - 0 
 
Fishing 
Platform/Night + 0 0  
 
Trap Fishing/Day 
- -   
 
Blast Fishing/Day 
-    
 
Handline 
fishing/Day&Night 
     
Note: 
- : Negative interaction.  
0 : Neutral/Non-rivalry interaction. No physical and technical interactions occur between methods. 
+ : Positive interaction. The operation of particular methods potentially benefits or optimizes others. 
Table 11 indicates the most likely nature of the interactions (negative, positive, or neutral) 
that will emerge when fishermen are competing for fishing grounds. Negative interaction 
does not always occur between, for example, a group of blast fishermen and handline 
fishermen. In particular situations (for example when handline fishermen are having less 
amount of catch or when they have not started fishing), handline fishermen prefer to 
cooperate with blast fishermen by “letting” them exploiting or harvesting fishing grounds at 
the first chance, and later on enjoy collecting some portion of the harvest.97 
Because of technological externalities between fishing methods and the fact that 
interaction between fishermen is becoming more intense, fishermen need institutions to 
redistribute marine and coastal resources, to, rearrange interactions among themselves to 
prevent conflicts, and to pursue compliance without costly punishment. Under such 
circumstances, a general norm of interaction (abbreviated as GNI) and a general 
convention of interaction (GCI) emerged for managing interaction between different 
groups of fishermen, they are; 
                                                 
97
 During an in-depth interview on Barrang Lompo Island in November, 2007, two handline fishermen (Bc and Sbg) 
explicitly mentioned that they would stop fishing if they saw a group of blast fishermen. They would follow them, if 
possible, waited them fishing, and prepared themselves to join collecting activity. They said that the amount of fish 
they could collect from blast fishing was more than the amount they could fish using handline fishing. Hence, they 
did not see any reasons for reporting blast fishing activity to the police. They often acted as “watchmen” in case 
there were polices around.  
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1. Fishermen must not enter particular locations if the fishing methods they are going 
to use will interfere with the methods employed by those who are already occupied 
the locations (GNI), and 
2. Those who arrive at particular fishing grounds for the first time are given the right 
to exploit those fishing grounds, or “fist comes, first fishes” (GCI). 
The above general norm for managing interaction between different groups of fishermen 
provides only main idea for coping with technological externalities. The heterogeneity of 
fishing methods operating in Spermonde Archipelago requires such norm to be made 
specific between fishing methods. Hence, fishermen crafted norms of interactions (NI) by 
which fishermen of particular fishing methods are informed about the actions or decisions 
they should or must make in particular situations with regard to the existence of particular 
groups of fishermen (see Table 12). The norms of interactions (NI) apply only to 
interactions taking place within open access zones. They do not apply to areas within 
private-restricted zones (PRZs) and island-restricted zones which emerged following a 
serious horizontal fishing-related conflict that occurred in 2000 (see Box 6).  
Different institutions apply within the emerging island-restricted zones or IRZs98 (see 
Figure 16). Apt to its name, rules apply within IRZs are island-specific. It means that, they 
are crafted by islanders on particular islands by considering, mainly, their own interests. 
Some of the documented rules within IRZs (abbreviated as RwIRZ) during fieldworks are; 
1. Cyanide fishermen must not fish in fishing grounds in the immediate surroundings 
of the islands of Langkai, Lanyukang, Lumu-lumu, and Bonetambung, or else their 
fishing equipments and catch will be confiscated (RwIRZ-1), 
2. Those who employ cyanide fishing are not allowed to live on the islands of Langkai 
and Lanyukang, or else they will be expelled from the island (RwIRZ-2), 
3. Blast fishermen must not fish in fishing grounds in the immediate surrounding of 
Bonetambung Island, or else their fishing equipments and catch will be confiscated 
(RwIRZ-3),99 
4. Outsider fishermen who fish by using modern boat liftnets within the area of 
Kodingareng Lompo Island must cooperate with or must sell their fish to any local 
                                                 
98
 Other researchers  have observed the existence of, what they called, island exclusion zones (IEZs) at the 
surrounding of particular islands (Glaser, et al., 2010a). It implies exclusion to particular fishing methods that 
potentially creates externalities to the dominantly used fishing methods by local islanders. However, I argue that, the 
term island restricted zone is more appropriate because the zones have been observed to be not totally exclusive for 
fishing methods that potentially created externalities.  There are some unique rules and norms (considering more 
than just technological externalities) apply within each IRZ which make them a restricted zone instead of an 
exclusive zone. 
99
 However, there is a convention telling that blast fishing in the immediate surrounding of this island is allowable only 
for local islanders if the catch is going to be consumed for wedding party or other religious ceremonials (IV, Ngs, 
August 2008; IV, Gmd, August 2009). 
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punggawa bontos of Kodingareng Lompo Island, or else they cannot fish within 
this area or their fishing equipments will be destroyed (RwIRZ-4), and 
5. Blast fishermen must not use bigger ANFO bombs when fishing in the immediate 
surrounding of Barrang Lompo Island to avoid damages to buildings (houses), or 
else, blast fishermen must pay the costs for renovating those buildings (RwIRZ-5). 
There is also a norm apply to outsider fishermen who fish for longer days (as in fishing 
migration or sawakung) within areas of IRZs, especially when they are using large-scale 
fishing methods, for example modern boat liftnets; 
• Outsider fishermen who perform fishing migration and/or fish by using large-scale 
fishing methods for longer time (i.e. more than one day), should contribute some 
amount of money to islands’ treasury or should give charity to the mosques. 
In almost all of their statements, fishermen and islanders emphasize on what outsiders 
must not do within IRZs of their islands, than what outsiders or insiders could do. In many 
interviews, it was often mentioned by informants that islanders need to protect “their reef” 
or “their areas” from “outsiders”.100 Rtb, for example, explained that; 
“Because many outsiders (orang luar) come (to fish) here, we eventually experience 
crisis…. [The abundance of] fish has decreased since cyanide fishermen started to 
fish. [But] the reef (taka-taka) belongs to nobody; [therefore] we cannot forbid them 
(cyanide fishermen) to fish our reef (taka-taka), but [if they want to fish] at the [reef 
situated at] island’s edges (pinggir-pinggir), don’t! What would be left for islanders 
(orang pulau) [then]?” (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
According the above statements made by Rtb and rules apply within IRZs, it has been 
prominent that the function of institutions as mean to protect interests (Vatn, 2005) has 
become a crucial issue for fishermen and islanders in Spermonde Archipelago. Through 
IRZs, fishermen and islanders on “resources-rich islands” (i.e. the islands of Langkai, 
Lanyukang, Lumu-lumu, and Bonetambung) try to ensure the availability of marine and 
coastal resources in the surrounding of their islands mainly for themselves and strive to 
secure their chances to gain benefit from it. “It does not matter if fishermen from other 
areas come to Langkai as long as they share their catch with local collectors (pengumpul) 
or fishermen.” (IV, Shr, July 2009). 
                                                 
100
 During my fieldworks, I found that fishermen and islanders on Langkai, Lanyukang, and Bonetambung Islands 
often quoted “our area” (daerah kita), “their areas” (daerah mereka), and for example “reef of Lanyukang” (taka-
takanya Lanyukang). However, none of them have ever mentioned “our fish” (ikan kami) or “their fish” (ikan mereka). 
It appears that, for fishermen, claiming space within marine and coastal zone has become reasonable than claiming 
reef and fish. It indicates a strengthened sense of territoriality among fishermen in the archipelago. 
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Table 12. Norms regulating interactions between different groups of fishermen 
 
Fishing 
Methods 
Handline Fishing Blast Fishing Trap Fishing Modern Liftnets 
Cyanide 
Fishing 
− Cyanide fishermen must 
not enter fishing grounds if 
handline fishermen are 
fishing 
− Handline fishermen may 
ask cyanide fishermen to 
leave fishing grounds 
− Cyanide fishermen must not enter 
fishing grounds if blast fishermen are 
fishing 
− Blast fishermen must not enter 
fishing ground if cyanide fishing 
fishermen are fishing 
− Cyanide fishermen must not enter 
fishing grounds if trap fishermen are 
fishing 
− Cyanide fishermen must not fish near 
area where fish traps are planted 
− Trap fishermen may ask cyanide 
fishermen to leave or move fishing 
grounds 
(not available) 
Modern 
Liftnets 
− Modern liftnets must not 
enter fishing grounds if 
handline fishermen are 
fishing 
− Modern liftnets may fish in 
the same fishing grounds if 
handline fishermen let them 
do so 
− Handline fishermen may 
fish at the surrounding of 
modern liftnets 
(not available) (not available) 
 
Trap 
Fishing 
− Trap fishermen must not 
enter fishing grounds if 
handline fishermen are 
fishing 
− Handline fishermen may 
fish near area where fish 
traps are planted 
− Trap fishermen may ask blast 
fishermen to leave fishing grounds 
− Blast fishermen must not enter 
fishing grounds if trap fishermen are 
fishing 
− Blast fishermen must not fish in area 
where fish traps are planted 
  
Blast 
Fishing 
− Blast fishermen must not 
enter fishing grounds if 
handline fishermen are 
fishing 
− Handline fishermen may 
ask blast fishing fishermen 
to leave fishing grounds 
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Box 6. Conflict over fishing grounds and the emergence of island-restricted zones (IRZs) 
 
A serious conflict occurred between fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago, 
approximately by the end of 1990s or by the beginning of 2000s. This conflict, in 
which cyanide fishermen (mostly from Barrang Caddi Island) were expelled from 
fishing grounds around the islands of Lumu-lumu, Langkai, and Lanyukang, required 
the involvement of governments for solving it. Lsr, a cyanide fisherman of Barrang 
Caddi Island said; 
“We were chased by fishermen of Lumu-lumu when we were diving at the 
surrounding of their island. And [we were also chased] at Bonetambung. That was 
around year 2000 if I am not mistake…. [The fight occurred] because of [fishing] 
locations. Fishermen of Lumu-lumu said [the reef where we dived] is their 
locations. In fact, Lumu-lumu is part of [Kelurahan] Barrang Caddi, hence, that 
was the same….Sea has no boundaries….” (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, 
November 2008). 
In a separate interview, Bh, another cyanide fisherman of Barrang Caddi Island also 
informed that he was chased when fishing at coastal water of Lanyukang Island (IV, 
Bh, November 2008). After enjoying some years hunting live groupers at reef 
belonged to areas of Langkai, Lanyukang, Lumu-lumu, and Bonetambung Islands, 
those potential fishing grounds soon became restricted for cyanide fishermen. This 
conflict soon escalated, involving not only fishermen but islanders from each island. 
As told by Zmh (IV, Zmh, November 2008), series of physical attack occurred 
between conflicting parties. Fishermen of Barrang Caddi, Barrang Lompo, and 
Kodingareng Lompo Islands continued their revenge by blocking the shortest path to 
the city, from where their rivals import foods and fresh water. 
 “They said cyanide fishing is illegal [according to state law]. Blast fishing and 
cyanide fishing are both illegal, [then] why did they forbid cyanide fishing and let 
blast fishing continue? I asked Alj (a patron and influential figure on Lanyukang 
Island) that question when we were [in a meeting] at the police station. He could 
not answer it….” (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
In other occasion, Alj argued that; 
“Cyanide fishing and blast fishing are not similar. Cyanide [fishing] is deadly!  [It 
causes] reef unable to grow (tumbuh). But blast fishing is like cutting trees; [they] 
could grow [again] but very slow (Iama)….. [Hence], cyanide [fishing] is more 
dangerous….it is polluting [the sea]…. But, for the governments they are both 
destructive…. (IV, Alj, July 2009). 
According to Sjw, a staff at the Agency of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, conflict 
resolution was then facilitated by polices of Sub-district Ujung Tanah and Agency for 
Marine and Fishery of Makassar (IV, Sjw, November 2008). Conflicting parties 
eventually came up with agreements (a rule and a convention) that (IV, Nma, 
November 2008; IV, Alj, July 2009; IV, Rfg, July 2009): 
1. Cyanide fishing must not fish in fishing grounds around the islands of Langkai, 
Lanyukang, Lumu-lumu, and Bonetambung, or else islanders of these islands 
will confiscate their boats, fishing equipments, and their catch, 
2. Cyanide fishermen may still fish at reef situated within the areas of those 
islands, but only at reef situated at far locations. 
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Dominant fishing method(s) on particular islands appeared to be a consideration in 
crafting IRZs rules. Such a consideration, at the same time, takes into account fishing 
methods used by outsiders along with the possible benefits or constraints (i.e. possible 
technical externalities) they might potentially deliver for “insiders”. For ensuring 
compliance from outsiders, they perform collective punishments, for example, fishermen 
of Langkai Island will chase off or try to catch violators, and seize their boats and 
equipments (IV, Dhn, July 2009; IV, Rfg, July 2009; IV, Shr, July 2009).  
Having their islands surrounded by spacious fishing grounds has, to some extent, granted 
islanders on resources-rich islands with power to craft institutions that benefit them and, at 
the same time, disadvantage fishermen who live on islands that happen to have less 
resources. As an illustration, by prohibiting cyanide fishermen from the island of Barrang 
Caddi to fish in the surrounding of their islands, fishermen from the islands of Langkai and 
Lanyukang do not worry about the possibility of being excluded from fishing around 
Barrang Caddi Island. When I asked Alj about this, he replied by rhetorically asking me 
the question; “We—the people of Langkai and Lanyukang fish at Barrang Caddi? Why 
should we fish at Barrang Caddi? What are we going to fish there?” (IV, Alj, July 2009). 
“Barrang Caddi has no reef (taka-taka). There is no such history (sejarah) [telling me that] 
fishermen from Langkai have ever fished there (at Barrang Caddi)” (IV, Rtb, July 2009).  
Figure 16. An illustration of the emerging IRZs and PRZs in Spermonde Archipelago 
 
Note: Island-restricted zones or IRZs (yellow areas) and some spots of private-restricted zones or PRZs (red areas) 
in Spermonde Archipelago. (Source: FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; IV, Rfg, July 2009; IV, Alj, 
July 2009). 
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In a morning observation (approximately at 6 AM local time), when I was at the coastal 
water between the islands of Barrang Lompo and Barrang Caddi, I have observed dozens 
of boats of different kinds and sizes departed from both islands to the west and northwest 
directions. Such directions would bring them to fishing grounds near the islands of 
Bonetambung, Lumu-lumu, Langkai and Lanyukang (PO, July 2009). 
Having spacious resources in the surrounding of their islands also grants fishermen with 
“bargaining power” for not to be excluded by rules within IRZs of other islands. The way 
they treat fishermen from Barrang Caddi Island differs to the way they treat fishermen 
from Kondongbali Island who stayed on Langkai Island for fishing migration: 
“We have asked them (i.e. fishermen from Kondongbali Island) to report themselves to 
me as hamlet’s chief [if they wanted to stay longer here]. But they do not do it. We 
cannot force them to leave this island [for not reporting themselves], [because] in other 
season we would also stay on their islands for fishing anchovy….” (IV, Rfg, July 2009). 
4.6. Questioning the Shared-views and the Emerging Hierarchy 
The occurrence of conflict over fishing grounds is, I would argue, an indicator of a shifting 
in fishermen’s shared-view (i.e. that marine and coastal zones in the archipelago are 
indivisible). As I previously explained, such a shifting was partly driven by the 
establishment of stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices (see Sub-chapter 
4.3). Nevertheless, driver for this shifting is not entirely local in origin. An effective 
implementation of centralized governance system, promoted by national government in 
1972, has divided small islands in Makassar coastal waters into three smaller 
administrative units called kelurahan (IV, Zmh, November 2008). According to this 
scheme, each island is administratively managed as hamlets (desa) which is lower units 
under kelurahan. This situation, I would argue, has amplified “sense of territoriality” 
through which fishermen and islanders see their islands, along with coastal waters and 
reefs in the surrounding of their islands, as areas with boundaries. Terms like “our area” 
and “their areas” were often quoted by informants to refer to particular locations.  
Introduction of new administrative boundaries in 1972 and existence of fishing 
methods/devices that require a permanent occupation of space have encouraged 
fishermen to draw imaginary lines for creating zones on the physically borderless marine 
and coastal water. At present, other shared-views (i.e. fish are inexhaustible, does not 
matter how much they are harvested, the fortune of fishermen is a God’s given destiny, 
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and abundance of fish does not decrease but merely undergoes spatial and temporal 
fluctuations) have appeared to be questioned. 
“Fish are inexhaustible, but [their abundance] may decrease. [The abundance of] fish 
[in the surrounding of Langkai] has decreased since bius (cyanide fishing) existed…. 
This is the reason why we forbid them fishing around Langkai.” (IV, Rtb, July 2009). 
“[….] In the past, I could catch one thousand tunas [….] only at [reef situated at the] 
island’s edges. Now, I cannot [catch a lot of tunas] because there are purse-seine nets 
fishermen (pa’rengge). There are [tunas], but fewer…. There were no purse-seine nets 
fishermen [in the past], [so] nobody fished tunas….” (IV, Ngs, November 2009). 
In almost all interviews, fishermen of the islands of Langkai, Lanyukang, and 
Bonetambung blamed cyanide fishermen for the decreasing abundance of fish in this 
region. They agreed that the impact cyanide fishing could deliver to reef and fish is 
harmful than the impact of blast fishing. Hence, fishermen have actually questioned what 
they used to believe and often say, that the amount of fish they could catch is 
predetermined by God’s given destiny. There is inconsistency between what they say and 
believe (i.e. shared-view) with what they do (i.e. excluding particular potential resource 
users). This, I would argue, indicates a conflict between what they believe for generations 
and what they observe during the recent years. 
The existence of PRZs and IRZs have rendered that not all fishing grounds in Spermonde 
Archipelago are free for fishermen with particular fishing methods. Even within open 
access zones, fishing grounds are distributed to fishermen according to an emerging 
hierarchy or order of precedence by which fishermen determine which groups of 
fishermen (with regard to fishing methods they are using) have more right over fishing 
grounds. Such hierarchy is apparent in norms of interactions (see Table 12). In order to 
reveal this hierarchy, I designed simple “win-lose” scenario between different groups of 
fishermen according to norms of interactions. The scenario is rather simple. Each of the 
five fishing methods are put into two situations; Situation 1 (red text) and Situation 2 (blue 
text). Being in Situation 1 means a fisherman or a group of fishermen has arrived at or 
occupied particular fishing grounds earlier than another fisherman or group of fishermen. 
The latter, a fisherman or a group of fishermen who recently arrive at the same fishing 
grounds that have been occupied by other is said to be in Situation 2. The results of “head 
to head” interactions between fishermen refer to the real results explained by informants. 
In each interaction, the results might be; one party wins while another loses, both parties 
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win, and non-rivalry. To win101 is if a party can maintain their operation at particular fishing 
grounds or expel other, while to lose is if a party leaves fishing grounds (either forced or 
voluntarily). Non-rivalry occurs when both parties do not physically interact due to, 
according to this scenario, difference in fishing time. The results of this scenario are 
shown in Figure 17.102 The winning party earns +1 and the losing party earns -1, while in 
non-rivalry situation each party earns 0. Total number of winning, losing, and non-rivalry 
each fishing method has is counted, and total point each party has is summed. The point 
earned by each fishing method defines their rank in the hierarchy. The higher points they 
earn, the higher their positions in the hierarchy. Table 13 shows total point each fishing 
method earns.  
Figure 17. “Win-lose” scenario according to the norms of interactions 
 
 
Table 13. Hierarchy/order of precedence for exploiting fishing grounds in Spermonde 
Archipelago 
 
Results from Interactions 
Fishing Methods Rank Win  
(+1) 
Non-Rivalry 
(0) 
Lose  
(-1) 
Total Score 
Handline fishing 1st 6 0 2 4 
Fishing Platforms  2nd 2 6 0 2 
Blast Fishing 3rd 3 2 3 0 
Trap Fishing 4th 3 2 3 0 
Cyanide Fishing 5th 2 2 4 -2 
                                                 
101
 Please note that, according to this scenario, to win does not mean to catch large amount of catch. To win simply 
means that a party has more privilege to stay and exploit particular fishing grounds than the other. 
102
 These results were compiled from both in-depth interviews and participant observations. 
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Reasons for winning or losing are, however, perceived differently by fishermen. The 
following statements made by a handline fishermen and a cyanide fisherman 
(respectively) illustrate such discrepancy: 
“If we (handline fishermen) see them (cyanide fishermen) fishing, we will tell them to 
go [by saying]; go away I want to fish here! They are afraid, [therefore] they leave. 
They (cyanide fishermen) go against state’s law (aturan negara), [while on the other 
hand] we do not…. If we are already fishing [in particular locations], they (cyanide 
fishermen) will not dare to come [to locations where we were fishing].” (IV, Rhm, 
November 2008). 
“Usually, if people (handline fishermen) are fishing [in particular locations] and we are 
also going to dive there, they (handline fishermen) will say: don’t fish near here, go 
away (jauh-jauh)! [If they say so], we will leave…. We just manage that [between 
ourselves] […] this is not a problem. Even though if we arrive [at a given fishing 
ground] earlier [than handline fishermen], we will [still] voluntarily leave (mengalah) 
[….] and fish in other locations, because we feel sorry (kasihan) about them….” (IV, 
Lsr, November 2008). 
According to the two statements above we may understand that handline fishermen 
perceive themselves as having more rights to exploit fishing grounds in this region than 
cyanide fishermen do. Cyanide fishermen do recognize such privilege, but they perceive it 
as their “gift” for handline fishermen who, among other fishermen, are considered the 
poorest of the poor and therefore deserve mercy. Handline fishermen, hence, appear to 
be the more legitimate group for exploiting fishing grounds than cyanide fishermen.  
Legitimacy is a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance 
with relevant rules or law and is constructed from connection with other institutional 
patterns in different functional contexts  (Scott, 1995). In the above statement made by 
Rhm and Lsr, handline fishermen—who win both situations (see Table 12)—earn 
legitimacy not only from state’s law, but also from cultural alignment (i.e. being considered 
the poorest of the poor) and normative support (i.e. handline fishermen deserve “mercy”). 
Each pillar of institutions (i.e. cognitive, normative, and regulative) provides a basis for 
legitimacy (Scott, 1995).103 Through in-depth interviews and a focus group discussion on 
                                                 
103
 Regulative structure emphasizes on conformity to rules which can be rules prevail at different institutional 
contexts, for example state’s law. Normative conception stresses a deeper moral bases (i.e. what is considered right 
or appropriate behavior according to particular values), while cognitive view stresses legitimacy that comes from 
adopting a common frame of reference of a situation (Scott, 1995)  
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Barrang Caddi Island, I compiled cognitive, normative, and regulative aspects which 
provide each fishing method with legitimacy (Table 14). 
As the first entitled to fish, handline fishermen are not only granted the most privilege for 
exploiting fishing grounds. Further, they also have the power to grant other groups of 
fishermen with more right to exploit fishing grounds. Under Table 13, each blast and trap 
fishing methods earns the same total point (i.e. zero). Trap fishing earns legitimacy from 
regulative aspect; aspect blast fishing does not have as an illegal fishing method 
according to state’s law. Nevertheless, I have found that (through in-depth interviews) 
blast fishing method is empirically positioned at higher hierarchy than trap fishing method. 
Hierarchy or order of precedence for exploiting fishing grounds, in this case, is further 
influenced by relationship particular fishing methods have with other methods ranked at 
higher position in the hierarchy. In the case of blast fishing, mutual relationship it has with 
handline fishing has become a crucial factor for lifting their rank in the hierarchy. The 
catch they could share with handline fishermen (and also with other fishermen and 
islanders) motivates handline fishermen to, in particular situations, let blast fishermen 
harvesting fishing grounds at the first chance. Such mutual relationship does not exist 
between handline and trap fishermen. Fishing for the lucrative live reef fish, trap fishermen 
have never shared their catch with other fishermen (IV, Us, August 2009). Hence, in the 
coastal waters of the islands of Langkai and Lanyukang (where handline fishing is the 
dominant method), blast fishing is allowed and is frequently practiced especially by 
fishermen from Lumu-lumu Island (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009), while, on the other 
hand, cyanide fishing is strongly forbidden (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; 
IV, Rtb, July 2009; IV, Alj, July 2009). 
A mutual relationship also occurs between handline fishing and modern boat liftnets. 
Taking advantage by fishing near to modern boat liftnets, handline fishermen from 
Bonetambung Island, for example, could harvest more fish and, therefore, earned more 
money. 
“Fish are schooling around modern boat liftnets (bagangs), so we could [harvest more 
fish and] earned [money from] two hundreds to three thousands [rupiah only] in one 
night [from the fish we harvested]. That is why I do not prohibit them (modern boat 
liftnets) [fishing around Bonetambung] because fishermen of Bonetambung can also 
harvest abundant amount of catch….” (IV, Ngs, November 2008). 
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Table 14. Hierarchy/order of precedence and sources of legitimacy 
 
Sources of Legitimacy Rank Fishing Methods Cognitive Normative Regulative 
1st Hand-line 
fishing 
− This method has been practiced 
in this region for a very long time  
− This method is widely used by 
fishermen in this region104 
− Method is considered non 
destructive 
− Handline fishermen deserve priority as 
the poorest of the poor  
− This method is a legal fishing 
method according to state’s law 
 
2nd Modern 
boat liftnets 
− This method operates only at 
night, hence does not disturb 
other fishing methods 
− This method benefits handline 
fishermen who fish at night 
− They cooperate with local patrons in 
the adjacent islands 
− They often give other fishermen or 
islanders subsistence amount of fish 
− This method is a legal fishing 
method according to state’s law 
 
3rd Blast fishing 
− This method has been practiced 
in this region for a relatively long 
time 
− This method is considered non or 
less destructive by the locals 
− This method benefits other fishermen 
and islanders because they may join 
collecting catch 
− Fishermen often give other fishermen 
or islanders fish for subsistence 
(Not available) 
4th Trap fishing 
− This method has been practiced 
in this region for a very long time 
− This method is considered non 
destructive by the locals 
(Not available) 
− This is a legal fishing method 
according to state’s law 
5th Cyanide 
fishing 
(Not available) 
− Cyanide fishermen also need to make 
their living 
(Not available) 
                                                 
104
 In 2005, Bureau for the Center of Statistics (Biro Pusat Statistik) recorded  700 handline fishing equipments were used in Makassar (BPS, 2005). This number constituted around 
33 per cent of the total fishing equipments used in Makassar, and has not been changed since 1993 (see BPS, 1993). However, it cannot inform us the approximate number of 
handline fishermen in Makassar because fishermen tend to change their fishing methods. Fishermen and islanders, nevertheless, always mention handline fishing as a method mostly 
employed by fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago. During my fieldworks, I have observed that, of the five fishing methods, handline fishing was the only method whose users existed 
on every island in Spermonde Archipelago. Hence, it makes handline fishing the most common fishing method in the archipelago. This can be one reason for the recognizing of 
handline fishermen as the dominant group in this region. 
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4.7. Chapter’s Conclusion. 
Defining institutions and constructing their components are challenging processes. 
Institutions have more than one aspect, and scientists emphasize only on particular 
aspects of institutions; either cognitive, normative, or regulative aspects (Scott, 1995). In 
Spermonde Archipelago, all of the three aspects exist in institutions in capture fisheries 
and contribute to institutional dynamics. By referring to each of the three aspects and 
types of punishment following non-compliance with institutions, I constructed components 
of institutions that have relevance with the prevalent ecological, social, cultural, and 
economic contexts in this region. Definitions of conventions, norms, and conventions were 
conceptualized, and their differences were outlined. 
Collective punishment (multilateral costly punishments) is among the effective 
mechanisms to promote fishermen’s compliance with institutions. Nevertheless, 
cooperative behavior and compliance with institutions are also motivated by reciprocal 
generosity, religious values, and a belief in karma. Complying with conventions and norms 
is also perceived by fishermen as something they should or must do as fishermen. This 
demonstrates co-existence of regulative, normative, and cognitive structures of institutions 
in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. 
Institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries have developed over time. 
Processes through which institutions in capture fisheries were crafted were once 
motivated only by the need to coordinate behavior by creating regularity of actions among 
fishermen. The prevalent shared-views among fishermen in this region have become an 
essential basis for crafting general conventions through which fishermen regulate the 
distribution of marine and coastal resources. According to these conventions, all fishing 
grounds in Spermonde Archipelago were once managed as open access zones. 
However, capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago continue to change. Adoption of 
new fishing methods is found to be among factors that changes capture fisheries in this 
region. It changes the way fishermen utilize fishing grounds. Together with a growing 
heterogeneity of fishing methods and intensified physical interactions in fishing grounds 
(from which technological externalities stem), some areas within open access zones are 
converted into island-restricted zones (IRZs) and private-restricted zones (PRZs). The 
existence of IRZs and PRZs introduces the concept of community property and private 
property into capture fisheries, within which excludability is a crucial issue. 
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Together with private-restricted zones (PRZs), the emergence of island-restricted zones 
(IRZs) has altered changes in spatial institutional regime managing marine and coastal 
zones in Spermonde Archipelago. Once managed as whole open access zones, marine 
and coastal zones in Spermonde Archipelago are then managed as open access zones 
(OAZs), private-restricted zones (PRZs) and island-restricted zones (IRZs). Within IRZs 
and PRZs, institutions promoting regularity of actions per se are considered insufficient. 
Thus, capture fisheries require institutions capable of protecting interests or rights (i.e. 
rules) and at the same time capable of suggesting appropriate values for handling 
particular situations (i.e. norms). In order to protect fishermen’s rights, a hierarchy or order 
of precedence which determines rights over the utilization of fishing grounds in open 
access zones has emerged as a solution for solving technological externalities between 
fishermen who fish by using different fishing methods. Cognitive, normative, and 
regulative aspects serve as sources of legitimacy through which each group of fishermen 
claims their rights. 
Repetitive interactions between fishermen (see Jost, 2005; Ostrom, 2005) in this region 
and prevalent social structures and culture have been the media in which institutional 
dynamics occur. Routines, culture, and social structures are important carriers of 
institutional dynamics (i.e. institutional emergence, persistence, and change) in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. 
Chapter 5. Understanding Institutional Dynamics: Attractors and Trajectories 
Schlager and Ostrom (1999) highlight the significance of collective choice rights (i.e. right 
of management, exclusion, and alienation) in creating dynamics for operational rules—
institutions by which users define, for example, who may or may not utilize resources and 
by which method. In community-level forest management in India and Nepal, for example, 
such rights were facilitated by forest councils, joint forest management or community 
forestry legislation (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). In Spermonde Archipelago, fishermen 
and islanders have been able to craft institutions for managing capture fisheries with the 
absence of any fora for facilitating communication between them. Nevertheless, if 
facilitated, fishermen are willing to communicate and are capable of managing 
(re)distribution of marine and coastal resources in this region (see Box 6). 
The existence of fora, through which natural resource users could communicate issues in 
capture fisheries and their find solutions (such as those in India and Nepal), could be an 
advantage. Such fora could provide legitimate decisions for resource users, for example, 
decisions about redistribution of natural resources in the unpredictably changing 
environments.  
The existence of a village council in a coastal village in West Sumatra has helped 
fishermen to cope with increasing competition between different groups of fishermen and 
with abrupt environmental changes (Deswandi, 2005). The council crafted institutions by 
which natural resources surrounding the village (as important livelihoods assets for coping 
with food insecurity) were distributed among households. However, such a forum might 
not be an appropriate mechanism for fishermen in this region. Living on geographically 
scattered small islands, interactions between islanders in this region are often limited by 
geographical constraints exacerbated by monsoons (PO, Barrang Lompo Island, April 
2008; PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). Nevertheless, without the presence of any fora, 
fishermen in this region are still able to craft institutions to redistribute marine and coastal 
resources in the ever-changing environments.  
Under Chapter 4, I argue that repetitive interaction between fishermen has facilitated 
institutional dynamics and motivated fishermen to “revise” the existing institutions to cope 
with changes. I have identified five factors framing repetitive interactions in Spermonde 
Archipelago. While certain factors tend to “preserve” the existing institutions, other factors 
promote institutional innovations. While the former tends to maintain institutional “status-
quo” for managing fishermen’s interaction and distribution of marine and coastal 
resources, the later facilitates institutional innovations through which fishermen’s 
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interaction and distribution of marine and coastal resources are redefined. Institutional 
dynamics in capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago have occurred in situations 
where those “conservative” and “innovative” forces interact. Considering the role of each 
factor in influencing trajectories of institutional dynamics (i.e. to maintain institutional 
status-quo or innovations), I term those factors attractors. 
5.1. The Attractors: Defining Trajectories of Institutional Dynamics 
5.1.1. Shared-views on Natural Resources and Life 
The prevailing shared-views among fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago are the 
products of framing through which ideas about phenomena in their surrounding are 
organized and meanings are inferred (Nisbet and Mooney, 2007). Taking into account 
fishermen’s subjective interpretation of their environments throughout the process of 
framing, shared-views therefore represent cognitive structures of institutions (Scott, 1995).  
Such views are sensible reasons for the existence of general conventions for fishermen in 
this region (see Table 10) from which they crafted general conventions. However, shared-
views are more than just “template” for molding institutions (i.e. general conventions). 
They are also force that maintain institutional status-quo and at the same time resists 
institutional innovations.  
Despite significant changes following the development of capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago (which are followed by the emergence of new norms, rules, private-restricted 
zones and island-restricted zones), general conventions and open access zones prevail in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries (see Box 6). In this case, I have found that, 
the persisting views among fishermen ensure the persistence of general conventions and, 
hence, the “conservation” of open access zones in this region. 
5.1.2. Distance to Resources: Spatial Discontinuity of Fishing Grounds 
Fishing grounds or reefs adjacent to or more reachable from particular populated islands 
are considered areas of those islands, while reefs situated at locations far from any 
populated islands belong to all fishermen in this region. Such agreement, I would argue, is 
foundation on which fishermen constructed concept of common property, through which 
fishermen and islanders on every island manage marine and coastal zones of their islands 
(see Agrawal, 2001).  
Such an agreement stems from sense of territoriality (see Sub-chapter 4.6). The sense is 
supported by spatial discontinuity in the geographical distribution of fishing grounds (i.e. 
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reefs) in this region and is amplified by the implementation of centralized governance 
system in 1972. Thus, when technological externalities triggered a conflict involving six 
small islands, islanders from small islands surrounded by spacious fishing grounds called 
for more rights over the exploitation and utilization of fishing grounds in the surrounding of 
their islands, which later on turned into island-restricted zones. Discontinuity in reef 
distribution in Spermonde Archipelago is among factors for the construction of concept of 
common property that diversifies institutional arrangements for managing fishing grounds 
in this region. 
5.1.3. Institutional Agents: Elders and Patrons 
Within a community, there are often individuals who have enough power to change 
institutions (Jentoft, 2004). According to Scott (1995), those individuals, or institutional 
agents, exercise their power via cognitive and normative processes; that is by defining 
what reality is and which values are appropriate in particular situations. In Spermonde 
Archipelago’s capture fisheries, those groups of individuals are elders and patrons, 
especially punggawa bontos.  
Being the respected elements within the community (see Pelras, 2000), elders and 
patrons hold considerable power to influence the way marine and coastal resources in the 
surrounding of their islands nd even in Spermonde Archipelago are distributed. Rules 
operating within IRZs are very much backed up by elders and/or patrons. Rules within 
IRZs of Bonetambung Island, for example, are promoted (and are mainly enforced) only 
by an elder.  
“Prohibition of cyanide fishing around Bonetambung is promoted by our hamlet chief 
(i.e. Ngs). I have tried to convince him that if we [fishermen of Bonetambung] did not 
take the fish [by using cyanide and blast fishing], then cyanide and blast fishermen 
from other islands would. But he (Ngs) is stubborn, he won’t listen to us. [However], no 
one [on Bonetambung] would stand against him….” (IV, Gmd, August 2009). 
Prohibition of using high-explosive ANFO bombs in the immediate surrounding of Barrang 
Caddi Island was initiated by an event in which a hatchery installation owned by Nma (a 
bos on that island) was damaged by blast fishing.  
“Nma [then] prohibits the use of high-explosive [ANFO] bombs in the surrounding of 
Barrang Caddi […], nowadays, no fishermen would dare to do that around Barrang 
Caddi” (IV, Zmh, November 2008). 
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On another occasion on a small island in Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency Spermonde 
Archipelago, the design of an MPA created after days of participatory planning was ruined 
by a single rejection from an influential man who happened to be patron for many 
fishermen participating in the planning.105  
While elders appear to exercise their power to influence institutions managing marine and 
coastal resources in the immediate surrounding their own islands, patrons can exercise 
their power in Spermonde Archipelago. The persistence of open access zones in this 
region, in which cyanide fishermen may still fish, is an example of patrons’ ability to 
influence institutions in this region (see Box 6). 
5.1.4. Diversity of Fishing Methods 
Diversity of fishing methods in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries increases as 
fishermen adopt new fishing methods or equipments. New fishing methods has changed 
fishermen’s fishing behavior, which in this paper, refers to spatial and temporal patterns in 
the utilization of fishing grounds to exploit particular target fish. Adoption of fish 
aggregation devices and stationary liftnet platforms, for example, have changed spatial 
and temporal patterns of marine and coastal resources utilization in the archipelago 
because fishermen or groups of fishermen started to occupy marine and coastal zones for 
longer time period.  
Fishing behavior of fishermen or groups of fishermen shapes the overall interactions in 
capture fisheries in this region, which eventually generates technical externalities. Longer 
possession of fishing grounds and technical externalities between fishing methods have 
created novel situations which require institutional innovations (either by crafting new 
institutions and/or changing the existing ones) in for managing interaction between 
different groups of fishermen and redistribution of marine and coastal resources (see Sub-
chapter 4.3). 
5.1.5. Policy Dynamics at Regional and/or National Levels 
Not all attractors promoting institutional innovations are local in origin. Policies and 
regulations crafted at regional and/or national levels is significant innovative force that 
amplifies the capacity of other attractors in facilitating institutional innovations in capture 
fisheries. The centralized governance system in 1972 (which was a policy formulated at 
                                                 
105
 Interview with Muhammad Neil in April 2008. He is an anthropologist and a former field facilitator of a 
development project carried out in Spermonde Archipelago, 
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national level) was implemented at regional level by dividing coastal waters of Makassar 
into several lower administrative units. Such a division has nowadays amplified the sense 
of territoriality among islanders; an idea conceptualized from spatial discontinuity of fishing 
grounds and patterns of utilization of fishing grounds prior to the existence of boat 
engines. An increasing heterogeneity of fishing methods and an altered technological 
externality in this region is also driven by a national policy (i.e. the first blue revolution). 
The significance of policy dynamics at regional and national levels to institutional 
dynamics in capture fisheries highlights the role of state as an influential institutional 
agent. State, through constitution, has been allocated special powers and prerogatives 
(Scott, 1995) by which state has become an “engine of rationalization” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983) with all its legitimate and coercive policies (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). 
Policy formulated by state (for example fisheries acts) may be used by particular groups of 
fishermen and islanders as basis (i.e. regulative legitimacy) for supporting or justifying 
their actions. The administrative division implemented in the coastal waters of Makassar is 
used as a justification for claiming fishing grounds and excluding cyanide fishermen from 
fishing in the coastal waters of the islands of Langkai, Lanyukang, and Lumu-lumu. Some 
prescriptions in norms of interactions, by which handline and trap fishermen are granted 
with more privilege for exploiting fishing grounds, have emerged from repetitive interaction 
framed by a common knowledge that cyanide fishing is illegal according to state’s law. 
5.2. Diversity of Fishing Methods: The Complex of Preferences for Fishing Methods 
Diversity of fishing methods alters fishing behavior and generates technological 
externalities. My research findings suggest that this is a major driver for the emergence 
and changes of institutions in fisheries within the last five decades (i.e. since the early 
1960s). As important driver of institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture 
fisheries, I here provide discussion to explain diversity of fishing methods as an emergent 
phenomenon; that is a phenomenon surfacing from “collection” of fishermen’s individual 
“free” decisions (Johnson, 2009; Waldrop, 1992). By understanding factors influencing 
collective preference, it is expected that we can have better insights about how diversity of 
fishing methods has actually emerged.  
5.2.1. A Mosaic of Diversity of Fishing Methods in Spermonde Archipelago 
On each of the researched islands, the majority of fishermen have been observed to 
prefer one to two fishing methods, to target particular species of fish within a year. This is 
also the case on other small islands in Spermonde Archipelago (PO, Badi Island, March 
 129 
2009; PO, Badi Island, May 2010; PO, Karanrang Island, March 2009; PO, Karanrang 
Island, May 2010). Such a preference has collectively shaped a mosaic in Spermonde 
Archipelago where each small island is characterized by the use of particular fishing 
methods. Four of the observed fishing methods appear to be the dominant methods 
employed by fishermen of the researched small islands.  
Table 15. Dominant fishing methods on the researched small islands in Spermonde 
Archipelago 
 
Name of Island Dominant Fishing Method in 
Northwest Monsoon 
Dominant Fishing Method in 
Southeast Monsoon 
Langkai Handline fishing Handline fishing 
Lanyukang Handline fishing Handline fishing 
Lumu-lumu Blast fishing Blast fishing 
Bonetambung Trap fishing Handline fishing 
Kodingareng 
Lompo 
Blast fishing Blast fishing 
Barrang Caddi Cyanide fishing Handline fishing 
Barrang Lompo Blast fishing Blast fishing 
Note: Data were collected and triangulated through in-depth interviews and participant observations.106 
There are five factors influencing individual fishermen’s preference for fishing methods 
within a year or during particular seasons. They are seasonal occurrence of particular 
target fish, market demands, patron-client networks, fishing skill, and prevailing local 
institutions on particular islands (IRZs). 
5.2.1.1. Seasonal Occurrence of Particular Target Fish 
It has been explained in Chapter 3 that the occurrence of certain lucrative target fish 
fluctuates seasonally and that fishermen change their fishing methods accordingly (see 
Figure 9). In a focus group discussion with cyanide fishermen of Barrang Caddi Island (in 
November 208), almost all participants stated that they employ handline fishing during 
southeast monsoon to fish narrow-barred mackerels (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, 
November 2008). On the other hand, during northwest monsoon, crews of trap fishermen 
of Bonetambung Island prefer fishing solo to catch octopus (FGD, Bonetambung Island, 
August 2009). 
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 Information about dominant fishing method collected on each island was cross-checked with informants on other 
islands. Through this cross-check, I have noticed that each small island in Spermonde Archipelago have their 
reputation with regard to dominant fishing method employed by fishermen on that island, the method might not be 
the only method employed during the whole year. Hence, a particular fishing method has been commonly associated 
with fishermen from a particular island. Trap fishing, for example, has been associated with fishermen from 
Bonetambung Island, while blast fishing has been associated with, mostly, fishermen from Lumu-lumu Island. 
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To fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago, shifting preference for fishing method has been 
a strategy for coping with seasonal fluctuations of marine and coastal resources. Such 
preference however is temporary and “reversible”. Nevertheless such a preference is not 
merely motivated by the fluctuating resource availability. Market demands are another 
factor that motivates fishermen to change their fishing methods.  
5.2.1.2. Market Demands 
Particular marine species in this region have become lucrative resources through 
commoditization as they are turned into marketable commodity. The existence of the live 
reef fish industry in Spermonde Archipelago provides incentives for fishermen to change 
their fishing methods into methods suitable for catching live reef fish that fit market’s 
requirements. When this industry began in 1990, it brought with it materials, equipments, 
and techniques which were soon adopted and widely practiced by fishermen in this 
region. 
The enduring demand for live reef fish provides incentive for fishermen to maintain fishing 
methods for catching live reef fish (for example cyanide fishing), despite resources 
fluctuations in this region. Thus, some fishermen perform fishing migration to different 
fishing grounds within or outside Spermonde Archipelago to catch live reef fish. Cyanide 
fishermen of Barrang Caddi, for example, temporarily migrate to Kalimantan or Papua 
during southeast monsoon to exploit live reef fish in those regions (FGD, Barrang Caddi 
Island, November 2008). 
Handline fishermen on Langkai Island also migrate to Kendari (Southeast Sulawesi 
Province) to cope with the declining abundance of narrow-bared mackerels in their coastal 
waters during northwest monsoon. Narrow-barred mackerel is seen as a more beneficial 
target fish, and hence fishing migration and maintaining their preference for handline 
fishing have appeared to be a preferred choice (IV, Dhn, July 2009; IV, Anr, July 2009; IV, 
Btg, July 2009). 
5.2.1.3. Patron-client Networks 
Capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago are organized through patron-client 
networks. Mobilization of marine and coastal resources from this region to local and 
international markets is channeled through patron-client networks. In order to supply 
markets with particular marine commodities, patrons provide materials and equipments for 
catching the demanded commodities for their clients. I have found that fishermen’s 
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preference for particular fishing methods is motivated by dominant fishing methods 
employed by patron-client groups which they are part of. 
Particular patrons are specialized in their business, for example, collecting live reef fish. 
Thus, to be the clients of patrons specialized in collecting live reef fish, fishermen have to 
choose among suitable methods for catching the fish. Among these patrons, some 
provide “extra insurance” for their clients; that is protection from being arrested by police 
for using illegal fishing methods. In interviews with cyanide and blast fishermen, they 
confessed that they would not employ those illegal methods without protection from their 
patrons. “If there was no protection (jaminan) from my punggawa [bonto], fishermen would 
not dare using cyanide (bius)….” (IV, Lsr, November 2008). 
Three patrons (one bos and two punggawa bontos) whom I managed to interview have 
explicitly admitted that they do provide some amount of money for certain individuals who 
worked in governmental bodies granted with authority for enforcing state’s law with regard 
to the practices of illegal fishing. This money (they called uang keamanan) is crucial to 
keep their business and clients safe. Without having a “protector”, illegal fishing is risky. 
Lap, a former punggawa laut of blast fishing who live on Kodingareng Lompo Island, 
provided an illustration about how risky it is to carry out illegal fishing without sufficient 
protection from a patron. 
“In 1990, I and my [blast fishing] crews were caught in a joint-operation (operasi 
gabungan). I paid twenty million [rupiah]107 to get my self and my crews released. In 
the next year, I was again unlucky.… I was caught […] and they made me pay seven 
million because I could not pay more…. The last time I got caught […] I could only pay 
one million […] then I finally decided to stop [blast fishing] for good.”108 (IV, Lap, May 
2010). 
5.2.1.4. Fishing Skill and Knowledge 
Although some patrons focus their business on live reef fish, their fishermen voluntarily 
choose fishing methods they want to employ. Patrons provide only options, while decision 
belongs to individual fishermen. Choosing fishing methods is not only affected by what 
equipments and materials a patron can provide. Fishing skill also influences this decision. 
There are at least three different fishing methods employed by fishermen in Spermonde 
Archipelago to catch live reef fish, such as handline fishing, cyanide fishing, and trap 
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 In 1990, IDR 20 million was equal to US $ 1,000. 
108
 See also the reason why fishermen of Langkai Island stop practicing blast fishing (Chapter 3). 
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fishing (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, Badi Island, March 2009; PO, 
Bonetambung Island, August 2009). The latter two fishing methods require diving ability. 
Especially for trap fishing, knowledge about how to locate and disguise the traps in the 
reef is needed.  
“We once tried [using] them (i.e. fish traps) here [on Barrang Caddi Island], including 
my fishermen […] because the result [of using fish traps] seemed good. But we always 
failed. Only knowledgeable fishermen can do that (i.e. using fish traps), like those 
[fishermen who live] on Bonetambung.” (IV, Nma, November 2008). 
5.2.1.5. Local Institutions or IRZs 
Of the researched islands, Langkai and Lanyukang are islands where I could not find any 
islanders employed cyanide fishermen (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009; PO, Lanyukang 
Island, July 2009). On both islands, islanders agree that no cyanide fishermen may live on 
these islands. Hence, no fishermen of these two islands practice cyanide fishing.  
“There is a new family moving from Bonetambung to this island (Langkai), because his 
previous house [on Bonetambung Island] was swept away by waves. People of 
Langkai asked him whether he uses cyanide for fishing. That family is allowed to build 
a house here because he does not use cyanide [to catch live reef fish].” (IV, Rtb, July 
2009).109 
Rules set on small islands (for managing their IRZs) influence not only preference of 
fishermen who live on those islands. They also influence decisions of other fishermen who 
do not necessarily live on those islands, but fish within those IRZs. Those fishermen have 
to employ particular fishing methods which are considered “legal” by islanders who 
manage those IRZs. The following statements illustrate this phenomenon. “We do not 
have to report [our presence to hamlet chief] when we are fishing here [in coastal water of 
Langkai]. We do not use forbidden (terlarang) fishing methods,” said a fisherman from 
Kondongbali Island who caught anchovy using gill nets (IV, Bc, July 2009). 
“I hid my equipments every time I came to Lanyukang. If they (islanders of Langkai) 
came and asked me, I would say that I use handline for catching octopus. When none 
of them were around, then I would prepare my cyanide and started catching groupers.” 
(IV, Lsr, November 2008). 
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 The man actually employed trap fishing (PO, Langkai Island, July 2009). 
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5.2.2. Lock-in Phenomenon of Preference for Fishing Methods 
Diversity of fishing methods in Spermonde Archipelago is the sum of collective preference 
of each island. At certain point, such collective preference appear to experience a 
phenomenon called locked-in; creating a situation where particular islands are dominated 
by fishermen using particular fishing methods.  
“Lock-in is a phenomenon where a technology achieves dominance in the market and 
accordingly has been able to enhance its comparative advantages over many 
decades.” (Cowan and Hultén, 1996).  
Such collective preference for particular fishing methods by islands, however, is not 
simply an “up-scaled” version of individual fishermen’s preference for fishing methods. 
Under Table 15, we can see how each island is dominated by particular fishing methods 
or, in other words, we can see how most fishermen on each island decide to employ 
particular fishing methods.  
Lock-in phenomenon stems from the concept of increasing returns developed by William 
Brian Arthur (Waldrop, 1992). According to Arthur, increasing returns are the tendency 
that which is ahead (in this case a particular fishing method) to get farther ahead, while for 
that which loses advantage to lose further advantage (1996).  He further argues that if a 
technology gets ahead by chance or clever strategy, increasing returns can magnify this 
advantage, and the technology can go on dominating the market (Arthur, 1996). The more 
particular technologies are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the 
more they are improved (Arthur, 1989). Lock-in, at the end, favors particular technologies 
into the standards (Arthur, 1996; David, 1985). 
Of three fishing methods suitable to catch live reef fish, fishermen from the islands of 
Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung end up with two different fishing methods, such as 
cyanide and trap fishing, respectively. Using their smaller and faster fiber-made boats, 
fishermen from the former island use cyanide to stupefy target fish, while fishermen from 
the latter island use bigger boats (locally called jolloro) to carry more fishermen and fish 
several traps (bu).110 In order to explain lock-in of fishing methods in Spermonde 
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 Some rumors, however, say that trap fishermen of Bonetambung Island only use bubu for camouflaging the fact 
that they actually use cyanide to catch live reef fish. However, I did not find any evidence to support this accusation. 
One informant on Bonetambung Island taught me and my research assistant (Soenarto) how to distinguish groupers 
caught by using cyanide and those caught by using traps. At two fish landing locations for live reef fish, we observed 
that almost all the groupers had scratches on their snouts (PO, Bonetambung Island, August 2009). They got those 
scars as they tried to escape from fish traps. Such scratches do not occur if groupers were caught by using cyanide. 
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Archipelago, I compare live reef fish capture fisheries as are carried out by fishermen from 
the islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung. 
5.2.2.1. The Emergence of Live Reef Fish Industry 
Historical events play a crucial role in creating lock-in (Arthur, 1989; Cowan and Hultén, 
1996), including lock-in of fishing methods in Spermonde Archipelago. To understand 
lock-in of fishing methods in live reef capture fisheries, we need to track historical events 
in which the islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung have become central in live reef 
fish capture fisheries in this region. At the same time, it will also explain why the islands of 
Langkai and Lanyukang (as islands situated at shorter distance to the earliest fishing 
grounds for live reef fish in this region) or Lae-lae Island (island from where the first 
cyanide fishermen were recruited) do not become central in live reef fish capture fisheries. 
Chapter 3 briefly explains how live reef fish industry began in Spermonde Archipelago. 
Bentley (1999) also provides a sequence of historical events, started with the 
development of the live reef food fish (LRFF) market in Hong Kong, the depletion of wild 
stocks in the coastal waters of Hong Kong and China, and the expansion of LRFF to 
Philippines, Malaysia, and eastern parts of Indonesia.  
Live reef fish industry in Spermonde Archipelago began as Hong Kong vessels landed on 
Lae-lae Island, where the first groups of cyanide fishermen were recruited and trained (IV, 
Nma, November 2008). Since Lae-lae Island lacked of man power, fishermen from the 
islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung were then recruited by live reef fish 
companies (IV, Nma, November 2008; IV, Uns, August 2009). Fishermen on the latter two 
islands were trained to dive and stupefy live groupers and bring them alive onto boats. At 
the time, diving was not a new to fishermen on both islands. Many of those newly 
recruited cyanide fishermen have had diving experience, because they previously 
involved in tripang (sea cucumbers) collection and blast fishing (IV, Bt, August 2009).  
During their employment with these companies, fishermen were never informed about the 
materials they used to stupefy live reef fish until it eventually leaked (IV, Nma, November 
2008; IV, Zmh, November 2008; IV, Bt, August 2009). Cyanide fishermen of the islands of 
Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung kept this information among themselves. Their main 
motive was to maximize their advantage by keeping competition as low as possible. 
“We did not tell them (fishermen of the islands of Langkai and Lanyukang) what we 
were using [to catch live reef fish]…. If they knew [about the cyanide] they would 
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[probably] also catch groupers. It would be difficult then […] if too many fishermen 
joined (i.e. practiced cyanide fishing).” (IV, Lsr, November 2008). 
Thus, although main fishing grounds for live reef fish in Spermonde Archipelago was reefs 
adjacent to the islands of Langkai and Lanyukang, none of the cyanide fishermen were 
recruited from these islands. Another relevant explanation I have regarding this was given 
by Rtb:  
“They (fishermen of the islands of Langkai and Lanyukang) cannot dive, they are all 
afraid to dive. If they could dive, they would also do cyanide fishing. Most people on 
this island (Langkai Island) came from Maros111. Their ancestors were farmers. That is 
why they cannot dive.” (IV, Rtb, July 2009) 
Information leak is “an accidental event” that today favors the islands of Barrang Caddi 
and Bonetambung as two islands from where live reef fish capture fisheries in Spermonde 
Archipelago are organized. With support from exporters, patrons establish patron-client 
networks that involve fishermen on many small islands in Spermonde Archipelago. Nma, 
for example, organizes fishermen from several small islands in two different administrative 
areas in South Sulawesi Province (i.e. Makassar Municipality and Pangkajene Kepulauan 
Regency). Not all of them are cyanide fishermen (see Figure 10). He claimed to manage 
up to 90 per cent of live reef fish capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago back to 1992 
when he just started his business (IV, Nma, November 2008).  
Information leak is one of three possible explanations why the islands of Bonetambung 
and especially Barrang Caddi are now the centers from where live reef fish capture 
fisheries are organized. The second explanation relates to the geographical situation of 
small islands. Nma once said live reef fish is a risky business. Once he buys live groupers 
from his fishermen, the possible loss (if the fish eventually die) will be on his expense. The 
fish could die because of over-exposure to cyanide or, in the case of trap fishing, sudden 
decompression and exhausted (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, 
Bonetambung Island, August 2009). As an illustration, a US $ 20 grouper could be as 
cheap as US $ 2 by the next morning if the fish died.112 On the other hand, patrons can 
not make daily delivery to the city. They deliver two to thee times a week, depending on 
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 Maros is regency in the mainland of South Sulawesi. 
112
 For the same reason, Us (a trap fisherman from Bonetambung Island) has never kept his catch (live groupers) 
even for a single night. He would ask his crews to deliver the fish to his bos in Makassar as soon as they reached the 
island. Keeping those groupers even for only one night could mean loss of significant amount of money (IV, Us, 
August 2009). 
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the quantity of fish they have. In particular cases, groupers are given special treatments to 
improve their quality, which would take days (IV, Sum, August 2009). 
Considering such a risk, the islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung are 
geographically situated at strategic position. Both islands are situated between the 
previous main live reef fish fishing grounds (i.e. fishing grounds adjacent to the islands of 
Langkai and Lanyukang) and exporters in Makassar (see Figure 2). Nowadays, those 
fishing grounds are no longer main fishing grounds for live reef fish. To catch live reef fish, 
cyanide fishermen from Barrang Caddi Island for example move further to the coastal 
waters of Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency, and even to coastal waters in other provinces 
(FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). However, the fact that live reef fish 
exporters maintain their base stations in Makassar makes business relations with patrons 
on the islands of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung remains persisting. A shift from 
shipping toward air exports of live reef fish (Bentley, 1999), I would argue, motivates 
exporters to run their business from Makassar. Because, although airport is located in 
Pangkajene Kepulauan Regency, government authorities responsible for issuing export 
documents and quarantine are all based in Makassar. 
The third explanation is rather simple. Numerous number of patrons and fishermen 
involve in live reef fish capture fisheries on the islands of Barrang Caddi and 
Bonetambung is more than just a result of clever strategies applied by patrons for 
nurturing their patron-client networks (for example by providing materials and fishing 
equipments, protection, and money and daily subsistence needs). It also has something to 
do with the fact that they are the first to receive financial supports to run live reef fish 
capture fisheries from exporters. Taking an earlier start gives them advantage to expand 
their patron-client networks in Spermonde Archipelago. Sequence of events (i.e. labor 
shortage on Lae-lae Island, financial supports following information leak about cyanide 
fishing, and shift toward air exports) and geographical advantage have turned the islands 
of Barrang Caddi and Bonetambung into important islands for live reef fish capture 
fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago. 
5.2.2.2. Lock-in of Fishing Methods: It is not all about the Money  
Many trap fishermen from Bonetambung Island previously worked for Hong Kong’s fishing 
vessels (companies) as cyanide fishermen. Hence, they are also exposed to similar 
information regarding cyanide fishing (for example materials, equipments, and fishing 
technique) as other fishermen from Barrang Caddi Island. All patrons collecting live reef 
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fish on Bonetambung Island also gain financial support from the same exporters who 
nowadays also support cyanide fishing on Barrang Caddi Island. However, instead of 
employing cyanide, live reef fish capture fisheries on Bonetambung Island rely on the use 
of traps. Fishermen on Bonetambung Island have employed traps to catch live reef fish 
since the middle of 1990s (see Box 7), while fishermen on Barrang Caddi Island have 
used cyanide since the beginning of LRFF fishing activity in 1990. Fishermen on each 
island have used their own preferred method for 15 to 20 years. I began my comparison 
between the two methods by investigating the economic aspects motivating their 
respective preferences for their fishing methods.113  
On Barrang Caddi Island, each group of cyanide fishermen I observed managed to catch 
three to five groupers of different sizes and species. Of those fish, one to two fish were 
super-size groupers, one to two fish were ekoran-size groupers, while the rest were bebi-
size groupers (see Table 7). On Bonetambung Island, each group of trap fishermen 
managed to bring home between ten to 15 live groupers. There were eight to ten super-
size groupers of different species. They also brought with them dead groupers which 
outnumbered the number of live groupers. Together with other dead fish of different 
species (e.g. snappers, parrot fish, etc), each group managed to collect between a half to 
two boxes of fish. Table 16 gives a rough estimation of money earned by each group. 
Table 16. A rough comparison of money earned by cyanide and trap fishing 
 
Fishing Methods Total Income 
(US $) 
Total Fishing 
Expense (US 
$) 
Total Day(s) 
Spent for 
Fishing 
Number 
of 
Crews 
Income per 
Person per Day 
(US$)114 
Cyanide Fishing 16 – 23 5 1 2 3.7 – 6 
Trap Fishing 87 – 113 45 3 4 2.8 – 4.5 
(Source: PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008; PO, Bonetambung Island, July 2009). 
I am aware that the result of the two observations on the islands of Barrang Caddi and 
Bonetambung are only indicative and are not methodologically valid in a quantitative 
sense. However, both trap and cyanide fishermen agree that cyanide fishing better 
income for fishermen. 
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 To begin, I started with observing the total catch per boat per fishing expedition, and then I continued with 
interviewing fishermen about their fishing efforts (i.e. total day(s) spent per fishing activity, number of crew(s) 
needed, amount of fuel and food needed (mentioned in IDR), and total income per fishing activity). In observation, I 
spent one day at one fish landing site on Barrang Caddi Island where I managed to observe the catch of 12 boats of 
cyanide fishermen (in November 2008), and one day on Bonetambung Island where I managed to observe the catch 
of three boats of trap fishermen (in July 2009). 
114
 Income per person per day is earned by dividing net income (i.e. total income is subtracted by total fishing 
expense) by number of crew plus “one extra person” which represented boats and engine. In cyanide fishing, for 
example, net income was divided by three. Punggawa laut, as the owner of boat and engine, hence, receive two 
shares. 
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Box 7. Returning to trap fishing 
 
“The total number [of live reef fish] caught by using traps (bubu) always exceeds [the 
number of live reef fish caught by using] cyanide. [Nevertheless] the income from 
cyanide fishing is higher [than trap fishing], because it (cyanide fishing) requires lesser 
expenses [than trap fishing],” (IV, Bt, August 2009). 
Fish traps have been traditionally employed by fishermen of Bonetambung Island. 
They could not precisely mention when their ancestors started to use fish traps. Sn, 
the oldest person on Bonetambung Island (who at the time of fieldworks was still 
regularly fishing) informed that: 
“Fish traps (bu) have been used even before the Japanese were here (that was 
before 1943). There were six Japanese who lived on this island…. They hired 
me to set fish traps. [But], they way they set those traps was different from 
mine. They dived and then they set those traps along with baits, [while on the 
other hand] I deployed the traps by using rope…. It was the Japanese who 
trained me to dive for setting the traps.” (IV, Uns, August 2009). 
Sn added that trap fishing method was introduced by fishermen from Galesong (a 
kecamatan located in a regency in South Sulawesi Province). Those trap fishermen 
came to the island for fishing migration (sawakung). In every sawakung, they spent 
at least two weeks before returning to Galesong. Fishermen of Bonetambung Island 
learned trap fishing from them. Even at present, fishermen of Bonetambung Island 
still import fish traps from Galesong. 
Before some fishermen of Bonetambung Island worked for orang Hong Kong as 
cyanide fishermen, they were diving to collect sea cucumbers (tripang). Those who 
could not dive used ladung; a metal spear attached to a rope and released from 
boat. Collection of sea cucumbers stopped as most fishermen preferred a monthly-
based salary from working as cyanide fishermen. 
“It is my sons (and nephews) who trained fishermen of Bonetambung to use 
diving masks (he mentioned several names) […] because they were working for 
a [live reef fish] company.… When orang Hong Kong left, fishermen of 
Bonetambung Island start to collect sea cucumbers again. [After a few years], 
fishermen of Bonetambung then start to fish for live reef fish again [….] only this 
time by using traps….” (IV, Sn, August 2009). 
It was Bt and his fellow fishermen who accidentally discovered and developed such 
a technique for catching live reef fish by using fish traps. This occurred, according 
to Bt, in 1995. Afterwards, many fishermen of Bonetambung Island returned to trap 
fishing, but this time, for catching the lucrative live reef fish. 
“We were leaving for sawakung (fishing migration). When we returned, we 
brought with us may live groupers [then] people start to ask, how we did that. 
When I told them [how to], people started to learn [how to use trap fishing to 
catch live reef fish] from us.” (IV, Bt, August 2009). 
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“It is true that we (cyanide fishermen) catch fewer groupers [than trap fishermen]. But, 
because cyanide [fishing] does not require much expense, at the end, the income of 
cyanide fishermen earned is higher than [the income] trap fishermen [earned].” (IV, 
Isw, November 2008). 
Classical economists believe that free competitive markets will always favor the best and 
the most effective technologies (Waldrop, 1992). It often refers to technologies capable of 
providing users with higher financial benefits. Actors are assumed to be fully-informed and 
behave in a uniformly maximizing preference-satisfaction manner (Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis, 2006). The comparison above, however, does not suggest so. Those live reef 
fish fishermen on Bonetambung Island (i.e. trap fishermen) are well-informed about 
cyanide fishing method, its technique, markets, access to protections and financial 
supports, and economic advantage it has to offer; nevertheless they still prefer trap fishing 
over cyanide fishing. Fishermen’s insistence on using traps for catching live reef fish, thus, 
must be motivated by factors other than money. 
5.2.2.2.1. Network Effects 
All my informants rejected an idea that tells patrons make them using whichever fishing 
methods they are choosing. Us, a punggawa laut who leads a group of trap fishermen of 
Bonetambung Island, argued that; 
“[….] Bos or punggawa [bonto] do not tell us which fishing methods we have to use. 
What if we could not use them? That (deciding which fishing methods to be employed) 
depends on us […] because it is us who are going to catch the fish.” (IV, Us, August 
2009). 
On other occasion, Nma also made a statement which supported the previous argument 
made by Us. He said that, “Fishermen decide which (fishing methods) they want to use 
[for fishing]. A bos or a punggawa [bonto] only provides what is asked by our fishermen.” 
(IV, Nma, November 2008). 
Choosing which fishing methods to be employed for catching live reef fish is one of the 
rights of punggawa lauts (see Table 5). Such a decision requires considerations which 
involve more than just their fishing skills and knowledge. The availability of protection from 
being arrested for using illegal fishing methods has been an important consideration for 
employing cyanide fishing method. During a focus group discussion with cyanide 
fishermen on Barrang Caddi Island, all participants admitted that protection from patrons 
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is factor without which they would not have the courage for employing cyanide fishing 
(FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). In a separate individual in-depth interview, 
Bh, a cyanide fisherman, reported the crucial role patrons have in protecting their clients. 
When two cyanide fisherman from Barrang Caddi Island were caught by islanders of 
Lanyukang Island and were sent to police for imprisonment, their patron (i.e. punggawa 
bonto) came for releasing them. 
“Fishermen of Langkai came and seized them (cyanide fishermen of Barrang Caddi 
Island) [….] and took them to a police station in the city (Makassar). Their punggawa 
[bonto] visited them [at the police station] and released them,” (IV, Bh, November 
2008). 
While punggawa bontos of Barrang Caddi Island offer an incentive (i.e. protection) that 
encourages fishermen to employ cyanide fishing, almost all punggawa bontos on 
Bonetambung Island act in the opposite way. Instead of providing protection for their 
fishermen, they refuse to involve in illegal fishing. In an interview, Sum, a punggawa 
pengumpul on Bonetambung Island, explicitly mentioned that; 
“I refuse to buy any fish offered by cyanide fishermen […] and I do not want them to 
work for me. Now, [when I buy live reef fish only from trap fishermen], those people115 
still come to me and ask for some money. They sometimes accuse me of buying these 
groupers from cyanide fishermen…. I have no choice except giving them the money. 
This is annoying […] and that is why I do not want to involve in cyanide fishing.” (IV, 
Sum, August 2009). 
Sum’s statement represents reluctance of many patrons on this island to have cyanide 
fishermen working for them. In addition, Sum said that he would provide any equipment 
for catching live reef fish for his fishermen, except cyanide. Hence, despite the free will of 
fishermen (in this case punggawa lauts) for choosing their preferable fishing methods, 
patron-client network influences fishermen’s decision on fishing methods. The process 
through which fishermen on Barrang Caddi Island decide to employ cyanide fishing is 
similar to that through which fishermen on Bonetambung Island choose trap fishing. Such 
processes are influenced by network effects; situations in which fishermen “voluntarily” 
adjust their preference for mainstream technology (i.e. fishing methods supported by their 
patrons) simply because it is widely used and/or provided, or because fishermen have 
limited choices (Arthur, 1996).  
                                                 
115
 Sum mentioned government’s organizations involve in monitoring fishery. 
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On Barrang Caddi Island, protection from patrons has encouraged fishermen to prefer 
cyanide fishing, while on Bonetambung Island patrons’ reluctance to deal with illegal 
fishing has discouraged fishermen not to choose cyanide fishing. Once fishermen join 
patron-client groups specialized in live reef fish fisheries, they have to choose their fishing 
methods from options provided by their patrons.  
Patron-client groups are sub-networks (i.e. fishing sub-networks) of larger networks of live 
reef fish industry. There are trading and prosecution-insurance sub-networks 
complementing and backing up fishing sub-network (Radjawali, accepted). Protection sub-
networks only exist in situation where fishing sub-networks employ cyanide fishing. The 
fourth sub-networks, which is termed in this analysis as consumption sub-networks, 
consist of consumers in, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore (Bentley, 1999). The 
latter sub-networks are connected to fishing sub-networks through trading sub-networks. 
These four sub-networks form larger networks that sustain live reef fish capture fisheries 
in Spermonde Archipelago, because each sub-network depends on each other creating 
network effects.  
Fishing sub-networks depend on demands from consumption sub-networks, while 
consumption sub-networks need a constant supply from fishing sub-networks. Trading 
sub-networks ensure the availability of market for fishing sub-networks which are 
responsible for constant supply of live reef fish. In such a relationship, both fishing and 
trading sub-networks are financially benefited. Prosecution-insurance sub-networks 
provide “immunity” for fishing sub-networks to ensure that live reef fish demand-supply 
chain is sustained. Without its protection, employing cyanide will be risky for the fishing 
sub-network. Prosecution-insurance sub-networks have interest in sustaining illegal 
fishing method, without which it would lose its significance in the larger network and, 
hence, financial benefit. As sub-networks are depending on each other, none are acting 
as central controller. Instead, the whole network is a self-sustaining network with sub-
networks responding to each other’s needs. This self-sustaining behavior of the four sub-
networks, I would argue, has sustained the use of cyanide fishing in Spermonde 
Archipelago, particularly on Barrang Caddi Island. 
5.2.2.2.2. Local Institutions 
The prevalent local institutions, for example rules within IRZs, do not only influence 
fishermen’s preference for fishing methods. Particular rules also sustain such a 
preference which finally ends up with lock-in of a fishing method. On Bonetambung Island, 
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Gmd is the only punggawa bonto who has cyanide fishermen work for him. With support 
from his bos in Makassar, Gmd could have protected any fishermen from Bonetambung 
Island if they were willing to employ cyanide fishing (IV, Gmd, August 2009). 
Nevertheless, as reported by Gmd, all of his cyanide fishermen live on other islands, and 
none of them live on Bonetambung Island. Fishermen on Bonetambung Island, I would 
argue, could have employed cyanide fishing by working for Gmd or for other patrons living 
on other islands. However, living on Bonetambung Island is their main reason for not 
employing cyanide fishing. On this island, an influential figure, Ngs (the hamlet’s chief) 
strongly prohibits all fishermen of Bonetambung Island to employ cyanide, or else, they 
must not live on the island. 
“I am given duty by government (pemerintah) to protect this area (coastal water of 
Bonetambung Island), and have never left [this island] ever since. We cannot reject 
[duty given by government]. We have to help government. That is why I protect my 
area from cyanide fishermen.” (IV, Ngs, November 2008) 
When I further asked Ngs, what if he finds any fishermen of Bonetambung Island use 
cyanide fishing, he answered that; 
”I will definitely expel him out of this island. But nobody uses cyanide here. If I find any 
of them are using cyanide, I will arrest him and send him to the police by my self. I will 
even beat him first if he live on this island […] [but] they are all afraid of me, [because] 
I do not even care if they were my grandsons or my nephews, I will beat them and 
send them to the police.” (IV, Ngs, August 2009). 
Ngs appears to be the most influential person on Bonetambung Island. It might relate to 
the fact that almost all of fishermen on the island are his family. Ngs once explained that 
(IV, Ngs, August 2009), “Maybe you will not believe [me], here (on Bonetambung island) 
nobody [live] except my grandchildren and nephews.” A survey in which all households on 
Bonetambung Island were covered has found that of the 272 household lived on that 
island, only two households were not related to Ngs’s family.116  
“Here on Bonetambung, fishermen are afraid of using cyanide. Ngs will be angry if he 
notices any of us were using it. Ngs has a bad temper that he will not hesitate to 
physically harm any fishermen who get caught using illegal fishing methods in the 
coastal water of Bonetambung, including his own families. He once punched a cyanide 
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 This survey was carried out by the Student Association of the Anthropology Department, Hasanuddin University, 
Makassar Indonesia.. 
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fisherman from Barrang Caddi [Island], which he later on noticed as his grandson. He 
did not care [though]. People are afraid of him,” (IV, Gmd, August 2009).117  
Although, Gmd emphasized fear as the main reason for fishermen on Bonetambung 
Island not daring to employ cyanide for fishing, some informants on this island mentioned 
that they respect Ngs as their uncle or grandfather, and therefore they voluntarily chose 
trap fishing over cyanide fishing.  
5.2.2.2.3. Investment, Innovation and User Groove-In 
In lock-in phenomena, users become unwilling to switch to other technologies because 
they have invested time and money into a particular technology (Cowan and Hultén, 
1996). This is another reason for both fishermen on the islands of Bonetambung and 
Barrang Caddi for keep doing what they are doing (i.e. preferring particular method over 
another). The time they invested has resulted in improved fishing skills, knowledge and 
experience, which benefits them when continue employing their preferred fishing method. 
Investing time and money for learning another method would be considered risky. Hence, 
they are all reluctant to switch to other fishing methods.  
Having long been accustomed and trained to use traps (see Box 7), fishermen on 
Bonetambung Island have traditionally transferred their skills and knowledge to younger 
fishermen of the island. This process has been localized only on this island, which gives 
those fishermen a competitive advantage over fishermen from other islands. Therefore, at 
the time Bt and his fellow fishermen successfully innovated trap fishing for catching live 
reef fish, it was too late for other fishermen from other island to learn such skills in order to 
compete with fishermen from Bonetambung Island. Therefore, when Nma encouraged his 
fishermen on Barrang Caddi Island to use traps fishing, his fishermen experienced a 
significant loss due to lack of skills and experience. Nma and his fishermen then gave up 
trap fishing method, and returned to cyanide fishing (IV, Nma, November 2008) 
Punggawa lauts of both cyanide and trap fishing fishermen have also invested in social 
networks, especially within their own groups. Each punggawa laut holds social and 
economic responsibilities to his clients (i.e. fishing sawis). One way for a punggawa laut to 
fulfill such responsibilities is to maintain them within their groups. Maintaining their groups 
simply means maintaining whichever fishing methods they are using. This “social 
investment”, in some cases, prevents punggawa lauts from permanently or temporarily 
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 During my fieldworks on Bonetambung Island in November 2008, I found Ngs was in a conflict with a fisherman 
who tried to collect ornamental reef in the immediate surrounding of Bonetambung’s coastal water. The fisherman 
eventually managed to escape when Ngs tried to arrest him. 
 144 
switching to other methods. Lsr, a punggawa laut of cyanide fishing, keep employing 
cyanide fishing for the same reason (IV, Lsr, November 2008). Even during southeast 
monsoon in 2008, when the lucrative narrow-barred mackerels were abundant, he never 
switched to handline fishing. 
“Most cyanide fishermen on Barrang Caddi [switch to handline fishing to] catch 
narrow-barred mackerels (tinumbu) […] but, I do not. I keep diving118. If I fished 
tinumbu, then my friend (his fishing sawi) could not join fishing […] and he would have 
no job (menganggur)….” (IV, Lsr, November 2008). 
Patrons, especially punggawa bontos, also have interest in ensuring that their fishermen 
keep using particular fishing methods they have invested in. Patrons can also be 
considered to be “producers” of fishing methods because they actively promote and invest 
in particular fishing methods through sponsorships. By the beginning of 1992, Nma, for 
example, convinced his fishermen to innovate their boats by making a modification. Such 
modification involves the making of three small holes into the boat’s floor. This 
modification is for reducing the mortality rate of fishermen’s catch.119 When his fishermen 
worried that their boats would sink due to the modification, he made investment by giving 
each of his fishermen some money (around US$ 10) (IV, Nma, November 2008). Such 
sponsorship was proven to be an effective marketing strategy for recruiting more 
fishermen. Nowadays, all boats used by cyanide fishermen from Barrang Caddi Island 
adopt this innovation (PO, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
Together with another innovation in 1997, this “three holes” modification has contributed 
to the lock-in of cyanide fishing on Barrang Caddi Island. In 1997, several boat makers on 
this island started to produce fiber-made boats (locally called perahu fiber). During my 
fieldworks in November 2008, there was at least ten workshops Barrang Caddi Island, 
producing fiber boats not only for fishermen from this islands but also for fishermen from 
other islands (IV, Syn, November 2008; IV, Hsn, November 2008). When compared to 
conventional boats (i.e. boats made of wood), fiber boats have several advantages: 
“The total expense for building a fiber boat is much lower [than for building a 
conventional boat]. [Building a fiber boat] requires less time. It is also more easily 
                                                 
118
 Almost on all occasion, cyanide fishermen on Barrang Caddi Island called themselves divers (penyelam or 
pa’selang) instead of cyanide fishermen (pa’bius). Hence, if a cyanide fisherman said “he dives” it means that “he 
dives for hunting live reef fish by using cyanide”. 
119
 Those holes are made at the middle of the boat where fishermen create chamber for keeping live reef fish they 
caught. The function of the holes is to ensure seawater flows regularly through the chamber. According to Nma, this 
innovation is capable of reducing the mortality rate of live reef fish exposed to cyanide. However, at the very 
beginning his fishermen were all afraid that their boats would sink. Therefore, Nma offered incentives to motivate his 
fishermen to adopt such an innovation.  
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repaired. Fiber boats are faster [than conventional wooden boats].” (IV, Syn, 
November 2008). 
Being faster (due to its lighter construction) has been among the most important features 
cyanide fishermen need. It will enhance their chance for both hunting live reef fish and for 
escaping if they are chased by other fishermen (when fishing within IRZs where cyanide 
fishing was prohibited) or by the police (FGD, Barrang Caddi Island, November 2008). 
While both innovations sustained fishermen’s preference for cyanide fishing on Barrang 
Caddi Island, a significant innovation which took place on Bonetambung Island (i.e. 
innovation of fish traps for catching the live reef fish) (see Box 7), has also sustained 
preference for fish traps.  
Innovations in live reef fish capture fisheries are a crucial factor that helps a technology 
defeats its competitors. Innovations that improve a technology sometimes come as a 
separated package of know-how provided not by the producers of the technology. Users 
(the adopters of the technology) often innovate to optimize the benefit from adopting such 
technology. When such innovations are capable of encouraging major and/or influential 
users to adopt the technology, producer is motivated to reproduce them (see Box 8). 
As cyanide and trap fishermen and their patrons invest their time and money to master 
their fishing methods, they continuously introduce innovations to those methods (either by 
developing new fishing techniques, or by investing in new equipment or technology). They 
create situations within which they are the best in doing their specialties. In other words, 
they create their own niches. The continuous investments made by patrons and fishermen 
create an effect Arthur (1996) has called “users groove-in”. 
Adoption of new fishing methods changes fishing behavior. At a certain point of time, 
fishermen have adjusted their level of convenience and satisfaction to the existing fishing 
methods. In such a situation, users become reluctant to change their “way of life”, and 
hence, they prefer to maintain the use of a particular technology. The case of lock-in of 
gasoline car provides good examples for users reluctance to change their “way of life” 
(Cowan and Hultén, 1996) and the creation of a single standard (Arthur, 1996; David, 
1985) to which users adjust their level of convenience and satisfaction.  
The domination of gasoline car in the market by 1924 affected people’s decision on where 
they lived, how far they would commute, and how they would spend their leisure time 
(Cowan and Hultén, 1996). The use of gasoline car has promoted the growth of middle 
class suburban areas (Cowan and Hultén, 1996). Switching from gasoline car to another 
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technology would mean changing ways of life, and most importantly, adjusting level of 
convenience—something that most people would be reluctant to do, without any 
guarantee that the substitute technology would at least provide the same level of 
satisfaction. Among risk-averse fishermen like those in Spermonde Archipelago, such 
reluctance is amplified by environmental fluctuations and uncertainty. A single standard 
users convenience (Arthur, 1996; David, 1985) is not only a “by product” of lock-in 
phenomena (Arthur, 1996), it is also a positive feedback that strengthens the dominancy 
of a technology over its competitors.  
Box 8. The lock-in of the QWERTY keyboard 
 
5.2.2.3. Path Dependence 
Lock-in phenomenon is path dependence, which refers to a property of contingent, non-
reversible processes (David, 2005). The concept of path dependence is developed from 
Pólya Urn model (see Box 9). Arthur’s generalized his model of lock-in  from this model 
(Leydesdorff and Van den Besselar, nd). In a case each technology has similar chance to 
be adopted; previous adopters of particular technology change the situation in which next 
Lock-in phenomenon of QWERTY keyboard gives a perfect example. Among the 
competing types of keyboard, by the late of 1880s, QWERTY keyboard succeeded 
to convince users and some influential producers to switch their keyboard to 
QWERTY instead of using the previously available types of keyboard (David, 
1985). 
Dominant technology is not necessarily the best technology, indeed the 
“superiority” of QWERTY keyboard rests not so much on its quality. In fact, The 
Hammond and the Blickensderfer keyboard was even convinced to be the ideal 
keyboard as it covered 70% of English languages, with DHIATENSOR keys in the 
home row (David, 1985). An innovation developed later on by its adopter amplified 
preference for QWERY keyboard. Touch typing, a distinct advance over the four-
finger hunt-and-peck method, has caused QWERTY to become locked-in as the 
dominant keyboard arrangement nowadays (David, 1985).  
Nowadays, as potential adopters, we are simply exposed to a single choice since 
all computer and typewriter producers put QWERTY keyboard on their products. 
(Similarly, gasoline cars remain dominating the markets despite the growing 
concerns about air pollution and global warming). QWERTY keyboard has 
entrenched into our daily life and have influenced or shaped our way of life. If any 
computer or typewriter producers are nowadays brave enough to arrange their 
keyboard with any arrangements other than QWERTY, it would take more than just 
an excellent marketing strategy and an attractive discount to convince us, who are 
used to work with QWERY keyboard, to adopt their products. The questions will be; 
are we willing to invest time and money for learning new keyboard arrangement 
and, at the same time, put our projects on risk of being delayed? 
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potential adopters are going to make their decisions. It can be more attractive for potential 
adopters to buy technology that is common in the market (partly because it is widely 
adopted) than one that is rare (Dolfsma and Leydesdorff, 2009).  
Randomness in Pólya Urn model occurs according to one important assumption; during 
initial condition the competing technologies are introduced without any sponsorship 
(Arthur, 1989). However, initial conditions in which fishing methods are competing for 
adopters is not a “sponsor-free” environment. Sponsored situation enhances advantage 
for particular fishing methods in particular locations. Table 17 summarizes some factors 
that favor cyanide fishing on Barrang Caddi Island and trap fishing on Bonetambung 
Island. Beyond general factors on both islands, there are specific factors responsible for 
lock-in of fishing methods on both islands. Those specific factors create condition in which 
preference of potential adopters for particular fishing methods is no longer based on a 
randomized process, even in initial condition. When a fishing method has already become 
dominant on an island, according to the Pólya Urn model, the next potential adopters will 
tend to choose the dominant fishing method over others, simply because the method 
appears to be a common method and is widely provided (Dolfsma and Leydesdorff, 2009). 
Table 17. Factors responsible for path dependence on the Islands of Barrang Caddi and 
Bonetambung 
 
Barrang Caddi Island (Cyanide Fishing) Bonetambung Island (Trap Fishing) 
General Factor 
1. Patrons and fishermen have invested 
in financial inputs, knowledge, skill and 
social networks 
1. Patrons and fishermen have 
invested in financial inputs, 
knowledge, skill and social 
networks 
Specific Factors 
2. Cyanide fishing requires smaller 
expense, thus may provide higher 
income  
3. Patrons actively sponsor this method 
by providing protection and incentive 
in initial condition 
4. Supported by innovations (i.e. “three 
holes” modification and fiber-boat) 
2. Local rules prohibit islanders 
employing cyanide fishing 
method 
3. Almost all patrons do not provide 
protection for illegal fishing 
method 
4. Supported by innovation (i.e. 
trap fishing method for catching 
live reef fish) 
5.2.2.4. Lock-in and Institutional Dynamics 
Although increasing returns tend to position one technology as the winner in markets for a 
very long time, lock-in is not a totally irreversible phenomenon (Cowan and Hultén, 1996; 
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Leydesdorff and Van den Besselar, nd). Cases of QWERTY keyboard (see David, 1985) 
and gasoline cars (see Cowan and Hultén, 1996) inform us that lock-in and lock-out are 
inseparable phenomena; lock-out of certain technologies are caused by lock-in of other 
substitutive technologies.  
Like technology, institutions may experience lock-in when institutional change becomes 
irreversible. Jentoft (2004) provides an example of a phenomenon of institutional lock-in 
from the case of Norwegian fisheries. Ten years of investment in quota system have 
discouraged any proposal for radical reform. It simply happened as those in powerful 
position (i.e. fisheries managers and scientists) have unchallenged authority for defining 
“the appropriate institutions for management”. Hence, institutional lock-in may occur in 
situation when power is centralized to particular stakeholders. Since diversity of fishing 
methods is significant for institutional dynamics Spermonde Archipelago’s capture 
fisheries, will lock-in of fishing methods results in institutional lock-in?  
Through lock-in of fishing methods, particular fishing behavior in Spermonde Archipelago 
will persist, including patterns of interaction between groups of fishermen who fish using 
those methods. Nevertheless, it is considerably difficult to predict that institutions 
emerging from repetitive interactions between fishermen (for example norms of 
interaction) will persist with the persisting patterns of interactions (spelled by lock-in of 
fishing methods). Diversity of fishing methods—despite its significance—is only among 
other drivers for institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. The 
outcomes of fishermen’s repetitive interactions (i.e. the emerging institutions) are also 
shaped by different cognitive, normative, and regulative structures. Those structures 
provide different legitimacy of actions for different groups of fishermen in repetitive 
interactions. 
As an illustration, island-restricted zones (including rules applied within these zones) 
driven by technological externalities between fishing methods eventually emerged in 2000 
despite the fact that such externalities have occurred since 1960, when fishermen in the 
archipelago start to adopt stationary liftnets platforms and fish aggregation devices. 
Hence, lock-in of fishing methods per se would not create institutional lock-in. However, 
diversity of fishing methods and its inherent technological externalities did trigger events in 
which fishermen began to question the way marine and coastal resources were distributed 
among fishermen, especially, with regard to fishing methods they were using. If fishing 
behavior and patterns of interactions between fishermen remain the same, by the 
 149 
occurrence of the lock-in of fishing methods, such situation may potentially hinder 
institutional dynamics.  
Box 9. Two balls inside an urn: The pólya urn process 
 
5.3. Chapter’s Conclusion 
Repetitive interaction between fishermen, especially between those who fish by using 
different fishing methods, is media in which institutions emerge, persist, and change over 
time. Five factors shape the outcomes (i.e. institutions) of the repetitive interaction; they 
are shared-views on natural resources and life, spatial discontinuity of fishing grounds in 
this region, influential figures within community,(institutional agents), policy dynamics at 
regional and/or national levels, and diversity of fishing methods. Some factors interact with 
each other, creating dynamic environments. The development of capture fisheries, for 
example, influence fishermen’s views about natural resources and impacts of ones’ fishing 
activity on others’. 
With regard to the trajectories or trends in institutional dynamics, some factors behave as 
force that “conserve” particular institutions and inhibit the process of institutional 
innovation through which institutions manage interactions between different groups of 
fishermen and redistribute marine and coastal resources under changing circumstances. 
Institutional status-quo also stems from the cognitive structure of institutions. Such a 
structure provides ideas of actions make sense in a given situation for fishermen. Such 
ideas are taken for granted by fishermen.  
Apt to its name, Pólya Urn Model uses an urn containing two balls, for example, a 
white ball and a black ball, to explain its theory. This model assumes a random 
process. In each step, one ball is randomly picked from inside the urn. In this initial 
condition, each ball has exactly the same opportunity to be picked which is 50 per 
cent for each ball. For whichever type of ball is picked up, the ball is then put back 
inside the urn together with an additional ball of the same type (Antal, et al., 2010). 
It means, if it was while ball “lucky” enough to be picked in the first step, then the 
white ball was put back inside the urn with an additional white ball. After the first 
step, we now have two white balls (with 66.66 per cent opportunity to be picked up 
in the second step) and a black ball (with a lower opportunity to be picked up in the 
second step). As it is likely that another white ball will be picked up in the second 
step, the domination of white ball over black ball is going to be altered in the next 
steps. The Pólya Urn model therefore exhibits rich and interesting phenomenon 
that includes strong influence of the initial conditions, where an initial imbalance in 
the number of balls can be locked-in forever (Antal, et al., 2010).  
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“As situation becomes more highly institutionalized, individuals accept and follow 
social scripts, [and] routines […] because they are accepted as ‘they ways things and 
done by person like me in situations like this‘.” (Scott, 1995: 138) 
On the other hand, some factors promote institutional innovations and changes. The 
emergence, persistence, and change of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture 
fisheries occur in situation framed by the interaction between these two forces. 
The obvious impacts of the development of capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago 
are adoption of new fishing methods and improvement of the existing fishing methods. 
Adoption and improvement of fishing methods have driven institutional dynamics, either 
through changing spatial and temporal patterns of fishing grounds utilization and the 
generated technological externalities between different groups of fishermen. Diversity of 
fishing methods emerges from fishermen’s preferences for fishing methods, which is 
influenced by five factors. Preference for fishing methods appears as “collective behavior” 
through which particular islands become dominated by particular fishing methods. 
Domination of particular fishing methods on particular islands appears to be locked in by 
network effects, prevalent local institutions, and by unwillingness of actors to switch to 
other methods considering investments and innovations they had already made and level 
of convenience to which they have adjusted to.  
However, despite the significance of fishing methods diversity for institutional dynamics, 
lock-in of fishing methods would only “lock” spatial and temporal patterns of marine and 
coastal resources utilization and patterns of interaction between different groups of 
fishermen. Diversity of fishing method is among drivers for institutional dynamics. 
Institutional lock-in will only occur if pattern of interactions between different groups of 
fishermen remain the same. On the other hand, such a pattern of interaction is also 
influenced by other drivers, for example policy changes at national and/or regional levels. 
Therefore, hypothetically speaking, lock-in of fishing methods per se would not create 
institutional lock-in in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries.  
Chapter 6. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research and Management 
6.1. Conclusions 
Through a synthesis between theories of institutions and empirical findings, this study 
defines institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries by constructing 
definitions of conventions, norms, and rules with regard to types of possible punishments 
following non-compliance conducts with institutions (Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). In 
such process, it takes into account the prevalent social and cultural settings, especially to 
make the six types of punishment developed by Posner and Rasmusen (1999) relevant to 
local contexts. Only by doing so can “outsiders” understand complex cognitive, normative, 
and regulative structures (Scott, 1995) that regulate interactions between fishermen 
(especially different groups of fishermen) and (re)distribution of marine and coastal 
resources under changing circumstances, and construct meaningful institutional 
statements and classify them into either conventions, norms, or rules. Nevertheless, 
distinction among components of institutions with regard to types of punishment is not as 
clear-cut as suggested by the grammar of institutions. 
In Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries, conventions are institutions that functions 
to create regularity of fishermen’s behavior. Non-compliance with conventions will end up 
with automatic punishments (for example boats crash, loss of fishing equipment, and 
death) and feeling of guilt. Norms are institutions that promote certain values which inform 
fishermen how to behave appropriately in a given situation. If they do not comply with 
norms, they will be punished by both their individual and shared “moral standards” (i.e. 
guilt, sin, and shame). Violating norms will also lead to informational punishments. Rules, 
on the other hand, are institutions aiming at protecting private and common properties. 
Non-compliance with rules will be punished by all delta parameters, except guilt, 
informational punishments, bilateral and multilateral costly punishments.  
In particular case (i.e. when fishermen consider punishing is risky), fishermen tend to 
avoid punishing each other. The same tendency also prevails among patrons; they avoid 
punishing each other. Informants often quoted the dignity of being a merciful person by 
forgiving others (who violated their rights). Such thought stems from their religious belief 
(i.e. Islam). However, both fishermen and patrons are aware of the costs of punishing 
others, especially the costs of bilateral costly punishments, as well as possible future 
benefits of forgiving them. Being reputed as persons with bad or honorable personality will 
improve their social acceptability within community. Such reputations will influence their 
possibility for having helps or assistances when needed (for fishermen) or for recruiting 
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more fishermen (for patrons). However, when the costs of punishing violators are 
distributed among punishers (i.e. multilateral costly punishments) so that each individual 
will bear a relatively “bearable cost”, fishermen and patrons tend to punish violators. 
Social exclusion, either from patron-client groups, fishermen fellows, or families, have 
appeared to be an effective measure to encourage compliance with institutions, especially 
with rules.  
External sanctioning (for example informational punishments, bilateral and multilateral 
costly punishments), however, is not the only mechanism for ensuring fishermen’s 
compliance with institutions. This is because institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s 
capture fisheries encompass more than just regulative structure. The existence of 
cognitive and normative structures makes automatic punishments and internal deltas 
(guilt, sin, and shame) effective mechanisms for encouraging compliance with institutions, 
especially with conventions and norms. Compliance with institutions is also motivated by 
their concept of siri’ and their belief in karma. This shall emphasize the significance of 
incorporating culture in explaining the logic or rationality behind compliance or non-
compliance with institutions. 
6.1.1. Institutional Dynamics 
Institutions for managing capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago experience gradual 
development. Research findings suggest that conventions, norms, and rules did not 
emerge at the same time, but rather gradual. Institutions managing interactions between 
fishermen and distribution of marine and coastal resources gradually developed following 
gradual developments mainly powered by policy dynamics at regional and/or national 
levels. Blue revolution launched in 1969 and implementation of centralized governance 
system in 1972 increased diversity of fishing methods and altered sense of territoriality 
among fishermen. Together, they change the contexts in which repetitive interaction 
between fishermen occurred. Institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture 
fisheries occur along four dimensions; temporal, spatial, situational, and structural. 
6.1.1.1. Temporal Institutional Dynamics 
It appears that, until 1960, capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago were locally 
managed through four general conventions (GC1, GC2, GC3, and GC4). Following wider 
adoption of stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices in this region in the 
beginning of 1960s, three new conventions (NC1, NC2, and NC3) and three rules (R1, 
R2, and R3) emerged to redistribute marine and coastal resources under new 
 153 
circumstances; that was when a smaller portion of potential fishing grounds in this region 
were converted into private-restricted zones (PRZs). Norms of interaction (NI), through 
which interactions between different groups of fishermen are managed, emerged following 
an increasing in the diversity of fishing methods and the occurrence of technological 
externalities between fishing methods. In 2000, island-restricted zones (IRZs) also 
emerged in this region.  
6.1.1.2. Spatial Institutional Dynamics 
Fishing grounds in Spermonde Archipelago have changed from a thoroughly open access 
zones into areas managed through three different spatial institutional regimes. Beside 
open access zones (OAZs), there are island-restricted zones (IRZs) and private-restricted 
zones (PRZs). Institutional dynamics occur as different institutions are applied to different 
zones. General conventions (GCs) and norms of interaction (NI) are applied only to fishing 
activities in open access zones. Fishermen who fish within IRZs or PRZs must surrender 
to particular rules and norms applied to these zones. 
6.1.1.3. Situational Institutional Dynamics 
Institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries have become not only more 
diverse but also more context-specific. Particular conventions (i.e. new conventions), 
norms, and rules are applied only to particular groups of fishermen and/or to interactions 
between fishermen of particular fishing methods. Norms of interaction, for example, 
specifically manage interactions between particular fishermen in particular situations. The 
context-specificity of institutions provides fishermen with solutions for tackling more 
complex situations. 
6.1.1.4. Altered Institutional Functions and Structures 
From 1960 to present, institutions managing capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago 
have transformed from “simpler” institutions (consisting of only general conventions) to 
more complex institutions consisting of rules and norms. It was simpler in a sense that, at 
least until 1960, institutions functioned only to create regularity of behavior. Dispute was 
resolved mainly by prioritizing an understanding between fishermen. Four general 
conventions were crafted from shared-views among fishermen and islanders. Relying only 
on general conventions, until 1960, institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture 
fisheries consisted only of cognitive structure which was created through subjective 
framing.  
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During the institutional transformation, institutions have undergone an alteration of their 
functions and structures. As an illustration, after some areas have been converted into 
private-restricted zones following adoption of new fishing methods, fishermen soon 
realized that they also needed institutions for protecting their interests. Regulative 
structures become prominent with the existence of external sanctioning mechanisms (i.e. 
informational punishments, and bilateral and multilateral costly punishments). 
Routine is not the only carrier for institutions in Spermonde Archipelago. Culture is the 
other (Scott, 1995). In this region, culture provides collective moral standards or values by 
which fishermen defines what is appropriate and what is not. Culture, I would argue, has 
enriched institutions in capture fisheries by adding normative structures. Social structure 
also serve as important carrier of institutions (Scott, 1995) at the level of patron-client 
groups. 
6.1.2. Institutional Dynamics: Institutional Emergence, Persistence, and Change 
Scott suggests that, to understand how institutions emerge and persist, one needs to 
conceive institutions as either cognitive, normative or regulative systems (1995: 89). He 
also suggests that a set of institutions may embrace all of the three structures. This is the 
case in Spermonde Archipelago where institutions in capture fisheries comprise cognitive, 
normative, and regulative structures. 
6.1.2.1. The Emergence of Institutions 
Repetitive interaction in capture fisheries is not only the object institutions strive to 
manage, but also the media through which institutions emerge, persist, and change over 
time. Until 1960, institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries consisted of 
only cognitive structure which is manifested into shared-views on natural resources and 
life. Taken for granted as prescriptions by which capture fisheries are organized, general 
conventions represent cognitive structure of institutions (see Scott, 1995). This is 
especially obvious in the way fishermen explain the existence of general conventions. 
However, when situation changed (because fishermen started to employ stationary liftnet 
platforms and fish aggregation devices since 1960), regulative structure for protecting 
private properties (through, especially, external costly punishments) were constructed. 
Accordingly, rules emerged in Spermonde Archipelago in 1960. Repetitive interaction after 
a wider adoption of stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices soon triggered 
conflicts from which new conventions emerged. 
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Repetitive interaction framed by technological externalities has motivated fishermen to 
construct normative structures for managing interaction between fishermen, especially 
between those who fish by using different fishing methods. Normative structure, from 
which norms emerged, stems from different cognitive, normative, and regulative aspects 
that serve as sources of legitimacy. Historical facts, religion, and institutions in other 
institutional context (i.e. state’s law) provide justifications for such a structure. Values 
contained in the normative structure inform fishermen about which behavior should be 
preferred in particular situations in order to achieve desirable outcomes through legitimate 
means (Scott, 1995; Vatn, 2005). 
Culture and routine are two important carriers of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s 
capture fisheries. While process of institutional emergence facilitated by routine (i.e. 
repetitive interaction between resources’ users) involves more observable processes (for 
example conflict), the process of institutional emergence facilitated by culture, in contrast, 
appears to be a continuous process, involving subjective framing (Nisbet and Mooney, 
2007) of long-term day-to-day interactions with environments (Schlager and Ostrom, 
1999). Such a process is, therefore, relatively subtle.  
6.1.2.2. The Change and Persistence of Institutions 
Institutional change has occurred as new institutions emerge to replace or complement 
the existing institutions. Such changes, for example, alter institutional arrangements for 
managing particular marine and coastal waters, from which private-restricted and island-
restricted zones emerge. Institutional change has also occurred because the existing 
institutions become illegitimate under particular circumstances. Such process is called 
deinstitutionalization, that is the vanishing (DiMaggio, 1988) or deterioration (Scott, 1995) 
of institutions driven by changing circumstances that render current practices or beliefs 
irrelevant (Zucker, 1988). In Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries, institutions 
deteriorate if institutional structures (i.e. cognitive, normative, and regulative structures) 
that previously bring institutions into existence become illegitimate. The deterioration of 
islands rules and island-restricted zones in the surrounding of the islands of Barrang 
Caddi and Barrang Lompo by the middle of 1970s is an example of how 
deinstitutionalization occurs in Spermonde Archipelago.  
While the process of deinstitutionalization above was triggered by an “abrupt” political 
change at local level (in which fishermen’s belief in the legitimacy of gallarangs for 
creating regulative structures eroded), deinstitutionalization in Spermonde Archipelago 
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can also be triggered by changes in the practice of fishing. The establishment of 
stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation devices in the early 1960s has rendered 
certain cognitive structures irrelevant within particular fishing grounds. Hence, general 
conventions were deinstitutionalized within all private-restricted and island-restricted 
zones in the archipelago. 
While changes of institutions have occurred through deinstitutionalization, then, the 
persistence of institutions, therefore, relates to the persistence of cognitive, normative, 
and regulative structures that support particular institutions. As an illustration, the 
persistence of general conventions (and hence open-access zones), despite the changing 
circumstances in the archipelago, is explained by the persistence of shared-views on 
natural resources and life among fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago. This represents 
the persistence of cognitive structure of institutions. 
Persistence of institutions requires, according to Scott, “talking the talk” and “walking the 
walk” (1995: 90). Current practices and belief maintain the existence of particular 
institutional structures. The existing of stationary liftnet platforms and fish aggregation 
devices, for example, maintains the existence of regulative structure by which private 
property is managed or protected. On the other hand, the persistence of cognitive 
structure of institutions relates to the “daily reproduction of religious values”, that is 
through the daily practice of Islam. Shared-views are partly derived from religious views 
about the fundamental role of God as a predetermining factor (i.e. SV1 and SV3). 
Compliance with general conventions is considered by fishermen to be part of their 
identity as a good Moslems. It is, therefore, taken for granted. This revives the existence 
of cognitive structure as among the pillars of institutions that manage capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago. 
6.1.3. Five Drivers, Two Forces: Institutions-as-Equilibria, an Alternative Approach 
Institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago are propelled by five drivers (shared-
views on natural resources and life, spatial discontinuity of fishing grounds, institutional 
agents, diversity of fishing methods, and policy dynamics at regional and/or national 
levels) which, according to their roles in influencing the trajectories of institutional 
dynamics (whether to maintain institutional status-quo or to facilitate institutional 
innovations), can be classified into two forces: conservative and innovative forces.  
Of those drivers, shared-views on natural resources and life have appeared to be the only 
driver that has clearer role as conservative force.  It has facilitated the persistence of 
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general conventions and open access zones in Spermonde Archipelago. While other 
drivers have clearly facilitated institutional innovations, elders and patrons, as institutional 
agents, have shown an inconsistency in their roles. Elders and patrons could empirically 
play both roles, either as agents who promote institutional innovations or as agents who 
conserve institutional status-quo. The previous role was shown in the emergence of IRZs, 
while the latter role was obvious in the persistence of open access zones in the 
archipelago (see Box 6). The emergence, persistence, and change of institutions in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries have occurred in situations framed by the 
interaction between these two forces.  
The fact that institutional dynamics in this region have occurred under the changing 
circumstances brings us to one major approach to understand institutional dynamics; that 
is institutions-as-equilibria approach (see Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Guimaraes and 
Sheedy, 2010). This approach rests on an assumption that; 
“[….] rational individuals, interacting with other rational individuals, continue to change 
their planned responses to the actions of others until no improvement can be obtained 
in their expected outcomes from their independent action.” (Crawford and Ostrom, 
1995: 582).  
This approach, I would argue, puts more weight on routine as carrier of institutions (see 
Scott, 1995: 54-55). Nonetheless, this approach is still useful for understanding 
institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago. There is an important philosophical 
reason in this approach: it places fishermen and islanders—rather than an external or 
third-party enforcer—as main actors in institutional dynamics (Crawford and Ostrom, 
1995). It sees fishing community in this region as able to self-organize in order to cope 
with changing circumstances (Waldrop, 1992). However, there are pitfalls in this 
approach. Firstly, it must be seriously considered that, in many communities, rationality is 
framed by the prevalent social structures, cultural contexts, and local ecological and 
economic settings from which sub-optimal behavior emerge (see Bednar and Page, 
2004), for example the conduct of reciprocity and catch-sharing (see Moran, 1982). 
Secondly, one needs to contextualize and define the meaning of equilibrium. In other 
words, one needs to define the notion of “no improvement can be obtained” (Crawford and 
Ostrom, 1995: 582). My research findings suggest that, the state of equilibrium In 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries relates to power relation between different 
groups of fishermen.  
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Institutional arrangements, through which marine and coastal resources are distributed—
as in norms of interactions (Table 12) and hierarchy of privilege for exploiting marine and 
coastal resources (Table 14), are found to be dictated by power relation between different 
groups of fishermen. Each group of fishermen gains legitimacy (as source of their power) 
from cognitive, normative, and regulative sources of legitimacy which reflects their cultural 
alignment, normative supports, and consonance with relevant rules and laws in fisheries 
(Scott, 1995). Changes in spatial institutional regimes in Spermonde Archipelago illustrate 
a change in power relation between different groups of fishermen. My research findings 
suggest that fishing grounds in Spermonde Archipelago were managed as open access 
zones until 1960. After 1960, private-restricted zones have emerged, followed by the 
emergence of island-restricted zones. Such changes, I would argue, convey a dynamic 
interaction between conservative and innovative forces.  
Open access zones (within which general conventions are applied) are established by 
shared-views on natural resources and life. Until 1960, such views have appeared to be 
the most dominant force. Diversity of fishing methods and emerging territorialities prior to 
1960 could not compete shared-views in influencing institutional outcomes from a 
repetitive interaction. The emergence of new conventions, and different sets of norms and 
rules in 1960 and in 2000, from which private-restricted zones and island-restricted zones 
emerged, indicates a changing interaction between these two forces, in which innovative 
forces begin to gain more power over conservative force. If open access zones indicate 
an “initial condition” of the state of institutional equilibrium, then in 1960 and in 2000 
capture fisheries have experienced shifting of equilibria driven by changing dynamic 
interactions between conservative and innovative forces.  
Those five drivers stem from different social, cultural, ecological, political aspects 
occurring at local, regional, and global scales. The significance of each of these aspects in 
influencing institutional dynamics in capture fisheries has changed over time. Such a 
dynamic will revise interactions between conservative and innovative forces to any 
unpredictable states. Therefore, hypothetically speaking, a shifting to new equilibria is 
always possible because each force gains or loses power to determine the trajectories of 
institutional dynamics.  
6.1.4. Conclusions for Management and/or Policy 
Institutional theories of natural resources management have long been dominated by 
neoclassical economists who provide influential view that only privatization (either by state 
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or private firms) can solve collective action dilemmas which result in competition among 
resources’ users, exploitative behavior and, eventually, environmental degradation (see 
Hardin, 1968). Hence, in crafting institutions for managing natural resources, management 
authorities (i.e. governments and/or development agencies) often over-emphasize the 
regulative aspect of institutions. Hence, institutions are mainly designed for constraining 
users’ exploitative behavior (which is assumed to be) driven by profit maximizing behavior.  
Assuming apolitical explanation for the prevailing illegal fishing practices and over-
exploitation in Spermonde Archipelago (i.e. poverty, lack of awareness and knowledge), 
management strategy so far sought for solutions from the establishment of community-
based marine protected areas (i.e. no-take zones) coupled with local institutional fences 
(i.e. village regulations), and alternative livelihoods (see COREMAP, 2009). However, the 
prevailing illegal fishing practices in Spermonde Archipelago indicates not only resistance 
to management approaches promoted by governments, scientific communities, and/or 
development agencies, but it also conveys that capture fisheries in this region are a 
system capable of learning and self-organizing. Such system actively responds to the 
changing circumstances (i.e. changing management policies) and conditions challenges 
and opportunities for its own advantage (Johnson, 2009).  
Fishermen and islanders in Spermonde Archipelago respond to the changing 
circumstances (which are partly generated by top-down management policy and 
approaches) by crafting institutions to redistribute marine and coastal resources according 
to the state of power-equilibria between resources’ users. The emergence, persistence, 
and change of institutions in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries have occurred 
beyond the knowledge and expectations of governments and development agencies. 
This, I would argue, makes capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago become too 
complex to be managed through top-down resource management policy. Nevertheless, 
through a never ending will to alleviate poverty and to safeguard, in particular, marine and 
coastal resources, government of Indonesia keeps trying to introduce “newly-formulated 
packages of development policies” (Li, 2007) for managing its ample marine and coastal 
resources, including those in Spermonde Archipelago. 
Spermonde Archipelago is, at the moment, the object of at least two management policies 
crafted at two different levels. In August 2007, government of Indonesia took a lead by 
proposing a Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI) in which Spermonde Archipelago is part of the 
5.7 million kilometer square of marine and coastal waters managed under this multilateral 
marine and coastal resources management scheme. CTI covers marine and coastal areas 
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in six Indo-Pacific countries such as Indonesia (Central and Eastern), Philippines, 
Malaysia (Sabah), Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste (Coral 
Triangle Initiative, 2010). At national level, the second Indonesian blue revolution has 
been started. Marine and coastal water within Spermonde Archipelago is among target 
locations of this national program according to the Ministerial Decree of Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (i.e. Keputusan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Republik Indonesia 
No. KEP.32/MEN/2010Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, ).  
Coral Triangle Initiative and the second blue revolution have similar goal; to alleviate 
poverty and to sustainably manage marine and coastal resources (see Coral Triangle 
Initiative, 2010; Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2010b). However, each of them 
gives different weights for different priorities which would deliver different impacts on 
marine and coastal resources management in Indonesia, particularly capture fisheries in 
Spermonde Archipelago. Coral Triangle Initiative emphasizes on the importance of 
protecting “the region’s extraordinary marine and coastal biological resources” as 
“biodiversity bank and food factory”, especially as major spawning and nursery ground 
and migration area for “commercially important tuna species, which support multi-billion 
tuna industry” (Coral Triangle Initiative, 2010). CTI seeks a regional cooperation in 
protecting Coral Triangle region through networked marine protected areas. The second 
Indonesian blue revolution, on the other hand, strives to nominate Indonesia as world’s 
biggest producer for marine and fisheries products by 2015 (see Ministry of Marine Affairs 
and Fisheries, 2010b). As capture fisheries are no longer seen as a promising sector, 
aquaculture, particularly mariculture is projected to be the leading sector to achieve the 
new era of “ocean economics”, in which marine and fisheries resources are expected to 
fuel the development of national economic. In the strategic planning, mariculture is 
expected to contribute as much as US$ 47 billions per year while, on the other hand, 
marine capture fisheries are “only” expected to contribute as much as US$ 15 billions per 
year (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 2010). 
Small islands in Spermonde Archipelago are among potential targets of interventions of 
this second blue revolution. Small islands are projected to be units of production through a 
concept called minapolitan—that is an effort to accelerate the development of marine and 
fisheries productions at the prospective areas or locations. The minapolitan is designed to 
improve the existing potency of marine and fisheries production by enhancing large-scale 
production of high-valued and marketable commodities, and the establishment and 
empowerment of community’s organization. Improvement of fishing technology and 
development of hundreds of mariculture areas, establishment of micro-small-medium 
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scales enterprises for supporting exports, establishment system for financing marine and 
fisheries production are among its strategies (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, 
2010b). 
Both CTI and the second blue revolution potentially change circumstances in which 
capture fisheries occur. Promotion of mariculture in Spermonde Archipelago, for example, 
can potentially convert more open access zones and/or island-restricted zones into 
private-restricted zones owned by individuals or groups of islanders. It will change spatial 
pattern of marine and coastal utilization, and alter interaction between resource users. 
Integration into global markets, for example through live reef fish industry, has changed 
the structure of patron-client groups, marginalized fishermen, encouraged a more 
exploitative fishing behavior, and altered islanders’ vulnerability to food security. This new 
optimistic projection to increase fisheries production (either by mariculture and capture 
fisheries) and exports through minapolitan shall raise a question; who will mainly be 
benefited from such a policy?  
On the other hand, the shared-interests between countries in the Indo-Pacific have 
promoted a networked governance for protecting Coral Triangle region, through which a 
horizontal governance (as an opposite to hierarchical bureaucratic system)  consisting of 
multi-organizational and multi-governmental relationships (Eggers and Goldsmith, 2003) is 
expected to make the contemporary management systems responsive to complex but 
interlinked problems (Dedeurwaerdere, 2005), for example dynamics of the geographically 
and ecologically related but institutionally fragmented ecosystems (Carlsson and 
Sandström, 2008) such as Coral Triangle region. Such a collaborative initiative includes 
complementary ad hoc organizations focusing on different types of knowledge and 
interests and state and local government agencies (including NGOs and private sectors) 
(Dengler, 2007; Eggers and Goldsmith, 2003; Elliott, 2011), creating Coral Triangle a 
space where interests and power are contested (Dengler, 2007). It is not clear how this 
“regional and global interests” to safeguard biodiversity and important nursery and 
spawning grounds would benefit fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago whose livelihoods 
depend on capture fisheries. Answers to the question of how such reserves will contribute 
to fisheries outside reserves is less well understood, while decisions on which the size 
and spacing of MPAs are based depends on modeling since there is no empirical 
information available regarding the dependence of yield and sustainability on size and 
spacing of marine reserves (Bostford, et al., 2006). MPAs in Indonesia are mainly 
established from biological perspective and are lack of successful “social story” (Christie, 
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2004). Hence, it is not clear how the establishment of networked MPAs in Spermonde 
Archipelago (as part of Coral Triangle) will directly benefit fishermen and islanders. 
Fishermen and islanders have actively responded to changing circumstances in 
Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries. Such responses are not predictable. Instead 
of a reduction in illegal fishing activities, blast and cyanide fishing persist and fishermen 
and islanders craft new institutions to redistribute marine and coastal resources, to fit to 
new circumstances. There could be many unpredictable scenarios through which capture 
fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago change and institutional dynamics occur. The 
prevailing process of institutional dynamics documented in this research suggests that 
capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago are a complex adaptive system. Managing 
such system requires an alternative approach rather than conventional top-down 
management policy that over-emphasizes on regulative approach per se. Governments 
and development agencies must be able to “escape” from their own assumptions that the 
prevailing illegal fishing practices and over-exploitation in Spermonde Archipelago are 
driven by local factors. They must consider the impacts of their interventions on the 
changing interaction between resources’ users, and pay more attention to the global-local 
connectivity, for example the whole network through which capture fisheries and illegal 
fishing practices in this region are sustained and the impacts of integration of capture 
fisheries into international markets on capture fisheries and fishing community. They must 
also seriously take into account social structures and cultural contexts that prevail within 
community in formulating present and future management policies and approaches. 
6.1.5. Capture Fisheries as a Complex Adaptive System 
Much of government’s perspectives on management of marine and coastal resources rely 
mainly on schemes to control the flow of specific resources into economy, that is by using 
fixed rules for achieving a targeted yield (Folke, et al., 2007). In doing so, strategy for 
balancing exploitation and conservation is often the case; that is by having a controlled 
level of exploitation (i.e. maximum sustainable yield) coupled with establishment of marine 
protected areas (Pitchford, et al., 2007). The latter strategy, although has been widely 
implemented in Spermonde Archipelago (through the so-called community-based no-take 
zones) does not show any promising results so far (see Baitoningsih, 2009). Blast and 
cyanide fishermen in Spermonde Archipelago demonstrate a quality of resistance, hence, 
Spermonde Archipelago remains a “hot spot” of illegal fishing practices in Indonesia 
(Destructive Fishing Watch Indonesia, 2003). However, such resistance, I would argue, 
informs us that capture fisheries and marine and coastal resources management in this 
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region are not amenable to conventional management strategies. Capture fisheries in this 
region exhibit a behavior that only complex adaptive system has. They are complex 
because various independent agents are interacting in many different and unpredictable 
ways and are adaptive as they do not just passively respond to changing circumstances, 
but actively try to turn whatever happens into their advantages (Waldrop, 1992). 
Johnson (2009) compiles key components of a complex adaptive system of which four 
can explain why capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago are difficult to be managed. 
Those components are; (1) the system contains a collection of many interacting 
independent agents whose behavior is affected by memory or feedbacks, (2) the system 
exhibits emergent phenomena arising in the absence of “central controller”, and (3) the 
system shows a complicated mix of order and disorder. 
6.1.5.1. Multiple-agent Interactions and the Role of Feedbacks 
Agents influencing institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries 
exist as different entities. They are individual agents, such as a fisherman, a patron, and 
an elder, and collective agents such as a group of fishermen, a patron-client group, and 
state. Each agent shows their capacity to learn from past experience and uses the stored 
feedbacks (i.e. memories and/or experience) to process new information to respond to 
new circumstances or changes their strategies accordingly (Johnson, 2009). Fishermen 
(i.e. punggawa lauts), for example, change their fishing methods according to the stored-
knowledge about seasonality and the availability of target fish), opportunities provided by 
markets, and subsidies promoted by their patrons. Because they are parts of patron-client 
groups, every decision taken by fishermen will serve as information to which patrons will 
respond, and vice versa. Within these networks, one agent’s decision serves as 
information for others on which their decision will be fully or partly based.  
Given the legitimate coercions (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985), state has appeared as 
influential agent who actively contributes to policy dynamics in capture fisheries. State’s 
interventions (i.e. law enforcements and development projects supported by development 
agencies), may originally stem from its governmentality120 (Li, 2007) or may be a response 
to the prevailing illegal fishing practices and over-exploitation in Spermonde Archipelago. 
As influential and legitimate institutional agents, state interventions have served as 
feedbacks to which fishermen and islanders “adjust” norms, conventions, and rules to fit 
                                                 
120
 Li defines governmentality, or government rationality, as the conduct through which government sets the 
“desirable or prioritized outcomes” for citizens or societies to be achieved through a calculated process/intervention  
(2007: 6) 
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new circumstances created by such interventions. This important role of feedbacks has 
made interactions between agents involving in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries 
becoming more complex (Johnson, 2009).  
6.1.5.2. Emergent Phenomena in the Absence of a “Central Controller” 
The complex and continuous interactions between agents raise emergent phenomena. 
Such phenomena are surprising in that they could not have been predicted base on 
knowledge of the properties of individual agents or actors (Johnson, 2009; Waldrop, 
1992). An understanding on the emergence and persistence of conventions, norms, and 
rules in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries can only be gained from an analysis of 
interactions between actors involving in capture fisheries, for example different groups of 
who fish by using different fishing methods. 
Institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s capture fisheries is an emergent 
phenomenon. Institutions have emerged, persisted, and changed over time without any 
agents or group of agents acting as “central controller”. This is a characteristic of 
emergent phenomena (Johnson, 2009). Although patrons and elders have appeared as 
influential institutional agents capable of determining institutions for managing marine and 
coastal resources in the immediate surroundings of their islands, such authority is not 
unchallenged. In fact they fully consider interaction between different fishing methods, 
especially between fishing methods used by the locals and outsiders (Glaser, et al., 
2010a).  
The absence of centralized mechanism in the process of institutional dynamics in this 
region, I would argue, has provided the most favorable condition for coping with 
geographical and climatic issues (that constrain communication between islanders) and 
with diversity of fishing methods for fishermen and islanders (Deswandi, 2010). Such a 
bottom-up process, through which institutional dynamics in Spermonde Archipelago’s 
capture fisheries occurred, provides more chances for flexibility and creates sufficient 
room for creativity to cope with changing situations (Waldrop, 1992). This is an ideal 
condition in situations full of surprises and uncertainty (Berkes, F., et al., 2003), like 
situations in Spermonde Archipelago. 
6.1.5.3. The Edge of Order and Disorder 
Johnson points out a natural tendency for something that is ordered to become “naturally” 
disordered as time goes by, while something that is disordered is very unlikely to order 
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itself without any additional help (2009: 25). This is also the case for institutional dynamics 
in Spermonde Archipelago. Research findings suggest that, at least, two phases of 
disorder have occurred in 1960 and 2000. Until 1960, capture fisheries operated with four 
general conventions managing distribution of marine and coastal resources and 
interactions between fishermen in this region. In 1960, of stationary liftnet platforms and 
fish aggregation devices turned such an order into disordered. In order to restore order in 
capture fisheries, fishermen crafted new conventions and rules. In between 1960 and 
2000, some institutions emerged while other vanished for creating order from disorder 
fueled by, especially, technological externalities. In 2000, fishermen and islanders once 
again ordered capture fisheries after a serious disorder manifested itself into a horizontal 
conflict.  
The ability to shift between order and disorder, which is facilitated by feedbacks, is a 
characteristic of a complex adaptive system (Johnson, 2009). Internally-stored feedbacks 
from previous experience (for example shared-views on natural resources and life) and 
feedbacks from new circumstances facilitate self-reorganization in the creation of order 
(i.e. equilibria) through emergence of new institutions and change, deterioration, and/or 
persistence of the existing institutions. 
6.2. Implications for Future Research and Management 
Looking at capture fisheries in Spermonde Archipelago as a complex adaptive system 
brings methodological consequences for future research. Instead of giving a very detailed 
attention to every component that builds capture fisheries, research in complex adaptive 
system focuses on the changing pattern of interactions between components as the result 
of their ability to process information from their environments, to learn from each others’ 
actions, to internally store memory and experience, and to provide feedbacks for their 
environments.  
Methodological breakthrough that uniquely distinguishes complex adaptive system 
approach from other traditional approaches is that complex adaptive system analysis 
uncovers connections between subsystems which were previously considered 
unconnected (Johnson, 2009). Traditional approach that tends to focus on providing a 
detailed knowledge on a specific issue (and, hence, tends to “neglect” its interactions with 
other issues prevailing at different scales and levels) would appear to be useless for 
providing explanations about how institutions managing interactions between different 
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groups of fishermen and distribution of marine and coastal resources in Spermonde 
Archipelago have developed over time.  
A complex adaptive system is  not amenable to conventional resource management 
approaches that stress on command-and-control (Plummer and Armitage, 2007). 
Therefore, this shall be an alternative approach for policy formulation in Spermonde 
Archipelago. Complexity focuses on phenomena emerging from a collection of relatively 
simple components (Johnson, 2009) and is started by understanding “simple behavior” of 
each component (for example individuals or groups of fishermen), that is how they actively 
respond to particular situations and interact with each other in the ever-changing 
circumstances (Waldrop, 1992). Complexity is also analogous to the study of networks 
(Johnson, 2009). Hence, complex adaptive system analysis provides a new perspective 
for integrated coastal zone management, with far-reaching methodological implications.  
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Annex 1. Guidelines for Interview 
1. Institutions 
Expected data:  
- Institutions managing interactions between fishermen, especially between different 
groups of fishermen (those who fish by using different fishing methods) 
Preliminary questions: 
- How do fishermen who fish by using different fishing methods manage to fish 
within the same fishing grounds? 
 
Expected data: 
- Institutions managing distribution of marine and coastal resources 
Preliminary questions: 
- Who may (may not) fish at fishing grounds in the surrounding of this islands? 
- Are there particular fishing grounds allocated only for particular fishing methods? 
 
Expected data: 
- Cognitive, normative, and regulative structures of institutions 
Preliminary questions: 
- Why particular regulations (aturan-aturan) exist and operate as they do? 
 
2. The development of capture fisheries 
Expected data:  
- Historical events/milestones that contributed to institutional dynamics 
Preliminary questions: 
- What fishing methods were used by fishermen in the past, and since when? 
 
Expected data: 
- Preferences for fishing methods 
Preliminary questions: 
- Why do you choose fishing method you are using? 
- Do you always use the method? 
- What fishing method is preferred by fishermen of particular islands, and why? 
 
3. Structure of patron-client groups 
Expected data: 
- Roles, rights, and obligations of each actor within groups 
 
Preliminary questions: 
To fishermen: 
- Do you currently work for a patron (punggawa)? 
- Why do you decide to work for your current patron? 
- Who was your patron before? 
- What do you need/expect from your patron? 
 
To patrons (punggawa bontos/punggawa lauts) 
- When did you start your business? 
- What is/are your obligations as patrons? 
- What are the differences between patron-client groups in the past and those at 
present? 
- What do you need/expect from your fishermen? 
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Annex 2.  Guidelines for interview for mapping of patron-client networks 
 
 
Interviewer: Date (dd/mm/yyyy): 
 
Time of Interview: 
 
 
Mapping of Patron-client Networks 
 
1. Name of Informants: ____________________ 
 
2. Address (Village, Island, RT, RW): ____________________ 
 
3. Type of Business (jenis usaha): 
 
4. To where do you sell the harvest, to whom? 
 
5. Do you have any collectors (punggawa bontos) and/or fishermen on other islands? (If 
yes, proceed to question 6) 
 
6. On which islands do your fishermen (pa’boyas), clients (non-fishing sawi), collectors 
(punggawa bontos) live, and how many are they? 
 
Pa’boya Sawi Collectors No. Name of Island I NI I NI I NI 
1  
 
      
2  
 
      
3  
 
      
4  
 
      
5  
 
      
6  
 
      
7  
 
      
Note: I = indebted, NI= not indebted. For pa’boyas, explain which fishing methods they are 
using! 
 
7. Do you still want to increase the number of your fishermen and collectors?  
a. If yes, from which islands do you prefer and why? 
b. If no, why? 
 
 
8. Have you ever expelled your fishermen and/or collectors? 
a. If yes, why? 
b. If no, why? 
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